Mobilizing local revenue capacities of African cities: Johannesburg and Nairobi by Kithatu-Kiwekete, Angelita Kuasa
i 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MOBILIZING LOCAL REVENUE 
CAPACITIES OF AFRICAN CITIES: 
JOHANNESBURG AND NAIROBI  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Angelita Kuasa Kithatu-Kiwekete 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management at 
the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg in fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.  
 
 
Supervisor: Professor Mohammed Jahed 
 
 
September 2015 
ii 
 
DECLARATION 
 
 
 
I declare that the Thesis 
Mobilizing Local Revenue Capacities of African Cities: Johannesburg and Nairobi  
 
hereby submitted to the University of the Witwatersrand for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy has not previously been submitted by me for a degree at this or any other 
university, that it is my own work, and that all material contained has been duly 
acknowledged. 
 
 
 
.......................................... 
 
Signed 
Angelita Kuasa Kithatu-Kiwekete 
September 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
DEDICATION 
 
To my Lord God YAHWEH, who makes my feet like hind feet and lifts me to my high 
places; 
Joyce Mwikali Kithatu my beloved mother;  
the late Benjamin Kithatu and the late Geoffrey Matthews Kakuli, who set the education 
precedent and the footprints that I follow;  
Hope Mugagga my husband and life partner, who has unwaveringly supported this project; 
and to Linda Kithatu, Oliver Kithatu; Edna, Seli and Merab Lusweti; Mahala Harisson; 
Keziah and Kirsten Mugagga who keep me grounded as an African woman who is God’s 
child. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
ABSTRACT 
Public finance literature has minimally engaged the fiscal autonomy of African local 
governments, and cities in particular. African cities should independently generate a 
significant portion of revenue locally in order to finance a varied range of municipal services 
to a diverse municipal population. This study aims to provide insight through the contextual 
analysis of the revenue assignment function of African cities. The study explores fiscal 
discretion and appropriation as a reflection of local fiscal autonomy and how these manifest 
in local revenue instruments. The study employs an illustrative case study methodology on 
Nairobi and Johannesburg by means of an examination of local revenue generation 
particularly water revenue and municipal borrowing to examine the contrasting experience of 
local fiscal autonomy of these two cities. 
 
The legal and institutional frameworks of these cities provide for an array of OSR. Previously, 
local revenue tools did not address the financing needs for municipal services of 
infrastructure required to cater for the growing and diverse municipal populations. A national 
process of local government restructuring compelled the cities to realign local structures to 
enhance revenue mobilization in order to address the challenge of municipal service delivery. 
The regulatory environment was also amended to effect intergovernmental transfer 
arrangements as well as particular local revenue instruments in each case. 
 
In Nairobi, the structural and legal changes have effectively entrenched the centralist nature 
of the Kenyan government, severely limiting the city’s autonomy with regard to water 
revenue. The city’s fiscal capacity for municipal borrowing has been left largely unchanged 
by Kenyan local government reform. In Johannesburg, the democratic dispensation has 
enforced local fiscal autonomy that was evident in the apartheid white local authorities. The 
mammoth task of centrally managing all the city revenues has brought to the fore 
administrative challenges particularly regarding water revenue; however, the city’s fiscal 
capacity has improved its state of municipal borrowing. These findings confirm the 
decentralization rationale. Fiscal decentralization is thus important for asserting the function 
of revenue assignment to enhance local fiscal autonomy. The two case cities show that local 
capacity and the historical role of central government are important in ascribing and 
manifesting this function. 
Key words: revenue assignment, local fiscal autonomy, cities, water revenue, municipal borrowing, revenue 
autonomy 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE RESEARCH  
 
A key issue that has been raised in public finance literature is how much revenue local 
government should be allowed to generate independently. The elements of a holistic fiscal 
decentralization programme require the national legal and structural processes to assure that 
local government accesses revenue independently as well as through designated channels 
from central government (Bahl & Martinez-Vazquez, 2006; Smoke 2001). While the need for 
intergovernmental transfers is acknowledged in the local revenue function, emphasis on local 
fiscal autonomy is reiterated to enhance local capacity to generate revenue (Bird, 2000; Oates 
1999; Rosen, 2005). The proximity between local expenditure and revenue enables sub-
national government to have a better handle on generating revenue that is directly connected 
with municipal expenditure needs (Bahl, 1999a; Denters & Lawrence, 2005; Slack, 2002).  
 
Internationally, most of the evidence on the revenue assignment aspect of fiscal 
decentralization is located in the realm of developed countries (Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez & 
Wallace, 2002; Dollery, Garcia & Le Sarge, 2008; King, 1993; Laubach, 2005; Oates, 2012). 
These studies examine the use of hard budget constraints to improve local fiscal discipline. In 
addition, the authors also reflect on how alternative revenue tools streamline local efficiency 
in the revenue assignment function within the context of an established regulatory framework 
and an economic base that provides the municipal tax base for local authorities. More 
recently, alternatives to improve the urban fiscal stress of these economies are proposed by 
Dethier (2013). Conversely, much of the published literature on revenue assignment in 
African local government examines local revenue which does not constitute trading services 
or the financing tools for capital expenditure. An example is the frequent investigation of 
property taxes in the context of the respective country. Another example is the use of 
business taxes as a local source of revenue, for instance, the Single Business Permit 
experience in Kenya; the Regional Services Levy in South Africa; and market licensing in 
Ghana (Asibuo, 1998; Bahl & Solomon, 2003; Devas & Kelly, 2001; Fjeldstad & Semoboja, 
2000; Franczen & Olima, 2003; Kelly, 2000). 
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Smoke, Bahl, Reschovsky, Shroeder, Solomon, & Vos (2003) find that restructuring in South 
Africa’s sub-national government affects local finance. These authors suggest that additional 
research to unpack the intricacies of reform initiatives in developing countries that 
“determines the impact of reform” on local revenue as well as “recognise more explicitly the 
political nature of decentralization” (Smoke et al.:2003: 278, 280).  
 
Bahl & Linn (1992) examine the fiscal, administrative, and political considerations that are 
involved in costing the supply of water services, property taxes, and intergovernmental 
transfers in urban cities of selected developing countries to make the case for fiscal 
decentralization. Cowden (1968) reflects on the fiscal autonomy of white local authorities 
(WLA) in South Africa and the manner in which the regulatory framework enhances the 
interplay of local fiscal discretion and appropriation in generating local revenue. These two 
studies point to the importance of local fiscal autonomy in urban authorities.  
 
This study drew on the experience of water revenues and the underlying implications for 
municipal borrowing to reflect on the peculiar presence of local fiscal autonomy in African 
cities. Whereas water revenues are an important revenue source for African local government, 
the underlying importance of this instrument lies in how trading services with the resultant 
revenues affect the borrowing powers of local authorities and how urban authorities may 
appropriate revenues for other services as well as for the equitable distribution of municipal 
services. Therefore, this thesis aimed to enhance our understanding of how country contexts, 
particularly in Africa, manifest local fiscal autonomy in light of local government 
restructuring and evolving legal framework.  
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1.2 AFRICAN CITIES AND THE NEED FOR LOCAL REVENUE 
 
Urban authorities are faced with particularly difficult financial 
problems because the standard of services required by large and ever 
increasing populations living in overcrowded and unhygienic 
conditions is much higher than in rural areas and the range of 
services needed may also be greater. In particular the present sources 
of revenue available to local authorities are not sufficient to provide 
such a level of services. 
                   (Nuhu, 1972: 252) 
 
The statement made above on the state of Nigerian local government in the 1970s reflects the 
contemporary concerns of African cities. The upward trend of the urban population in 
African cities is unprecedented in the continent’s history (UNHabitat, 2014: 17; UNHabitat, 
2008: 4). The population and the number of Africa’s large cities increased more than thirty 
times in the period between 1950 and 2005, for instance, in two cities, Lagos and Cairo, each 
with a population of over one million residents at the time, to over forty African cities with a 
combined urban population of over 110 million residents. In 2011, 52 African cities had 
populations of over one million inhabitants (UNHabitat, 2014: 23; UNHabitat, 2008: 26). The 
spurt in the number of urban residents in African cities is attributed to various factors which 
include demographic trends and government policies, as well as changes in the status of local 
governments.  
 
The escalating demographic gradient is an important contributor to the continuous increase in 
African urban populations as illustrated by the natural population growth (UNHabitat, 2014: 
17). Africa’s urban population may also be positively influenced by the concentration in 
urban areas of national economic policies that promote investments and economic 
opportunities in these cities. The phenomenon of urban primacy has also caused several 
African capital cities to become the foci for economic and political investment; examples 
include Dakar, Senegal’s capital and Kampala, Uganda’s capital (UNHabitat, 2009a: 26-29). 
Furthermore, the reclassification of cities, particularly those in Africa, has increased the 
number of cities and as a result, increased the continent’s urban population (UNHabitat, 
2009a: 36). 
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The growing number of urban residents remains an important resource for the economic 
development of Africa’s cities; additionally the subsequent increased economic activity 
positively influences the gross domestic product of the cities’ respective countries. Cities that 
have been able to benefit from strategic economic positioning and have become important 
economic contributors in their respective countries include Nairobi and Johannesburg. 
Conversely, these two cities, like most cities in developing countries facing rapid 
urbanization, also have to contend with the critical issues of urban inequalities that are 
evident in the concentrated areas of slums and informal settlements in these cities (UNHabitat, 
2009a: 97, 119).  
 
The provision of critical municipal services to these marginalized areas remains rudimentary 
and thus continually requires redistributive alternatives with financing consequences. 
Municipal revenue mobilization must take into cognizance the affordability of critical 
municipal services to certain sectors of the municipal population that require access and 
utilization of the said utilities. Furthermore, the basic level of municipal services offered by 
cities must align with prescribed national and international standards to ensure equity and the 
realisation of individual human rights (CoJ, 2006a: 12-12; Heyns, 1995; NCWSC/AWSB, 
2009; UNHabitat, 2014: 19).  
 
These are some of the issues that exacerbate the revenue challenges facing African local 
governments. Particular African cities, however, operate within a regulatory framework in 
which specific municipal services are considered to be trading services and in which the cities 
also have access to finance development capital (UNHabitat, 2009b; Cowden, 1968). These 
cities report that they are thus able to generate significant local revenue to finance municipal 
expenditure (NCC, 2010; CoJ, 2011). It is in the context of the respective country legislative 
framework that both cities are considered to be at the forefront of local fiscal evolution. 
Cognizance of the unique challenges associated with local fiscal autonomy has yet to be 
revealed across comparably sized African cities. The following section portrays the fiscal 
architecture of Nairobi and Johannesburg to highlight their vast financing need that is 
intended for municipal services. 
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1.2.1 The City of Nairobi 
 
Figure 1.1: Nairobi County 
 
Source: UNEP
1
 
 
Nairobi is over 100 years old and has a colonial history. The city was chosen as a site to serve 
as a suitable stop between Mombasa and Kisumu during the construction of the Kenyan 
Railway during the late nineteenth century. The city developed along racial lines and the 
former European areas became the more affluent resourced areas in terms of municipal 
service provision while the African areas remained densely populated and under-resourced 
(Obudho, 1997; Nangulu-Ayuku, 2000). Rural and international migration to Nairobi has 
rapidly increased the city’s population, estimated in 2009 to be 3.12 million residents, that is, 
made up of 985,016 households (KNBS, 2010). The downside of rapid urbanization in an 
African city such as Nairobi is the growing prevalence of slums and poverty in the under-
resourced regions of the city where access to municipal services such as water and sewerage 
services remains rudimentary (NCWSC/AWSB 2009; UN Habitat, 2009b: 119).   
 
 
                                                          
1
 Map from the United Nations Environmental Programme website. 
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On the other hand, as the capital city of Kenya, which is the largest economy in East Africa, 
as well as the third largest in Sub-Saharan Africa, Nairobi retains the lion’s share of East 
Africa’s financial services and corporate headquarters (APRM, 2006: 17). As the 
concentration of economic activity makes Nairobi the pulse of the regional hub, the city’s 
knowledge and economic sector require sustainable provision of municipal infrastructure and 
services. This contrasting demand for municipal services from the diverse municipal 
community calls for the city to have access to significant financing. Ideally, local discretion 
should allow Nairobi to generate more revenue independently than through the 
intergovernmental process to finance municipal expenditure (Gildenhuys, 2012; Bird, 2000). 
 
In terms of governance, Nairobi operates within a centralized regulatory framework that 
stipulates the financing and provision of municipal services. The framework also allows the 
city to charge rates and levies for the variety of services that Nairobi provides as well to 
borrow funds to finance capital expenditure. The revenue process forms part of the sub-
national budgeting process that is managed by central government. After recent local 
government reforms were rolled out in Kenya, the city emerged from a fiscal crisis that had 
plagued it for decades (Nairobi City Commission 1988; 1989; MoLG, 2002). The city now 
reflects positive increases in the generation of local revenue (NCC, 2010). The evidence of 
local fiscal autonomy for this city is examined in this study. 
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1.2.2 The City of Johannesburg  
 
Figure 1.2: City Of Johannesburg 
 
Source: Wikimedia 
 
Johannesburg came into existence in 1886, a decade or so earlier than Nairobi. The city 
sprang up as a mining town to grow rapidly into a large city by mid-twentieth century and 
also developed along racial lines (Beavon, 1997; Tomlinson, 1999). Migration to 
Johannesburg is as profound as it has been in the other large African cities, with the city’s 
population having increased from 3.2 million in 2001 to 4.4 million in 2011, presently with 
1,434, 856 households with an estimated 64% of Johannesburg’s population having access to 
piped water inside dwellings
2
 (Stats SA, 2011). Historically, areas previously allocated to the 
non-white population were inadequately financed and serviced by the respective local 
authorities (Simkins, 1991). The city’s residents in these impoverished areas have limited 
access to water and sanitation infrastructure, a municipal service, despite the city’s valiant 
efforts to address redistribution in line with national and international norms (CoJ, 2005a: 30; 
Stats SA, 2011).   
 
                                                          
2
 This figure includes access to communal taps in the townships that are shared by several households 
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The city has become South Africa’s largest city with an economic base that contributes 16% 
of the country’s gross domestic product and is the corporate headquarters for major banks and 
companies, making it a desirable location for economic activity in the region (CoJ, 2008). 
The economic vibrancy requires accessible and sustained municipal services. These 
contrasting demands for constitutionally mandated services call for optimal utilization of 
local revenue instruments in financing municipal expenditure. 
 
The South African Constitution Act (1996) mandates that the metropolitan city of 
Johannesburg implement a governance structure that caters for the administration and 
management of municipal resources in order to provide services within Johannesburg. The 
constitutional mandate also provides for the municipality to impose rates and levies as well as 
to borrow responsibly in order to finance municipal expenditure (RSA, 1996). The revenue 
process operates within a municipal budgeting cycle that is regulated by a national and a 
municipal legal framework. During the local government transition phase into democracy, 
restructuring in Johannesburg saw the city merge into a metropolitan municipality. The 
process of merging historically fiscally deprived areas with well-resourced segments to form 
a uni-city created a lengthy fiscal crisis experienced by Johannesburg into the democratic 
dispensation of local government. The city has since emerged to realign its revenue streams 
and project annual steady increases in municipal revenue (CoJ, 2002; CoJ, 2011). The study 
examines how fiscal appropriation plays out in the city’s water revenue and municipal 
borrowing. 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Local government in Africa reflects a disconcerting inability to finance the provision and 
maintenance of mandated municipal services, as has been documented in a variety of 
literature on public finance (Adebayo & Rowland, 1972; Assibey-Mensah, 2000; Awio & 
Northcott 2001; Gachuru & Olima 1998; Yemek, 2005). The revenue tools that a large 
majority of local authorities are mandated to use are often plagued with administrative and 
human constraints. These hindrances further limit the generation of local revenue which 
adversely reduces the financing for municipal expenditure.  
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The erosion of local revenues thus reflects on the decay of municipal infrastructure and the 
provision of municipal services. This issue is magnified in African cities where “greater 
responsibility for local services requires greater ability to generate own revenues” and where 
“the cities often have inadequate revenue to meet expenditure needs” (UNHabitat, 2009a: 10, 
13). However, some countries have a national framework that cedes to selected cities the 
function of revenue assignment to independently generate a significant portion of local 
revenue. In the case of South Africa and Kenya, an established legal framework allows for 
the larger cities of both countries to leverage local fiscal discretion. Nairobi and 
Johannesburg are examples of such cities with local fiscal authority. The cities both have 
access to sophisticated municipal revenue tools. Operating revenues garnered from user 
charges for services provided and charged as per consumption level; licensing from a variety 
of businesses; mobilizing capital markets for municipal borrowing; as well as 
intergovernmental transfers are common revenue options for the two cities (UNHabitat, 
2009b: 21-55). From these avenues, the local revenue for Johannesburg and Nairobi has risen 
steadily and consistently (CoJ, 2011; NCC, 2010). This augurs well for a city government 
which “must rely on its financial strength in the form of reserves or borrowing to obtain 
necessary capital funding” (SACN, 2007: 7). Local discretion for municipal finance has a 
particular experience that underlies the obvious increases in revenue. The application of fiscal 
appropriation also has implications for the resultant effect on the generation of local revenues.  
 
1.4 PURPOSE STATEMENT 
 
The opportunity to examine specific municipal revenue tools within a context of municipal 
service delivery backlogs and the complexities of African cities presents itself for this study. 
This study examines the experiences of Nairobi and Johannesburg in generating water 
revenue as a trading service and the criteria for accessing funds through municipal borrowing 
to discourse on local fiscal autonomy. The generation of these revenues is conducted within 
the dynamic context of economic growth, urbanization as well as the legal framework for 
each city. The study intends to reflect on the implications recent local government reforms 
have had on the cities’ discretion to use these tools to generate revenue. The study uses a 
multiple (two) case analysis of the cities of Nairobi and Johannesburg in order to contrast and 
draw out insightful information that will present a clearer picture of the local fiscal autonomy 
experience of the African cities.  
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1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The study was broadly concerned with the experience of local fiscal autonomy and reflects on 
the particular experience of the local revenue capacities of Johannesburg and Nairobi. The 
central research question of the study examines how local fiscal discretion and 
appropriation manifest in the generation of local revenue. 
 
The study objectives were identified to guide the research to  
(i) conceptualize how fiscal appropriation is used in the local function of revenue assignment; 
(ii) investigate how specific revenue tools manifest local fiscal autonomy;  
(iii) consider the implications of the research findings to fiscal decentralization theory.  
 
The objectives were translated into the following research questions:  
 
1. How do the respective national frameworks establish local fiscal autonomy in the African 
cities Johannesburg and Nairobi?  
 
Nairobi and Johannesburg are constituted within a national framework that asserts 
cooperation and interdependence among the different spheres of government. For the purpose 
of fiscal decentralization, the study highlights the legislative machinery that regulates the 
municipal fiscal function of the two cities. The question examines the cities’ local fiscal 
autonomy in light of local government reform and the theoretical elements of fiscal 
decentralization.  
 
2. What are the instruments that leverage significant local revenue?  
 
The revenue assignment function for Nairobi and Johannesburg is evidenced by the cities’ 
ability to generate significant municipal revenue to finance municipal services. The 
instruments purposefully selected are user fees and municipal borrowing because these 
instruments may be aligned to the municipal mandate and be assigned at the discretion of the 
cities.  
 
11 
 
Restructuring has seen the cities’ create utilities, specifically, Johannesburg Water and 
Nairobi Water and Sewerage Company with corresponding impact on water revenue. 
Municipal borrowing allows the cities to enhance local fiscal capacity in order to engage 
capital markets for funding for capital expenditure. The question attempts to determine 
whether an underlying relationship of local fiscal discretion and appropriation of these two 
revenue instruments indeed asserts local fiscal autonomy. 
 
3. What are the emerging issues as the cities assert local fiscal autonomy? 
 
This final question reflects on how both cities assert the function of revenue assignment 
through the interplay among national government, council (political office bearers), and city 
administration. The question also examines if indeed these cities independently navigate the 
specific instruments to leverage revenue. Ultimately this question determines whether the 
findings resound to or digress from fiscal decentralization theory. 
 
1.6 DEFINITION OF LOCAL FISCAL AUTONOMY 
 
The definition of local fiscal autonomy employed in this study relates to the independence of 
local government in generating own source revenues (OSR) as well as the discretion in 
managing local fiscal capacity to secure funding for capital expenditure (Bahl & Martinez-
Vazquez, 2006: 22). Local government access and utilization of local revenues should reflect 
revenue autonomy. In this case, cities should be permitted to design, set and implement tax 
rates on the various user charges for municipal services. In turn the problem of vertical 
imbalances in fiscal decentralization is reduced by the cities’ reduced reliance on 
intergovernmental transfers. Local government is thus able to set revenue targets at its own 
discretion instead of waiting on intergovernmental transfer arrangements for funding 
municipal expenditure.  
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Local fiscal autonomy in sub-national government will manifest in the political and technical 
decisions made on generating revenue. Local fiscal discretion compels sub-national 
governments to impose hard-budget constraints on the generation of local revenues to sustain 
the generation of local revenue. Urban authorities in particular are able to make political 
decisions regarding the generation of own source revenues, which shows local fiscal 
appropriation. Finally, the use of local fiscal discretion in revenue autonomy reflects 
positively on municipal creditworthiness and borrowing capacity. 
 
1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH  
 
Literature on the practice of fiscal decentralization in developing countries tends to take on a 
broad overview that expresses country level experience. Do Vale (2013) concludes that the 
decentralization experience in South Africa and Brazil was democratic while India’s 
experience served to deepen democracy and that South Africa’s experience was most 
profound because of the legal, administrative and fiscal restructuring that was effected. In 
South Africa, Smoke et al. (2003) concludes that the process of local government 
restructuring in South Africa is useful in generating local revenue although challenges remain. 
Yemek (2005) determines that service provision is enhanced by the country’s 
intergovernmental transfer system but governance and minimal citizen participation are 
lacking. Momoniat (2001) finds that since democracy, local government revenue streams 
have become varied across the different South African municipalities.  
 
Chapman, Gakuru & De Klerk (2003) argue that local capacity and erratic intergovernmental 
transfers exacerbate the fiscal stress of Kenya’s sub-national government while Devas & 
Kelly (2001) find that the Single Business Permit presents an opportunity for local 
government to increase local revenues. Property tax in Tanzania is encumbered by ineffective 
administration as was determined by Fjeldstad (2001). There are also individual country 
studies in southern Africa that examine the generation of local revenue for sub-national 
government (EISA, 2010; Reddy, Sing & Moodley, 2003). 
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The literature also reflects the common practice of revenue sharing arrangements in fiscal 
decentralization often referred to as intergovernmental transfers. Crane (2004), for example; 
finds that the erratic transfer of the Road Maintenance Fund in Kenya drastically reduced the 
financing for maintenance of road infrastructure by local government and that effecting 
regulations to mandate the regular transfers would enhance revenue sharing arrangements 
between central and local government. The issues around the administration of property tax 
as a source of local revenue in Kenya and South have also received attention (Franzsen & 
Olima, 2003; Gachuru & Olima, 1998; Kelly, 2000; McCluskey & Franzsen, 2005).   
 
The distinction of local government within an African country is important to reflect the 
varying capacity and mandate of the country’s different municipal jurisdictions (Smoke 
2000a; 2000b). However, the resultant fiscal distinction isolates the larger African cities that 
have no comparable cities in their respective countries, for example, Lagos, Cairo, Kinshasa, 
Johannesburg and Nairobi. It then becomes useful to reflect on how these African cities with 
similar dispositions such as local revenue tools implement fiscal decentralization, and 
particularly on the function of revenue assignment. This gap presents an opportunity to 
conduct research on local fiscal autonomy to capture the experience of African cities that 
already have significant economic bases, developed fiscal systems and a considerable local 
population plagued by urbanization woes (Prud’homme, 2003).   
 
1.8 LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
This study is concerned with the revenue assignment function of cities and the manner in 
which the experience of local fiscal autonomy reflects in specific revenue tools. Municipal 
revenue is also affected by the payment levels for municipal services which also affect 
service delivery, and in turn revenue generation occurs simultaneously across the entire 
municipal budgeting process. This study is concerned with the political and administrative 
decisions and actions that influence the generation of water revenues and municipal 
borrowing and does not cover the entire process of generating municipal revenues. 
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1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
The first section provides an overview of the thesis. Chapter one provides the background for 
study which sets the fiscal landscape of the cities that are studied and reflects on the 
arguments and rationale of the study. The second chapter provides an overview of the fiscal 
decentralization literature to project revenue autonomy in order to explore local fiscal 
autonomy. Chapter three explains the epistemological stance taken in the study and then 
discusses the process followed during the study. 
 
The next section presents the research findings. Chapter four gives the legislative and 
structural context for local government reforms in Kenya and in South Africa and how this 
has affected the local fiscal mandate of Nairobi and Johannesburg. Chapter five presents the 
case of Nairobi and how the city manages water revenue and municipal borrowing in the new 
legislative context. Chapter six elaborates on how Johannesburg’s water revenue and 
municipal borrowing have been affected by the new democratic dispensation. 
 
The last section gives the conclusions of the study by presenting the contrasting experience of 
the local fiscal autonomy of the two cities. Finally the findings from the study are given in the 
context of the theoretical implications of the study in public finance discourse. 
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter provided the background of the study by introducing the aim of the study which 
is to scrutinize how the function of revenue assignment manifests in Nairobi and in 
Johannesburg. It further provides the rationale for examining the fiscal function of African 
cities that face a growing demand for municipal services against limited municipal revenue 
tools. The next chapter gives an overview of the literature on fiscal decentralization and 
presents the conceptual framework for the study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON LOCAL FISCAL 
AUTONOMY 
 
This chapter gives the theoretical underpinnings of the study. The rationale for local 
government is given in the context of public sector activity and decentralization. This is 
further examined through fiscal decentralization theory to present the knowledge gap for the 
scrutiny of the local revenue assignment function in African cities. Finally, in this chapter, 
the conceptual framework on local fiscal is given to emphasis the concept’s relation to 
revenue assignment.  
 
2.1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND FOR LOCAL POLITICAL GOVERNANCE 
 
This section advances the theoretical basis for decentralization in relation to the political 
mandate of sub-national government over local fiscal resources. At the national level, the 
existence of government has been stressed in public finance literature (Wagner, 1958; 
Musgrave, 1959; Rosen, 2003).  Government provides an array of services that the private 
sector is often hesitant to provide from the medium to long term. Health services, water and 
sanitation, rail transport and infrastructure, national safety and security, and postal services 
continue to be the responsibility of the state (Gildenhuys & Knipe, 2000). 
 
Public sector activity in this case gives emphasis to three government functions: income 
distribution; stabilization; and resource allocation. The first two functions are income 
distribution and stabilization allocation of fiscal resources to best maximize the welfare of 
each individual in society. These two functions are considered the primary responsibility of 
central government. The third allocation function concerns the provision of services which 
can be provided to citizens in a differentiated manner. Particular services depend on the scale, 
on citizen preference and ability to pay for the service, should allow for different tiers of 
government to deliver differentiated services. King (1993) asserts this emphasis on local 
government to perform the allocation function of government as is determined by efficiency 
rationale for service provision and citizen preference for municipal services. 
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Research has been conducted at the sub-national level of government, the political and 
development space has been used to amplify the need for fiscal resources at the local level. 
This has involved scrutiny on the delegation of authority and function to local authorities in 
decentralization literature. Cheema & Rondinelli (2007) track the evolution of the debate on 
decentralized governance to the current contemporary decentralization endeavours to 
integrate democracy and economic development. Historically, government was viewed as 
“the institutional embodiment of state sovereignty and as the embodiment of political and 
legal decision making” (Chema & Rondinelli, 2007: 1). The concept of decentralization 
moved from this centralist view to the inclusion of new actors into governance such as civil 
society and the private sector in the late 1980s and 1990s. New public management principles 
that support decentralization and the “globalization of these ideas” by the international 
development organizations and particularly the United Nations compelled developing 
countries to integrate decentralization as a form of enhancing governance (Chema & 
Rondinelli, 2007: 1). 
 
Olowu & Wunsch (2004) argue that decentralization is purported to augment governance 
through the participation of local communities into government processes for the delivery of 
services. In developing countries, decentralization debates draw on the premise that local 
communities are often isolated from local governance and increasing local participation will 
enhance accountability and, eventually, the delivery process of government (Olowu & 
Wunsch, 2004:1). Accountability of elected officials and local participation in government 
are some of the political advantages that are proposed for decentralization (Denters & 
Lawrence, 2005; Bahl, 1999a: 4). 
 
The notion that decentralization also brings government resources for service delivery closer 
to the grassroots communities is also highlighted in the decentralization discourse. Devas 
describes the Indonesian decentralization experience as an “exercise to achieve uniformity” 
rather than devolving function and authority to local government (1997: 358). 
Decentralization in Africa is seen as a means of bringing development to rural areas, 
increasing community participation in local government as was the equitable allocation of 
resources by central government (Conyers, 1983; Hussein, 2003; Ndegwa & Levy, 2003).  
 
 
17 
 
Asiimwe & Musisi (2007) find that the objectives envisioned in the decentralization process 
in Uganda have not altogether been realized.  The decentralization goals which relate to: 
improved accountability and effectiveness; citizens’ ownership of programmes and projects; 
and increasing the political authority of local officials remain largely unmet. Uganda’s 
centralist government still constraints local officials from implementing the decentralization 
mandate. These authors highlight the importance of local government performance as an 
instrument for democracy and delivery of government services.  
 
Rondinelli, Nellis & Cheema (1983) use a political economy framework to examine the 
various factors that impede the implementation of decentralization in developing countries. 
The lax rate of development in the continent adversely affects the implementation of 
decentralization policies (Rondinelli et al., 1983; Rondinelli, 2008; Smoke, 2001). The 
sluggish rate is mainly attributed to sparse physical, human and fiscal resources that local 
authorities must work with which are seen to mitigate the meagre results of municipal service 
delivery (Rondinelli et al., 1983: 76). More often than not, local authorities have the legal 
mandate but have to grapple with the minimal resources available. This is particularly evident 
in the escalating demand for urban municipal services in African cities that remains unmet in 
the impoverished sectors of the cities (UN Habitat, 2008; 2014).  
 
Nonetheless, Nath & Schroeder (2007) assert that the importance of a grassroots tier of 
government to provide services locally as opposed to central government still remains. The 
above decentralization theories make the case for local political governance. The inclusion of 
communities into decision making over local government programmes is also important. 
However, the nature of the devolved democratic sub-national government is such that local 
political decisions must also include the acquisition of local revenue for municipal 
expenditure. Often local political decisions made by local politicians are informed by the 
regulatory framework within which cities operate within a unitary state. This basis makes the 
theories presented above deficient in the interrogation of the fiscal political decisions made 
on local revenue as opposed to the local political governance mandate often examined in light 
of municipal and national expenditure in communities.  
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This assertion of local political oversight is important in providing the premise for local 
political decision making over fiscal resources in sub-national government. Therefore, 
although decentralization theories make a case for local government and are quite useful in 
augmenting political accountability and governance, they remain limited in exercising 
discretion over local finances without a regulatory framework that should firstly deploy the 
ability to generate fiscal resources to sub-national government. The next section examines 
fiscal decentralization literature that mitigates the revenue assignment function in local 
government. 
 
2.2  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND FOR FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION  
  
Economists presume the inevitability of the state in society (Musgrave, 1959; Eckstein, 1967; 
Wagner, 1958). Using an economic theory perspective, Musgrave (1959) advances the 
theoretical development of public finance through his exposition that initiates the exploration 
on the normative rationale for the political economy. Government in this case is determined 
to exist as an “economic unit consisting of officials, with unlimited life and significant in 
people’s life” (Wagner, 1958: 5). These theorists argue for the essentiality of financing for 
government activities and expenditure.  
 
The financing of government is then used to give effect to the fiscal nature of government. 
Rosen (2005) portrays the involvement of government in economic activity in order to 
examine issues around taxation in the economy. He also scrutinizes the economic 
environment to extrapolate the nature of the fiscal economy, purposes of taxation as well as 
justice in tax distribution. Public finance therefore stipulates government roles in the national 
fiscal and monetary systems. Through fiscal policy, government uses various taxation 
methods on both individuals and enterprises in order to derive income for government 
expenditure. Monetary policy, on the other hand, is used to manage money supply and to 
regulate the economy such that inflationary pressures and the cyclic activities of the economy 
continue to bolster economic growth. These dual fiscal roles are managed by national 
governments. 
 
 
 
19 
 
Musgrave (1959) initiates an orientation towards multi-level finance which permits different 
financing arrangements of public goods for sub-national and national government at their 
most efficient. At the tier of sub-national government, fiscal decentralization has been 
popularized by economists who stress the importance of this aspect of devolution in 
allocating local government tools with which to finance and to perform the allocation 
function of government (Bird, 1993; Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1999). 
 
Emphasizing the importance of local efficiency for fiscal federalism is the Decentralization 
Theorem which states: 
 
For a public good- the consumption of which is defined over 
geographical subsets of the total population, and for which the costs 
of providing each level of output of the good in each jurisdiction are 
the same for the central or respective government – it will always be 
more efficient to (or at least as efficient)  for local governments  to 
provide the Pareto-efficient levels of output  for their respective 
jurisdictions than for the central government to provide any specified 
and uniform level of output across all jurisdictions.  
(Oates 2012: 35) 
 
This theory posits that decentralization is beneficial when the costs of providing for service 
delivery are the same for local and central government or even better when the local 
economies of scale outweigh the costs at the national tier. Empirical studies have been used 
mostly in the federal Western countries to provide anecdotal justification for fiscal federalism 
in varying degrees (Oates, 1999; Jackson, 1993; Tiebout, 1956). The ideal of local efficiency, 
therefore, is useful for the devolution of fiscal resources to sub-national government because 
it asserts independence in generating a majority of revenue locally. It is also important for the 
devolution to include political governance over the generation of local revenue. 
 
The practice of fiscal decentralization is different for developed countries as compared with 
developing or transitioning states because the former emphasis local efficiency whereas the 
latter highlights local capacity. Fiscal decentralization theory thus places emphasis on the 
different aspects of implementation in the various countries across the spectrum. In these 
contrasts, the theory posits that the delegation of fiscal resources will affect the efficiency, 
processes and autonomy of local government. 
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2.2.1 Efficiency Associated with Fiscal Decentralization  
 
Efficiency is often the logical argument put forward for fiscal decentralization (Rosen, 2005; 
Oates, 1999). In this local efficiency rationale proposed, the economists: Bahl (1999a); Bird 
(1993; 1999) and Oates (1999; 2012) stress that there should be a clear distinction between 
the level of government and the function of government for local fiscal autonomy. Local 
discretion requires that local expenditure be mainly financed from local revenues and that 
reliance on central government to finance local expenditure be minimized. Jackson (1993) 
maintains that fiscal decentralization enhances political and economic efficiency. Local 
control of resources is increasingly important in areas where local preferences can be 
matched to local expenditure. Proximity to citizens thus allows local government to meet 
diverse preferences and reduce or ignore external spillover effects.  
 
The case made for local fiscal autonomy by this theory suggests that local authorities are also 
more likely to indulge in experiments and innovations at the local level. The local flexibility 
means that sub-national government is not under pressure as is the state to provide uniform 
services to a larger magnitude of the population. Bahl (1999a) also supports the ideal of local 
efficiency and projects that local government promotes efficiency and offers better services. 
Once government moves closer, there is increased local revenue from the increased tax net 
and accountability is enhanced by the proximity of local expenditure and local revenue. 
 
Sutherland, Price & Joumard (2005) find that fiscal rules imposed by central governments or 
self-imposed by sub-national spheres in the countries that fall within the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have been applied to local tax autonomy 
and municipal borrowing to enhance efficiency. However, local fiscal efficiency has, in turn, 
been compromised by the limited revenue autonomy of sub-national government and the 
increasing burden of expenditure responsibility placed on local government as determined in 
a previous study by Joumard & Kongsrud (2003). Therefore, local efficiency remains an ideal 
that local government revenue tools must be tailored against to optimize local revenue 
generated for local preferences. The ideal compels sub-national government to impose local 
fiscal discipline in order to improve local fiscal capacity for financing local services. The 
experience in implementing fiscal devolution for developing states highlights the discrepancy 
and reiterates the importance of local efficiency as shown below. 
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2.2.2 Process of Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries  
 
Rondinelli et al. (1983) and Rondinelli & Nellis (1986) explore various conditions that affect 
the implementation of decentralization policies for developing countries. Specific conditions 
such as the degree of political commitment; administrative support; and financial factors are 
seen to facilitate effective decentralization. To further emphasize the assertion, Rondinelli, 
McCullough & Johnson (1989) provide a framework that may be used to analyse the political 
economy of implementing developing countries in order to assess the above conditions 
holistically in light of decentralization. This model stresses the importance of local fiscal 
authority in asserting that “fiscal responsibility should be at the core of decentralization” 
(Rondinelli et al., 1989: 67)  
 
Bird (1993) and Bahl (1999a) both highlight the dual nature of fiscal decentralization. The 
first aspect is revenue sharing that calls for the division and allocation of fiscal resources 
across the levels of government. The second aspect is revenue assignment requires 
independence in generating local revenue. Revenue assignment, asserts local fiscal 
autonomy by granting local authorities the mandate to generate local revenue through various 
means. The experiences of developing countries in implementing both options of fiscal 
decentralization show an increasing reliance on central government for intergovernmental 
transfers and depletion of local revenue instruments as discussed here.  
 
Revenue sharing is the common experience in Eastern Europe and in African states and puts 
emphasis on intergovernmental transfers to allocate revenue to local authorities (OECD, 2002; 
Crane, 2004; Mothusi, 2010, Rubvuta, 2010). In Europe’s case, this method of national 
revenue division among the levels of government assures access of revenues to the Eastern 
European local authorities. This form of fiscal decentralization also asserts the centralist 
nature of national government, thereby reinforcing the revenue sharing system with little 
room for sub-national government to maneuver for local fiscal autonomy (OECD, 2002).  
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The similarity between Africa and Eastern Europe in implementing fiscal decentralization is 
the centralized control of fiscal resources by national government. This is where the 
similarity ends because Eastern Europe has established local government systems while 
African local government fiscal systems often require significant resources to generate local 
revenue thus rendering municipal functioning weak and less inclined to increase revenue and 
show revenue autonomy (EISA, 2010; Reddy et al., 2003; Adebayo & Rowland, 1972).  
 
Sharma (2003) and Mothusi (2010), writing about Botswana, find that the increasing 
dependence of local authorities on Botswana’s central government incapacitates local fiscal 
autonomy in the country. The centralized structure that also exists in Swaziland constrains its 
local government from leveraging significant revenue independently (Sabela, 2003). At 
independence, Zambia had an established local government system that fell victim to 
structural adjustment programmes as well as decreasing revenue from the mineral sector. 
Maipose (2003) and Rubvuta (2010) both confirm that this predicament decreased local fiscal 
capacity coupled with statutory constraints that hinder revenue autonomy thus leaving the 
Zambian local authorities with limited local revenue as a result.    
 
Nigeria, a federal state that should reflect more pronounced traits of fiscal decentralization, 
has a local government structure with urban authorities that remain heavily reliant on 
intergovernmental transfers from state governments as opposed to the local generation of 
revenue (Adedokun, 2005; Agba, Stephen & Nnamani, 2014; Nuhu, 1972). Akindele, Olaopa 
& Obiyan (2002) find that successive constitutions and regulatory amendments have 
increased the number of local authorities in the country but have not proportionally increased 
revenue-raising abilities for Nigerian local government. Agba et al. (2014) also confirm that 
the dependency on central government for revenue is increasingly magnified in Nigeria’s 
federal structure of government. 
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African countries have also tried to address the local revenue problem through transfers from 
central government. Intergovernmental transfers aimed at poorly resourced local authorities 
without the capacity to generate local revenues to finance municipal mandates are used for 
this purpose. In Kenya, the fiscal state of rural and smaller local authorities has been 
improved through revenue sharing but not the local capacity to generate local revenue (Crane, 
2004; Gitau & Amaya, 2003; Oyugi, 2008; Smoke, 1994). The same applies in South Africa 
where rural municipalities have been able to access fiscal resources for development as 
opposed to the situation during the apartheid era as determined by Ahmad (1998) and Yemek 
(2005). Yemek (2005) also finds that the inter-governmental transfer effort in South Africa to 
increase the delivery of social services has reduced local fiscal responsibility and local 
governance. 
 
In the second more viable option for local revenue, revenue assignment in developing 
countries is also evident in Latin America and some African states. The federal nature of the 
South American countries is a characteristic that augurs well for the implementation of fiscal 
devolution. The established administrative and political federal structures are expected to 
facilitate fiscal federalism (Afonso & de Mello, 2000). Evidence suggests that the absence of 
adequate control measures on the implementation of local fiscal autonomy has led to severe 
government deficits. The fiscal deficits have also been increased by the inefficiencies of local 
revenue collection (Bird, 1999; 2000; World Bank 2000). Martell’s (2000; 2007; 2008) 
empirical studies on Brazilian municipal borrowing show the importance of a legal and 
regulatory framework to guide local lending. The framework also determines that the 
relationship between central and local government either diminishes or asserts local fiscal 
discipline that should manifest local fiscal autonomy.  
 
Studies on the generation of local revenues on the African continent centre on the use of 
property tax and other taxes including market and business licences (Asibuo, 1998; Devas & 
Kelly, 2001; Fjeldstad, 2001; Kelly, 2000; 2001; McCluskey & Franzsen, 2005). The 
utilization of property tax in East Africa has been widely scrutinized (Kelly, 2001; Franzsen 
& Olima, 2003; Gachuru & Olima, 1998; Kelly, 2000). Property tax, however, remains an 
inelastic tax because its proximity to and visibility by the local population suggests that 
significant increases in the property rates will encounter resistance from ratepayers. There are 
also challenges associated with administering this local revenue tool (Ebel & Talierco, 2004; 
Tanzi & Zee, 2001). 
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 The potential contribution of income from property rates is also restrained by archaic 
legislation as is the case in Uganda (Balihuta & Ochieng, 2007). A similar experience also 
confirms that the administrative quagmire in Malawi restrains the generation of significant 
local revenue, particularly from business taxes and property rates (Kelly, Montes, Maseya, 
Nkankha & Tombere, 2001).  
 
Studies also reveal that local business taxes are becoming increasingly important sources of 
local revenue. An example is the turnover tax introduced in the 1980s in South Africa. The 
now defunct regional services used the Regional Service Levy as a viable source of local 
revenue during (Bahl & Solomon, 2003; SACN, 2007). Devas & Kelly (2001) maintain that 
the amalgamation of business licences for Kenyan local authorities through the Kenya Local 
Government Reform Programme has resulted in the Single Business Permit becoming a 
significant contributor to local revenue. 
 
Two studies that emphasize the aspect of revenue autonomy in developing countries are 
important in resonating significance for this study.  These studies highlight the importance of 
local fiscal discretion and appropriation in revenue mobilization. First, during apartheid the 
prominence given to WLA independence in local revenue was pronounced in the regulatory 
framework and in literature. Cowden’s (1968) study on the revenue function of apartheid 
local government finance found that local fiscal discretion and capacity are important to 
revenue autonomy of all local government revenues.  
 
The second study by Bahl & Linn (1992) examines the experience of urban cities’ revenue in 
developing countries through the examination of internal and external sources of revenue. 
This study found that although user charges for trading services like water and electricity 
services should take into account social, economic, financial, administrative and political 
considerations to ensure the sustainable supply and maintenance of local services this was not 
always the case. Therefore the potential revenue from these sources was not realized.  The 
latter study also found that costing the supply of urban water in developing countries does not 
adequately cover the fixed and variable cost of water services (Bahl & Linn, 1992). The 
attempt to balance these competing considerations brings in the element of local fiscal 
appropriation over generation of local revenues.  
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Fiscal decentralization theory is, therefore, important to local government because it provides 
fiscal tools to finance municipal expenditure. This theory lays emphasis on the enhancing the 
efficiency and process of using the local revenue tools by sub-national government. The 
revenue assignment function in particular should afford sub-national government more 
autonomy in the manner in which local revenues are generated. 
 
2.2.3 Critique of Fiscal Decentralization 
  
Fiscal decentralization should allow local government the opportunity to generate local 
revenue. The possibility that the implementation of fiscal devolution may have adverse 
effects is considered in this section. These negative consequences affect three significant 
areas: the challenges may be evident from within the jurisdiction of local authorities; at the 
level of national government; or by the country as a whole.  
 
Fiscal decentralization is sometimes seen to increase the incidence of corruption at local 
levels as found by Koldstad & Fjeldstad (2006) and Fjeldstad & Semboja (2000). The 
example is given of property tax in Tanzania to show that the close proximity between local 
officials, politicians and residents acts as a catalyst for corruption. This occurs when the local 
government system lacks adequate measures and instruments of accountability. This vacuum 
created by the inadequacy of control and accountability mechanisms above coupled with 
pressing local needs presents the opportunity for corruption to take root whilst generating 
local revenue (Koldstad & Fjeldstad, 2006; Tanzi, 2000; Tambulasi & Kayuni, 2007). 
 
Local government often does not have the capacity to generate local revenue. As a result, 
local authorities are inhibited from raising significant local revenue. This internal constraint 
reduces the efficiency of municipal authorities in financing local services. The detrimental 
effect of incapability in the fiscal experience of African local government is documented by 
Asibuo (1998), Bird (2000) and Nuhu (1972). The lack of diversity in own source revenues 
also prevents sub-national government from mobilizing local revenue by hindering the 
exploration of alternative avenues for local revenue (Tannenwald, 2002). 
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From a national perspective, fiscal decentralization erodes fiscal tools that national 
government uses for fiscal policy and the overall purpose of stabilization of the economy. 
Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez & Wallace (2002) use an example of income tax as such a fiscal tool 
for sub-national government that is also an important source of central government revenue 
to highlight this dilemma. If urban authorities are fiscally mighty, local fiscal autonomy, for 
example, may reduce tax instruments at the disposal of central government and constrain the 
national administration from using tax reforms to regulate the economy when the need does 
arise (Jourmard & Kongsrud, 2003: 19-22; Prud’homme, 1995).  
 
Evidence also suggests that local fiscal autonomy may lead to a distortion of resource 
allocation of services and increase inter-jurisdictional disparities. Tiebout (1956) theorized 
this distortion by his proposition on mobility of local residents across jurisdictions for better 
value on local services. He presented the occurrence of this incidence of disparity as when 
local residents are more likely to relocate to communities where they do receive maximum 
benefit for local goods that they are willing to pay for, commonly referred to as “voting with 
their feet” (Tiebout, 1956 Cited in Oates 2012: 12). Moreover, the local distortion of the 
overall fiscal landscape by the fiscally strong urban authorities cripples the ability to obtain 
information on government in general (Prud’homme, 1995; Heyns, 1995). 
 
Contemporary reflections on the size of the public sector service call for a reduced civil 
service and a movement towards a leaner government structure. In this context, the 
suggestion has been made that fiscal decentralization increases public sector employment 
because of the increased levels of government created to cater for local services. Prud’homme 
(1995) suggests that local government thus hinders the goal of reducing the civil service. 
Furthermore, the size of a country does not always encourage implementation of fiscal 
devolution. Prud’homme (1995) advises that in the case of smaller countries fiscal 
decentralization may prove ruinous as the country’s small size and proximity to its population 
already allows national government to respond to local residents’ needs. Therefore, the 
cognizance of the negative implications that may arise from the implementation of delegation 
of fiscal resources to local government is important. This consideration promotes a holistic 
understanding of the practice within the context of public sector economics and public 
finance. 
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It is important to reflect on the issue of dominant Western influence with respect to fiscal 
decentralization in developing countries that have opted to reform local structures (Boex, 
2009). This influence is illustrated by the provision of technical assistance to developing 
countries in restructuring financial processes and structures to become contemporary in order 
to boost OSR (Boex, 2009). The technical assistance has prompted several African states to 
redesign specific revenue instruments for purposes of fiscal decentralization with assistance 
from international agencies (Kelly et al., 2001; Prud’homme, 2003; Smoke, 2003; World 
Bank 2001). 
 
Fritzen (2007) provides a framework to evaluate the effectiveness of technical assistance for 
purposes of development. The framework calls for an initial assessment of the overall 
government as well as the local institutional context of the developing country. This prior 
determination helps to ascertain the country’s leaders’ political will; operational; and social 
capacities. Any weakness in these areas is likely to constrain implementation of 
decentralization programmes. Next, the goals of technical assistance need to be aligned with 
the implementing country’s development programmes. Additionally, modalities need to be 
developed to examine effectiveness throughout the implementation of the local government 
reform programme. Fritzen (2007) argues that using this framework will enhance the 
implementation of measures intended for reform.   
 
However, shortcomings associated with technical expertise have hampered the 
decentralization efforts of developing economies. Smoke (2000a) presents four major 
concerns: inadequate scope of reforms; weak coordination among multiple co-coordinators; 
the imposition of development models by donors; and finally the lack of differentiation of the 
various types of local authorities in the local reforms. Smoke (2003) also argues that weak 
coordination among multiple co-coordinators including donors, central and local government 
officials and politicians involved in local reform, hampers effective implementation. This 
weakness is also alluded to by Fritzen (2007) as a critical contributor to the failure of local 
development projects. Besides, the differentiation of the various categories among local 
authorities during implementation of reform is not always evident (Smoke, 2003).  
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In summary, the literature presented above shows that decentralization theory acknowledges 
the importance of fiscal devolution to local government. Fiscal decentralization is purported 
to enhance local efficiency in developing countries and may take the form of 
intergovernmental transfers or revenue assignment. Revenue sharing is the option which is 
preferred by a majority of developing countries since central government retains discretion in 
the allocation of fiscal resources to local government. Constraints in implementing the 
function of revenue assignment especially in the generation of local revenue has been 
interrogated with respect to property rates, business taxes, municipal borrowing and trading 
services to highlight the importance of local fiscal discretion and capacity. 
 
The local fiscal traits of political governance, fiscal discretion and appropriation examined 
through the decentralization discourse above should collectively augment the local fiscal 
autonomy of local government. This is particularly important for urban authorities in 
asserting independence to generate OSR as well as for the development of local fiscal 
capacity that enhances access to development capital. The premium placed here for the 
function of revenue assignment in sub-national government thus reveals a knowledge gap 
which local fiscal autonomy through OSR such as trading services and municipal borrowing 
can be investigated for contemporary African cities. In view of the position presented above 
on fiscal decentralization theory, the following conceptual framework presents the contextual 
theoretical propositions that guide the study.  
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2.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR LOCAL FISCAL AUTONOMY 
 
The decentralization theories presented in the section above to conceptualize fiscal 
devolution are drawn from the context of both developed and developing countries. These 
theories point to the importance of local independence in revenue mobilization that enables 
sub-national government to make decisions on the generation of OSR.  
 
Local revenue autonomy in cities should project local fiscal autonomy.  The localised 
independence is comprised of the essential elements of discretion and appropriation. These 
elements can be exercised in the decisions made by cities to generate specific OSR.  The 
premise of the conceptual framework is that local fiscal autonomy is evident through fiscal 
discretion and fiscal appropriation in the local generation of OSR. This requires that the two 
concepts to be scrutinized within a regulatory framework that permits generation of OSR at 
the local level.  
 
2.3.1 The Concept of Fiscal Discretion 
 
Local efficiency, as espoused by Oates (1999), is vested in the notion that fiscal discretion 
can be applied to the specific context of sub-national government. The ideal prescribes that if 
local goods are to be provided by local authorities, the financing of these particular municipal 
services should be more efficiently performed by fiscally resourced local authorities with 
mandated revenue autonomy. The particular conception nests in his decentralization theorem 
that normatively proposes:  
 
in the absence of cost savings from the centralized provision of local 
public good and of interjurisdictional externalities, the level of 
welfare will always be at least as high if pareto-efficiency levels of 
consumption are provided in each jurisdiction than if any single 
uniform level of consumption is maintained across all jurisdictions.  
(Oates 1972 cited in Oates 1999: 1122)  
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The mandated revenue autonomy should be reflected in a fiscal decentralization framework 
for urban authorities. There are six features that give effect to a holistic fiscal decentralization 
programme. In the first instance, an adequate enabling environment provides the precedent 
through laws that provide the regulatory framework for local revenue. Secondly, assignment 
of appropriate functions to government is shown by the mandated services that urban 
authorities provide within the local jurisdiction. Smoke (1994) and Crawthorne (1997) 
maintain that the existence of a legal framework is essential for entrenching the function of 
local government and the corresponding sources of revenue.  
 
Bahl (1999b) also argues that decentralization features should show that sub-national 
government has access to an appropriate set of own-source revenues as well as an adequate 
intergovernmental transfer system to finance the operating and capital costs of local service 
provision. Additionally, the local fiscal capacity and the discipline to manage municipal debt 
cater for access to development capital that is directed towards the financing needs of 
municipal infrastructure. Finally, local political accountability is important in providing 
horizontal accountability to the electorate (Bahl & Martinez-Vazquez, 2006; Smoke, 2001). 
These six elements provide sub-national government with the mandate to provide and finance 
municipal service delivery.  OSR, municipal access to development capital and the presence 
of a local political accountability are the three elements in the fiscal decentralization 
framework chosen to reflect on the African cities’ experience of local fiscal autonomy. The 
ability of cities to use independent streams of OSR, local capacity to utilize municipal 
borrowing and more importantly to exercise the local political mandate to ensure the 
sustained generation of municipal finance shows the interplay of local fiscal discretion. 
  
An adequate enabling environment is necessary to support revenue autonomy which is 
provided by a regulatory and legislative framework for OSR. Bahl & Martinez-Vazquez 
(2006) prescribe a normative approach that envisions that decentralization should proceed 
along a deliberative trajectory from inception to the actual local revenue generation used to 
finance municipal services. Implementing fiscal decentralization includes participation from 
the electorate in national discussions in moving towards decentralization. The deliberations 
culminate in the adoption of a decentralization policy that provides the mandate for local 
revenue autonomy.  
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This preposition assumes that the implementing countries operate from a blank canvas with 
no history of decentralization. However, the colonial history of a majority of African local 
government points to a decentralized state prior to local reform (Beavon, 1997; Obudho, 
1997, UNHabitat, 2008). 
 
Constitutional and legal provisions should provide the basis for revenue autonomy. In Africa 
a regulatory framework does not always guarantee successful deployment of fiscal resources 
as shown in the literature presented above (Smoke, 2001: 19-20). To enhance the generation 
of local revenue, African local government has undergone structural and legislative changes. 
These changes done through local government reforms are often required to support the cities’ 
access to and utility of local revenue (Cameron, 2005; CDE, 2000; Devas & Kelly, 2001). 
These reforms encompass all the elements associated with fiscal devolution mentioned earlier 
in this section. 
 
The assignment of appropriate revenue to sub-national government is an important element of 
fiscal decentralization (Smoke, 2001; Bahl 1999b; Bahl & Martinez-Vazquez, 2006). 
Revenue autonomy affords “sub-national government independent sources of revenues” and 
detracts from the “lower level of government … becoming a spending agent of the centre” 
(Bahl & Martinez-Vazquez, 2006: 22). The assignment of appropriate revenues for African 
local authorities tends to lean heavily on the consideration of fiscal tools that do not seriously 
compete with national sources of tax revenue. This is primarily because the “fiscal structure 
for developing countries remains prescriptive” (Oates, 1999: 1143). The centralized control 
has left the municipal sphere with limited revenue tools. Inadequate revenue ability coupled 
with the increasing demand for municipal services by residents also highlights the concerns 
about the “unfunded mandates” in which local revenue does not match expenditure; as well 
as correspondingly high collection costs that further erode local revenue. (Smoke 2001: 23).  
 
The acknowledgment of the peculiar nature of demand for municipal services in African 
cities contradicts the common practice of intergovernmental transfers used by their respective 
states (Nuhu, 1972; UNHabitat, 2009). More importantly, urban authorities should be able to 
rely more on own resources and local capacity to generate revenue than on national treasury 
allocations. Municipal financing of local goods will assert the revenue assignment function in 
cities. This is because the municipal demand for services requires a local response to the 
financing of the services since: 
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The unique characteristics of large cities and metropolitan areas are 
reflected in the magnitude and complexity of the expenditures that 
local governments in those areas are required to make on municipal 
services. These characteristics are also reflected in their ability to 
pay for services. 
(UNHabitat, 2009: 10). 
 
 
Fiscal devolution thus requires assignment of revenue instruments that are effective, 
economic and that the utility of local revenue strives towards the following characteristic 
ideals: first the instruments should yield significant income; second the revenue tools should 
be based on political expediency which is acceptable and can be overturned; third, the ease of 
administration and collection costs should be as low as possible; fourth, the utility of the 
revenue instruments must remain consistent with economic and social goals and also that the 
instruments promote equity within the local jurisdiction; last, the visibility of using specific 
revenue tools should assist the local population to see how much they are paying (Reed & 
Swain, 1997: 85-89). The colonial history of African cities cedes local revenue in the form of 
rates; grants; trading profits; property income; capital grants and borrowing (Cowden, 1968; 
Prest, 1960, Tukur, 1972; Rowland, 1972).  
 
African cities must also reflect the municipal capacity “both in terms of greater responsibility 
for local services and greater ability to levy their own taxes and collect their own revenues” 
(UNHabitat, 2009: 13). These cities must also be afforded the ability to fund the ongoing and 
capital costs of such municipal services. The revenue tools should allow the cities to 
independently generate revenue for these municipal demands and also use local discretion in 
the generation of such OSR. Water revenue and municipal borrowing are used in this study to 
be municipal revenue instruments in African cities that reflect on the relationship between 
these ideal characteristics for fiscal discretion.  
 
The cities are mandated with water and sewerage service as a municipal function with the 
corresponding directive to generate revenue through this trading service. Bahl & Linn (1992) 
find that fiscal considerations are important for the pricing of water services. Water tariffs 
should cover the fixed and variable costs of water supply to ensure sustained supply. The 
cities are also required to inculcate fiscal discipline that imposes hard budget constraints on 
generating and managing water revenues to illustrate revenue autonomy which in turn lends 
itself to enhancing municipal creditworthiness (Bahl & Martinez-Vazquez, 2006: 22). The 
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study assumes that local fiscal discretion in water revenue is evident in the decisions made on 
the pricing of water and the management of income generated from the revenue instrument. 
 
The regulatory framework should also allow cities to navigate the credit requirements for 
municipal borrowing independently. This requires urban authorities to generate local capacity 
and utilize local discretion in securing long term debt. Municipal loan theory suggests that 
“municipal credit rests upon revenue raising powers” (Cowden, 1968: 197) which allow the 
cities to engage capital markets to access finance for capital expenditure. Increasing access to 
development capital reduces the reliance on intergovernmental grants for municipal capital 
expenditure. Fiscally strong local authorities can then secure loans and bonds (Smoke 2000: 
28). Therefore, to realize this particular revenue autonomy, developing countries redesigned 
“revenue systems so as to provide decentralized levels of government a much expanded 
access to own revenues to finance their budgets and thereby reduce their dependence from 
above and review the use and restrictions on debt finance” (Oates, 1999: 1144). Local fiscal 
discretion in municipal borrowing is reflected in the city’s relationship with national 
government as well as the municipal capacity to enhance creditworthiness (credit rating) 
through information of the state of the city fiscus and the local socio-political economy. The 
concept of local fiscal appropriation is determined below. 
 
2.3.2 Local Fiscal Appropriation 
 
The influence of public choice through representative and direct democracy will affect how 
public goods are provided at the national level (Rosen 2005: 87, 99). Consequently, the 
importance of local political governance over fiscal resources requires that political 
representatives have the mandate to appropriate resources to finance municipal expenditure.  
In the case of decentralization, local fiscal appropriation allows municipal councils to make 
decisions regarding local revenue because the councillors theoretically represent the element 
of accountability to local voters in African cities (Bahl & Martinez-Vazquez, 2006: 15). 
Although the concept of local appropriation has been left out in fiscal decentralization theory, 
it is important to reflect on fiscal decisions regarding the generation of OSR with particular 
reference to water revenue and municipal borrowing. 
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Trading services are the mandated local services which cities can provide and levy tariffs on 
the basis of consumption whereby “the cost per unit can be quantified and consumption value 
can be allocated to a specific consumer” (Gildenhuys, 2012: 101).  The pricing of these 
municipal services require that social and economic considerations linked to access are taken 
into account during the pricing process. Bahl & Linn determine that considerations for 
income distribution are critical because “the structure and level of user charges may in fact 
determine the extent to which low-income people make use of services like water” (1992: 
271). Local fiscal appropriation allows for such a trading service to integrate the element of 
cross-subsidization for the urban poor. Local political oversight on the management and 
pricing of water revenues thus provides an indication of such local political governance.  
 
The appropriation of profits from trading services such as water revenue through fiscal 
appropriation over the range of municipal services also emphasize the point that “municipal 
services should be regarded as whole and not as units hence the aggregation of profits” 
(Cowden, 1968: 116). Profits are also appropriated to sustain the long term costs of municipal 
borrowing where “finance for capital expenditure is borrowed on the basis of local 
government revenue” (Cowden, 1968: 116,118). The correlation of development capital and 
sustainable OSR through fiscal appropriation is important because it suggests the underlying 
importance of local political governance over OSR. Besides, the premium placed on urban 
authorities to integrate “hard budget constraints” to enhance local fiscal capacity implies that 
decentralized government must place a premium on the generation of OSR and not be overly 
“dependent on transfers from above” (Oates 1999: 1139). This requires that the projections be 
made over OSR in order to sustain for current as well as capital municipal expenditure. 
 
Finally, local fiscal appropriation requires that local political oversight remain evident in the 
management of water revenues and in the debt decisions for capital expenditure. Local 
political oversight is vested in political municipal council representatives who maintain 
horizontal accountability making the cities responsive to the needs and preferences of local 
residents (Bahl & Martinez-Vazquez, 2006: 15). The municipal capacity to independently 
reflect fiscal responsibility should positively influence its credit rating and resultant access to 
the municipal debt market. Local appropriation is thus determined by the hard budget 
constraints used to sustain OSR as well as to improve on access to municipal borrowing. 
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Therefore, generation of OSR in African cities can be seen to be a reflection of local fiscal 
autonomy. The concepts of local fiscal discretion and local fiscal appropriation point to the 
use of local fiscal capacity to the generation of OSR. By examining particular OSR namely 
the water revenue and municipal borrowing of particular African cities may reveal an 
underlying relationship that illustrates local fiscal autonomy.  Cities will use local fiscal 
discretion in determining how to generate OSR during municipal budgeting processes. Local 
fiscal appropriation is examined in the municipal political governance. The opportunity for 
appropriation can be recognized in the instance for pricing water revenue. This takes place 
during the cross-subsidization in the pricing of water revenues with funds directed to other 
aspects of water, other municipal services or capital expenditure. In terms of municipal 
borrowing, the regulatory framework should also allow for local propensity to be developed 
through municipal creditworthiness in order incur debt for capital expenditure. The sustained 
generation of OSR particularly water revenue also allows local revenue autonomy of trading 
services to be a critical determinant for municipal creditworthiness. The cities use local fiscal 
appropriation to maintain local political oversight over the water revenue and municipal 
borrowing as illustrated in Figure 2.1 below. Therefore, this conceptual framework expressed 
in this section provides an overall regulatory framework that allows the cities to assert local 
fiscal discretion in not only generating and managing water revenues but also in incurring 
municipal debt.  
 
Figure 2.1: Conceptual Model for Local Fiscal Autonomy 
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In the Figure 2.1 above, the conceptual model elaborates the revenue assignment function for 
the case cities. The central government should provide an enabling framework that outlines 
the legal and regulatory environment in which the cities can generate and manage OSR as 
well as the fiscal capacity that provides access to development finance. This municipal 
mandate should permit the cities to manage a significant portion of local revenue 
independently. The allowance for intergovernmental transfers is also included to cater for 
revenue sharing although the cities’ reliance on this revenue source should not surpass the 
revenue assignment aspect for the cities. Thus local fiscal autonomy is be projected as the 
study’s research questions which examine the regulatory framework and assigned local 
revenue tools that the case cities operate within to generate OSR. 
 
The revenue assignment should in turn issue the cities with local fiscal discretion and 
appropriation. These concepts are devolved towards the generation of OSR, shown by the 
management of water revenues and fiscal discipline for municipal creditworthiness. Local 
fiscal discretion is used for redistributive purposes in this instance. This is examined in the 
the pricing for water revenue should include social considerations whereby the municipal 
council approves as well as asserts local fiscal capacity for municipal creditworthiness. Local 
fiscal appropriation is also applied to long-term debt decisions which are based on the 
sustainable generation of OSR and the local political oversight exercised over water revenues. 
This last is scrutinized to highlight the issues that come to the fore through the contention of 
local fiscal autonomy. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter began with a reflection on how fiscal decentralization theory has influenced the 
determination of the conceptual framing for the study. The definition of local fiscal autonomy 
is given to provide the basis in which cities independently generate revenue. Local fiscal 
discretion and fiscal appropriation are then given as the conceptual components of local fiscal 
autonomy. The link between the elements of fiscal decentralization and these concepts guides 
the examination on local fiscal autonomy. Local government reforms show the manner in 
which the elements of an enabling environment including fiscal discipline and delegation of 
municipal function supported by intergovernmental transfers give effect to revenue 
assignment. The chapter then introduces the model of revenue autonomy in African cities 
presented in the conceptual model.  
 
The cities should operate within a regulatory framework that promotes independence using 
the particular OSR examples of water revenue and municipal borrowing in order to provide 
evidence of local fiscal discretion and appropriation by the cities. Therefore, the framework 
provides a link between the theory which encompasses the measurement of local fiscal 
autonomy and the utility of local revenue instruments. Local fiscal autonomy is determined 
through the independent management of water revenue and municipal borrowing. The next 
chapter presents the research methodology employed in the study to local fiscal autonomy for 
the two case cities. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3.1 METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter presents the research strategy that was used in the study. Initially, a description 
of the research orientation is given to portray the manner in which the researcher’s 
ontological view influenced the direction in which her strategy unfolds. This is followed by 
the researcher’s rationale that guides the selection of the case study method. The concluding 
section then outlines the process on how the relevant data was collected and analyzed. 
 
3.2 EPISTEMOLOGICAL ORIENTATION 
 
Prior to the study, the writer’s orientation was inclined towards positivism. Positivism seeks 
to “explain and predict what has happened in the social world by searching for irregularities 
and causal relationships between its constituent elements” and involves the use of “deductive 
reasoning to postulate theories that can be tested in a way that the world may be predicted 
and controlled” (Krauss, 2005: 760). This view was acquired during undergraduate studies 
rooted in the field of social sciences. Courses in economics and statistics inclined the writer’s 
budding orientation towards the notion of defining the known world, as it is viewed by 
researchers, as a place where “the data and its analysis are value free and data do not change 
because they are being observed” (Krauss, 2005: 761). Furthermore, “deductive reasoning 
was used to postulate theories that can be tested and controlled” in a manner in which “laws 
of cause and effect are discernible in the universe” and the research method was adopted to 
suggest answers to the development question in economic studies that relate to governance  
(Krauss, 2005: 760).  
 
The positivist perception was propagated by the cursory stance often evident in public 
administration literature that looks to fix the problems of an ineffective African public service 
through processes and policies (Adamolekun, 1999; Adebayo & Rowland, 1972; Crawthorne, 
1997). Literature abounds on Africa’s rocky path to development including practice notes and 
field reports from development and donor organizations as well as practitioners where 
African local government in particular is saddled with incapacity challenges (Adebayo & 
Rowland, 1972; Boex, 2009; Smoke, 1994).  
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This disconcerting view has been asserted through the proponents of the modernization trail 
to development who propose that the course for advancement in the continent to be directed 
as an external initiative. This is documented in public administration and decentralization 
literature (Adamolekun, 1999; Rondinelli, 1989; Conyers, 1983; Prud’homme, 2003).   
 
However, the writer’s persistent foray into graduate studies saw a shift from this ontological 
view that was mainly drawn from the constricted evidence of the perspective of African local 
government structures. The researcher’s emerging realism stance integrated constructivism 
and positivist views in the attempt to build an alternative reality for African local revenue 
autonomy (Krauss, 2005). Chilisa (2005) is vocal on the use of indigenous knowledge in the 
development discourse. The writer now feels that this view that encompasses indigenous 
experience should be integrated into the discourse on local government in the continent. She 
anticipates that capturing the nuances of the political and administrative processes of 
government in the local sphere positively alters the efficiency of government processes, as 
espoused by Cloete (1991)
3
.   
 
The writer reckons that evidence that reflects on the adoption of Western ideals on 
governance regarding African government incapacity, particularly with the continent’s abrupt 
implementation of government reforms through New Public Management, may miss nuances 
from the processes themselves that may contribute richer perspectives to the discourse on 
public sector governance (Ayee, 2005; Common, 1998; Dzimbiri, 2008). It is in order to 
address this quandary that the writer attempts to gauge the intersections between the local 
administration, local political influences; and the national regulatory environment to reflect 
on how the political and centralized developmental agenda alters the notion of an 
interdependent, yet distinct local government in the African context.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 Cloete (1991) developed a model that integrates the policy making, planning, finance, organizing, work 
procedures and control functions to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration. Although 
this paradigm was designed for apartheid government structures, the model provides a cohesive alternative to 
the numerous and disparate processes of government. 
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McFarlane calls for a contemporary reflection on development that utilizes a post-rationalist 
approach that goes beyond the traditional “linear approach” and instead considers how 
“knowledge, learning and related concepts are conceived and how this perception alters the 
context for implementation” particularly for government policy (2006: 288). This alternative 
approach determines that the repository on development knowledge may rest outside of the 
vestibule of the traditional governance architecture. It is in this vein that the writer anticipates 
the knowledge residing with African local officials and local politicians on local governance 
on particular opportunities and challenges are implicitly important to local fiscal autonomy.  
 
Arguably, the context of African local government is fraught with complexities that may mar 
these inroads to local revenue autonomy but specific cases may reflect how fiscal innovation 
has overcome the inherent challenges. Furthermore, the institutional memory as well as the 
political and administrative intersections in the local fabric will portray the local fiscal 
experience. Ospina & Dodge (2005) support the interconnectedness of the practitioner and 
the academic to enrich public administration discourse, which is the narrative that the writer 
proposes to weave. Therefore, it is the writer’s realism stance that informs this particular 
reflection of the local fiscal experience of Johannesburg and Nairobi.  
 
3.2.1 Implications for the Study 
 
The study reflects a particular experience of local fiscal autonomy in the context of African 
cities. The realism stance that the writer adopts calls for multiple realities to be converged 
from different sources to construct her perceived reality through different lenses. In order to 
construct this reality, it is important that the researcher consider “not just the voice and 
perspectives of the actors, but also of the relevant groups of actors and the interaction 
between them” in order to be able to construct the phenomena (Tellis, 1997: 2). 
 
Realism acknowledges the existence of “multiple perceptions about a single mind-
independent reality” that involves the convergence of positivism and constructivism (Krauss, 
2005: 761). How and why does local autonomy manifest in water revenue and municipal 
borrowing and how do the political and administrative actors intersect to realize local fiscal 
autonomy in generating local revenue?  
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Realism may be useful in unpacking these linkages since the stance remains “value cognisant, 
conscious of the value systems and of the researcher” (Churchland 1979, cited in Krauss, 
2005: 761). The goal of realism in this research is the “discovery of observable and non-
observable structures and mechanisms independent of the events they generate” (Krauss, 
2005: 762).  
 
The study contextualizes the political and administrative narratives that are shared by 
interviewed respondents in light of the documentary evidence presented in government 
documents to reflect upon local fiscal autonomy. Adopting a realism stance allows for the 
probing of the phenomena of the local fiscal autonomy of two African cities that are 
considered very different yet similar in the urbanization challenges they face. The 
examination also calls for a reflection on the specific interventions adopted by case cities 
over the use of specific local revenue tools that may be viewed as novel in the generation of 
OSR. Besides, the urban dynamic of the case cities illustrated during the study may reveal 
constraints and inroads during local fiscal discretion that suggests a “more intuitive 
empirically grounded generalisation” for African cities’ experience of generating OSR   as 
found by Stake (1995) (as cited in Tellis, 1997: 2). The case study method was the research 
design that was adopted for the study is given in the section below.  
 
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
  
This study was concerned with the OSR experience of local fiscal autonomy in Johannesburg 
and Nairobi. These two cities were purposefully selected to reflect on particular African cities 
with a prescribed regulatory framework for the revenue assignment function and illustrate a 
vital fiscal component of African local government. Ultimately, the aim was to redraw the 
generalisations that have been made on the discourse on the fiscal capacity of African local 
government and particularly African cities (Smoke, 1994; Smoke, 2001). The two cities are 
thus Johannesburg purposefully selected as the cases to reflect on this specific African 
experience of local fiscal autonomy.  
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The motivation for selecting the case study method was that it allows for the collection of 
“rich descriptive material” through various means that enable the reconstruction of events 
around government policies and processes. The physical data is supplemented by narratives 
from local politician and technocrats who provide insights into the complexities of generating 
OSR in the case cities to illuminate local fiscal autonomy as a specific aspect of fiscal 
decentralization in African cities (Mitchell, 2004; MacPherson, Brooker & Ainsworth 2000). 
Besides, the use of multi-site cases also allows the collection of data from various sources 
and in the natural setting, which assist in answering the case study query on the “how and 
why” issues on the cities’ financial processes of revenue mobilization in the related context as 
is explained below.  
3.4 CASE STUDY METHOD 
 
Case studies may be used to “investigate a contemporary phenomenon in depth with real life 
context especially when the boundaries between the phenomena and context are not clearly 
evident” (Yin, 2009: 18). The context of the research is the simultaneous occurrence of local 
political decisions and administrative actions to finance the provision of local services. Case 
studies are optimally used when a “holistic in-depth investigation is needed” using a unit of 
analysis that “is typically a system of actions” (Tellis, 1997:1). Johannesburg and Nairobi 
satisfy the criteria as the unit of analysis. Schramm (1971) also determined that a case study 
also illuminates how a decision was taken, the reason for implementation and provides the 
results of the decision (as cited in Yin 2009: 17). The research endeavours to analyse local 
administrative actions in light of both national and local political decisions made for specific 
local revenue tools, to reflect the experience of local fiscal capacity for revenue autonomy.  
 
Case studies may be exploratory, explanatory or descriptive (Yin, 2009; Tellis, 1997). Stake 
(2005) also identifies three types of case studies: collective, intrinsic and instrumental. The 
writer elected to use an instrumental case study to examine the cases of Nairobi and 
Johannesburg to “provide insight into the issue” of local revenue. Hence the case examination 
illustrates the experience of local fiscal autonomy while “redrawing generalisations” using 
theoretical prepositions on revenue assignment for local fiscal autonomy in the context of 
African cities (Stake, 2005: 444). Case studies favour the use of multiple data sources. 
Archival records, documents, interviews and observations are the sources of evidence that are 
used in the study (Yin, 1982; 2009).  
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Using a variety of data enhances the triangulation of data and method. Similarly, the multi-
perspective analysis projects the “voice and interaction of related groups” (Tellis 1997; Jack 
& Raturi, 2006). This reflection is useful in unpacking the engagement of local politicians, 
government officials in council management, in water utilities and in national government.  
 
Replication is also important in multi-site cases and allows the researcher to “predict 
contrasting results for anticipatable reasons” (Yin, 2009: 54). The use of two cities with 
similar local revenue tools and demand for urban services but contrasting regulatory 
frameworks allows for the replication of data collection in order to predict the differences. 
The analytic conclusions emanating from the use of theoretical replication realize that a 
“single solution is not always applicable in all situations”; rather it is “important to reflect on 
what has been done” (Rodden, Eskeland, & Litvack, 2003).  
 
In addition, the replication logic proposed by Yin (2009) and Agranoff & Radin (1991) aids 
the analysis through an iterative process to determine the manner in which political decisions 
affect local administrative processes for the local function of revenue assignment. The use of 
multi-site case studies is also useful in unearthing what might be the “leading edge of change” 
in specific situations as well as the context which is useful for reflecting on inherent 
innovations utilized by the cities to increase the specific areas of revenue (Shofield, 2004: 81, 
84). 
 
Finally, the use of case studies requires the examination of the phenomena of local revenue 
both in contemporary and retrospective context. Scrutinizing operational links is “traced over 
time instead of frequencies or incidence” to “identify adequate causal theories” and the 
formation of “supportive constituencies” in the different tiers of government towards specific 
policies and programmes (Yin, 2009; Sabatier, 1986). Evaluating policies over a longer time 
frame assists in drawing more meaningful conclusions on the desired effect of implemented 
policies since “over time objectives were clarified, research resulted in more adequate causal 
theories, and supportive constituencies were fostered both at state and local levels” according 
to Sabatier (1986: 38). 
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Besides, case studies used to trace developments over time enable research to encompass 
both the “snapshot and the moving picture” simultaneously (Agranoff & Radin, 1991). In 
summary, the multi-site case study method was chosen to enable the researcher to reflect on 
particular nuances of local fiscal discretion for water revenues and municipal borrowing in 
the two cities. The sources used to collect data are described next. 
 
3.4.1 Data Collection 
 
Using multi-site cases serves two purposes. First, the data is collected from different contexts 
using similar instruments with the purpose of replication. Second, the use of various data 
sources in the different contexts incorporates the multi-perspectives sought for the study. The 
dual approach complements the purpose of creating an overall picture of the fiscal experience 
under scrutiny. This was achieved by the physical and cyber engagement with local 
politicians, government officials and primary data described in this section. 
 
3.4.1.1 Negotiating access 
 
The researcher anticipated that sensitivities around access during data collection would arise 
from two areas. In Johannesburg, as a foreign student scrutinizing local government 
processes and in Nairobi where the writer is a citizen, the potential obstacle to accessing data 
sources was considered to be the navigation around organizational “red tape” as a hindrance 
to accessing documents and officials for the research. Thus a two-pronged approach was used 
to gain access to the data sources. Obtaining access for research purposes calls for the 
researcher to adopt a flexible approach in alternating between formal and informal channels. 
This flexible approach should enhance the researcher’s effort to gain entry, establish rapport, 
as well as maintain contact with the targeted research subjects for the duration of the study 
(Bengry-Howell & Griffin, 2012; Johl & Renganathan, 2010). Therefore, the use of formal 
and informal processes in this dual approach required the writer to be persistently innovative 
for the purpose of obtaining data identified as relevant to the study.  
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Initially, a formal request was submitted to the office of the town treasurer in the Nairobi City 
Council and to the head of finance in the city of Johannesburg’s municipal administration. 
The request provided a concise account of the purpose of the research for each city with 
specifications of intended access to council officials and documents that were required from 
the council officials and offices. This was supported by letters from the academic department, 
academic supervisor and the researcher’s registration at the university. The researcher 
anticipated that, as a result of the formal application, the senior officials would either consent 
to an interview or nominate another senior official to be interviewed as well as provide access 
to key municipal revenue documents that were not electronically available.  
 
While waiting for responses from the letters to both cities, the researcher also used informal 
channels to gain access. Informally, a senior city official in Johannesburg who was known to 
the writer from previous research was contacted to solicit pilot interviews and additional 
contacts in Johannesburg. Email requests were also sent to senior city officials who had left 
the city’s employ and had moved to academia or the private sector. Afterwards, the interview 
respondents were asked for additional contacts using common ground (research interest) to 
facilitate a positive response rate for targeted interviewees. In Nairobi, the researcher made 
use of a research assistant to gain access to the city offices and to interview the some of the 
respondents. The assistant was well versed in navigating Nairobi’s corridors of political and 
administrative power and was thus able to alleviate the common anxiety that is associated 
with researchers (Bengry-Howell & Griffin, 2012). This two-pronged approach was useful in 
gaining access in Nairobi and in Johannesburg for the purpose of data collection.  
 
Agranoff & Radin (1991:225) caution that time and access to key informants remains a 
significant challenge that is experienced in the case study method. In retrospect, the writer did 
underestimate the delays encountered in obtaining access to documents and interviewing 
officials. An extreme example is the additional clearance required for Nairobi that involved a 
tedious process of obtaining and further renewal of a Kenya research permit that took the first 
half of 2012. Nonetheless, once granted the research permit proved to be a useful admission 
tool for accessing Nairobi’s documents, officials and councillors. The specific experiences of 
gathering evidence in each city are described below. 
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3.4.1.2  Interviews  
 
Interviews are increasingly seen as a “universal mode of systemic enquiry” that is useful in 
obtaining an “in-depth experiential account of an event” (Fontana & Frey, 2005: 698-699). 
The interview technique used to gather information residing with officials and politicians was 
in-depth interviews. This particular form of interviewing is a potential rich data source which 
researchers may use to obtain intuitive material that is not recorded in written form as 
archival or current documents. The study is concerned with unpacking reflections on the 
nuances of political decisions on the municipal administration which means the writer relies 
on the experiences of political and administrative officials as a critical data source. 
 
Fontana & Frey thus deduce interviews to be negotiated instruments that may utilize a 
reflexive approach to interviews through language to “create a sharedness of meanings” for 
both the researcher and respondent in order for both to “understand the contextual nature of 
specific events (2005: 699). The conceptual lens of local fiscal autonomy used in the 
preliminary document review guided the development of the interview schedule used in 
national treasury and for council officials and local councillors. The key informants 
constituting political and administrative elite were purposefully selected because of the 
strategic positions these respondents held in relation to the fiscal processes of the two cities. 
The respondents were in the cities’ employ prior to, during or after the restructuring of local 
government in Kenya and in South Africa. Interviewing senior officials from national and 
local government helped corroborate the data drawn from documents and reports. 
 
The key informants were purposefully selected because of their insightful proximity to the 
fiscal processes of the city in question during and immediately after the fiscal crisis. The 
respondents had also been involved in crafting the agenda for fiscal revitalization in both 
Nairobi and Johannesburg. The writer also found that some of the key informants who 
responded for the interviews included those who were no longer in the council employ in the 
case of Johannesburg.  
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These past officials had also retained their institutional memory and in some instances, the 
later engagement with academia or the private sector showed them to be “comfortable with 
the practice of scholarly research” (Peabody, Hammond, Torcom, Brown, Thompson & 
Kolodny, 1990: 453). Peabody et al. (1990) assert that such interviews are potential high 
yield ways to obtain insightful information that is not often recorded in written form such as 
archival material, policies and books. The respondents were, therefore, a strong data source 
for the study. 
 
The interviews were conducted during a particular period in the cities, that is, prior to 
political elections. This elections period affected the availability of and access to officials and 
councillors differently. In Johannesburg the interviews were conducted between April and 
August 2011, which was an election year for South African local government. Outgoing 
councillors who were contacted showed a willingness to be interviewed which confirms the 
assertion of Peabody et al. (1990) on interviewing political elite that have left the political 
arena for academic or private business pursuits.  
 
The Johannesburg city officials proved to be a more hesitant group during this time which 
required the writer to be “persistently innovative to counter this reluctance” to be interviewed 
(Bengry-Howell & Griffin, 2012). Once contact was established with potential respondents, 
the writer endeavoured to maintain a routine of regular communication to secure interviews. 
Although the writer tried to sustain contact with identified respondents during and after 
municipal elections, the city’s reshuffle process meant that alternative contacts had to be 
sought when initially targeted respondents seemed improbable. The writer thus was able to 
interview senior officials who had been in the municipal administration during 
Johannesburg’s transition and democratic phase. In addition, interviews were conducted with 
officials from Johannesburg Water and at the national treasury’s unit dealing with 
municipalities.   
 
Kenya’s general elections include local elections and took place in March 2013. Interviews 
were conducted astride these elections in two phases. The first batch of interviews was done 
in August and September 2012, while the last interviews were done in February 2013. The 
interviewees in Nairobi included respondents who had been involved in Nairobi’s local 
restructuring process as well as joined the city after local reform. The Nairobi interviews 
were conducted with the assistance of a graduate research assistant.  
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The assistant was trained in the interview protocol used for council officials and councillors. 
The respondents who were interviewed provided their consent for the interview as well as 
recording the interview. The participant information sheet and consent form are attached to 
this thesis as Appendix One. 
 
 
The interview schedule was developed from the preliminary perusal of fiscal documents on 
Nairobi and Johannesburg. A pilot interview was then conducted with a senior official from 
Johannesburg to test the interview instrument. The interview guide was refined and adopted 
for politicians and officials. Representatives from the three pre-determined groups 
comprising city administration including water utilities, national treasury, and councillors 
were interviewed. The interview schedules that were used for the Nairobi are attached as 
Appendix Two and Three respectively while the Johannesburg interviews, Appendix Four 
and Five are also attached to the thesis.   
 
Table 3.1: Summary of Interviews: 
Key Informants Institutional 
Representation 
Number of Interviews 
Johannesburg Nairobi 
City officials incl City Treasury 4 7 
Local politicians 2 2 
Water utility officials 2 3 
National Treasury 2 2 
Total 10 14 
 Source: Author 
 
A total of 24 interviews were conducted in Johannesburg and Nairobi with key strategic 
respondents that were drawn from the national treasury, finance officials from the city 
administration, local officials from water utilities as well as local councillors as illustrated in 
Table 3.1 above. Field notes that were made during the interviews were later typed and saved 
on file. The interviews were also taped on digital recorder with consent from the respondents 
and were later transcribed and saved as electronic files and tape recordings in the case 
database. 
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The main challenge that the writer experienced with using this technique was that she often 
could not control the availability of the key informants which meant that it sometimes took a 
longer time for interviews to be granted or sometimes even postponed to later dates or in 
several cases alternative interviews were conducted. Besides, at any one time, the intersection 
of the political and the administrative office in local government is fraught with tension 
which impedes the access for research. The public’s unease with service delivery is 
particularly high during an election period; this adds to the tension.  
 
This writer found that politicians vacating office accepted more interviews than the city 
officials who kept postponing appointments. In view of this limitation, the researcher then 
had to reassess the intended number of interviews realistically and balance this limited 
availability with obtaining insightful interviews. The writer then decided to source informants 
with the strategic institutional memory that would depict the cities’ experience prior to, 
during and after local government reform. This challenge corresponds to the criticism on case 
study data collection raised by Agranoff & Radin (1991) that is mentioned earlier in section 
3.4.1.1. 
 
The primary data collected from the interview transcripts was examined in lights of three 
predetermined themes. These themes were centred on the nuances around the central/local 
government relationship on local revenue; the management of city revenue; as well as the 
utilization of specific local revenue tools which include the issues that emerge when cities 
work towards the fiscal objective of sustainable generation OSR. The themes were drawn 
from the research questions. The data emerging from these themes was also examined against 
financial data that was collected from primary documents explained in the next section. 
 
3.4.1.2  Documentation 
 
Primary sources of data that constitute documentary evidence are not created for research 
purposes. Notwithstanding, the value of primary data is that documents are often “stable and 
unobtrusive” for scrutiny (Merriam, 2009: 153). Moreover, documents that are archival 
documents are seen as “precise and quantitative” (Merriam, 2009: 156). The perusal of 
documents particularly government policies, reports and legislation provides information that 
enables the researcher to “make inferences and guide further investigation” (Yin, 2009: 102). 
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More importantly, documents should be used against other sources of data such as interviews 
which helps to corroborate and to augments evidence (Yin, 2009: 102,103). In view of this 
importance placed on documentary evidence, the researcher sought current and archival 
government documents that project the cities’ fiscal processes and structures within the 
national framework. The writer also looked for policies and reports that were mentioned 
during interviews to further guide the investigation of the analysis of the entire data that was 
collected. 
 
In Nairobi, the researcher was alerted to the requirement that to conduct research with public 
officials and institutions required a research permit. The research permit was obtained from 
the Ministry of Education in Kenya. The permit expedited access to documents from council 
offices and national treasury that were not accessible on the local and central government 
websites. The writer obtained physical and electronic copies of national policies; city budget 
and financial statements; council and national documents on local government reform 
ministry reports and documents on the city’s fiscal state; annual reports; medium term 
business plans; and audited statements from Nairobi City Water, Sewerage Company and 
council offices. 
 
In Johannesburg, the researcher was able to obtain most of the financial information from the 
city’s official website. For documents from Johannesburg Water, prior approval was obtained 
through the legal process that prescribes access to information of government documents. In 
addition, electronic and verbal requests were made to established contacts for documents 
from the national treasury; national department of cooperative governance that oversees 
South African municipalities; Johannesburg Water; and the council administration. The 
former local government library that housed records of the municipal council’s proceedings 
was converted to the Urban Resource Centre and this process cordoned off the library to 
public access in 2011. Although the City Director of Libraries confirmed that the researcher 
could access the library, numerous attempts to get into the library in 2011 and 2012 proved 
fruitless. Alternatively, the researcher was able to source key archival documents on 
Johannesburg’s fiscal history and local restructuring from city officials.  
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The documents collected from the two cases above were analyzed with two objectives in 
mind. The first was to extrapolate financial data on the following variables:  
OSR: the operating revenues that the case cities generate on an annual basis from using the 
various local revenue instruments  
Water revenue: the revenue generated from the supply of water and sewerage services 
including the water revenue that the cities obtain from the water utilities  
Water and sewerage tariffs: the tariffs annually set by the water utilities to price the supply 
of water and sewerage services to the different categories of consumers in the cities 
Governance of water revenue: the governance structure of the water utilities created to 
perform an independent municipal function for water and sewerage services for the cities  
Municipal debt burden: in this variable, the overall city revenue is compared with the 
municipal long-term loans for the city 
Municipal credit rating:  the independent credit rating that is performed by reputable rating 
agencies regarding the risk factors that affect municipal borrowing 
Local fiscal legislation: the laws and regulations passed by central government to enable the 
revenue sharing and revenue assignment functions for the cities  
 
The financial data was then used to project the revenue trends of municipal revenue.  The 
revenue trends were developed in the context of OSR generation through various municipal 
revenue tools, for instance, water services and municipal borrowing, as a part of a city’s 
complex annual budgeting process. The generation of municipal revenue is thus structured in 
a way that political and technical actions occur simultaneously. 
 
These processes include the: council meetings that deliberate and approve annual and 
midterm municipal budgets on expected revenues and expenditure; the development of 
municipal tariffs and charges on the varied municipal services; the final approval of 
predetermined annual tariffs; as well as the collection of service charges for the provision of a 
single municipal service such as water revenue. The municipal revenue processes may be 
examined through financial and annual municipal reports. The researcher opted to examine 
overall municipal revenue, water revenue and municipal borrowing through the examination 
of both cities’ financial statements prior to, during and after local restructuring in order to 
capture the causes and effects of local government reform in both cities.  
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Equally important in the document review is the second purpose of examining the municipal 
fiscal documents from Nairobi and Johannesburg, was to project the cities’ overall revenue 
mobilization effort in light of the political decisions on the use of municipal revenue 
instruments to generate and sustain local revenue for these cities. This required the 
determination of the regulatory environment, which prescribes the cities’ generation of 
local revenue through the relevant legislation. Thus, the generation of municipal revenue is 
examined in light of local and national political decisions as well as local fiscal capacity to 
sustain the generation of local revenue. In collecting data through the interviewing of 
strategic political and technical officials and extrapolating the financial data discussed here 
will project local fiscal autonomy for these cities. 
 
3.4.1.3  Ethical considerations 
 
The data was sourced from study participants selected because of the positions they hold in 
public office, including access to government documents that may not always be openly 
accessible to the public. On this basis, prior to the interviews, the respondents were informed 
of the structure of the interview within the overall purpose of the study to ensure “informed 
consent” (Fontana & Frey, 2005:715). Verbal or written consent was given for the interview 
as well as permission to record. To further protect the identity of the respondents, a code was 
assigned to each of the transcripts and used in citation in this thesis. 
 
A research permit was granted from the National Council for Science and Technology in the 
Kenya Ministry of Higher Education that enabled the writer to access data from Nairobi. The 
research permit is attached as Appendix Six. In order to meet the procedural ethical 
requirements of the university, ethical clearance was obtained from the university once 
approval for the proposal of the study had been granted by the Higher Degrees Committee. A 
copy of the university’s ethics research clearance protocol is attached as an Appendix Seven. 
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3.4.1.4 Data Management Plan 
 
Data collected for research purposes needs to be organized and documented in a design that 
enhances future reference. A case study database acts as a data management tool because it 
provides a chain of evidence which enhances the reliability of the study. The database also 
offers the “derivation of evidence from initial research questions to conclusions emanating 
from case study” (Tellis, 1997; Yin, 1982).  Empirical data is stored in physical and 
electronic format. Physical copies of government and council policies and documents are 
reserved in box files. Field notes taken during interviews are in notebooks. Digitally recorded 
interviews, transcripts and electronic primary data are stored as computerized files. An Excel 
spreadsheet indicates the list and location of the data. This thesis also provides citations to the 
case study database as to where actual evidence is located.  
 
3.4.2 Data Analysis 
 
The analysis of data usually begins simultaneously with the collection of pertinent 
information involving data entry, coding, descriptive analysis, cross tabulation, and the 
testing of relationships among themes (Chadwick Bahr, & Albrecht, 1984). Data analysis aids 
the researcher in constructing events to depict evidence or lack thereof of local fiscal 
discretion. Initially, the writer had anticipated that the study would also examine the role of 
international organizations: namely, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for 
their insights into public sector reforms. An outcome of the preliminary analysis was to drop 
the theme on technical assistance. 
 
The conceptual framework developed from the study forms the basis of analysis that was 
conducted at various stages (Yin, 2009: 18). At the first level of analysis, coding was done to 
“fracture the data and gravitate towards interpretation to higher levels of interpretation” 
(Strauss, 1987: 55). The dual use of quantitative data drawn from the cities’ financial reports 
and qualitative data gleaned from inferences made in the interviews constructs the narrative 
on local fiscal experience. A cross case analysis involves the “building from specific to 
general isolated data and meaningful events from the cases” with the intention of reporting 
conclusions that are “firmly embedded in the context of the case material” (Agranoff & Radin, 
1991: 219; Yin, 2009).   
54 
 
Descriptive analysis and time series that is derived from the financial data in the document 
sources were used to depict specific trends in the local management of OSR. A review of 
documents was also used to project the regulatory environment as well as the trends in water 
revenue and municipal borrowing against overall city revenue. The qualitative data was 
analyzed over several stages. By means of open coding, text from interview transcripts and 
notes were coded into initial categories developed from the predetermined themes for 
analysis to sketch out categories. The next level of analysis was iterative and involved the 
examination of these preliminary codes against emerging patterns and relationships to 
construct a reality on the cities’ fiscal states and discretion (Strauss, 1987). The final level of 
analysis was then conducted against the conceptual framework developed for the study in 
light of the theoretical propositions that had been developed earlier.  
 
3.4.2.1 Use of CAQDAS 
 
The use of computer-assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) has raised 
several criticisms. CAQDAS is criticized for lacking uniform protocols which can aid 
researchers in qualitative analysis. Another disadvantage of CAQDAS is the software’s 
inability to deal with temporal data which requires consideration of space and time data 
(Bhowmick, 2006: 9). Despite these limitations, the use of Atlas ti has been recommended to 
PhD students to assist in the analysis of qualitative data because CAQDAS aids the 
development of a data management system and the organization and retrieval of data. 
CAQDAS also supports the coding process and helps researchers check for consistency as the 
coding process evolves (Wickham & Woods, 2005).  
 
The writer elected to use CAQDAS software to analyze the qualitative data sourced from 
interviews because the analytic tool provides the researcher with ease of coding and retrieval 
of data and enhances the testing of relationships in the data through visualization. The 
software allows the research process to be reflexive and allows emerging patterns to be 
synthesized into the conceptual framework for analysis (Rademaker, Grace & Curda, 2012; 
Wickham & Woods, 2005; Marshall, 2002). 
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3.4.2.2 Reliability and validity  
 
Creswell & Miller (2000) advance a two-dimension framework that can be used to validate 
studies using three research lenses: lens of the researcher; lens of the study participants and 
lens of people external to the study. Three paradigms are suggested by the authors. In the first 
instance, the post-positivist paradigm triangulates the sources of data; uses member checking 
during analysis which involves taking the data back to the participants for review through 
focus groups; and also uses an audit trail with memos and the research log providing a 
narrative account of data collection. The second constructivist paradigm calls for the use of 
the researcher’s lens to dis-confirm or negate evidence in the field. This is achieved through 
prolonged engagement in the field and uses a thick rich description to detail the accounts of 
the study.  
 
The last paradigm referred to as the critical paradigm requires the researcher to provide a 
personal narrative on the research process, collaborate with participants in the data collection 
and analysis, and use a peer reviewer who is familiar with the research to examine the 
research to “assist in reviewing the research in challenging the researcher’s assumptions and 
pushing the researcher to the next step methodologically”. 
 
To enhance the reliability of the study, this writer triangulates the data collected across the 
various sources of data and the different categories of interview participants to check for 
areas of congruence and divergence in the conceptual framework. The writer also envisaged 
that she would be able to present her research finding to a round-table constituting of national 
and local treasury officials that would cater for member checking and peer-review. Instead a 
research colloquium for an international conference of local government officials and 
politicians taking place in Africa in May 2013 presented this opportunity for member 
checking and peer review. The researcher presented part of the research findings at this 
colloquium. The comments and inputs were useful in guiding the final analysis and drafting 
of the study. The annual PhD forums were also used to engage fellow students and academics 
to compel the researcher’s analysis towards the final step of the research. 
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3.3.2.3 Limitations of data collection 
 
The writer intended to interview officials located in both ministries of local government in 
Kenya and South Africa but both career progression of targeted officials and the looming 
national elections circumvented the writer’s efforts to interview targeted officials from the 
ministries. In South Africa, attempts to locate relevant officials at the provincial office and 
the national department were unsuccessful. In Kenya, requests for interviews at the ministry 
were not responded to, which may be attributed to the newly established transitional authority 
dealing with the new municipal structures implemented after the 2013 elections. The 
researcher was able to obtain documents and policies on that guides the process Kenya’s local 
government reform by the parent ministry of local government from the Town Treasurer’s 
offices. In South Africa, electronic copies of the national framework for the parent ministry’s 
oversight were provided to the researcher. 
 
3.4.3 Notes on Terminology 
 
In order to protect the identity of the key informants that were interviewed for the Nairobi 
and Johannesburg cases; the terminology used to cite the transcripts that were used in the 
study shows user-defined classifications of the primary documents in the CAQDAS database 
as given below in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Key to Interview Transcript Citation 
Officials: 
P1: JO - Officials in city; ministry; utility in Johannesburg 
P1: NO - Officials in city; ministry; utility in Nairobi 
Politicians: 
P1: JC -  Local politicians in Johannesburg 
P1: NC - Local politicians in Nairobi 
 Source: Author 
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Conclusion 
 
The chapter presented the research strategy that was employed to extrapolate and analyse 
data relating to local fiscal autonomy in Nairobi and Johannesburg. The multi-site case 
method was useful in sourcing fiscal information from these two cities from the various data 
sources and guided the researcher’s interviews of key informants with insight into the 
processes of local government reform. The data collection provided information that was 
used to scrutinise how the cities undertook local reforms to improve local governance and 
also enhance the local fiscal state.  
 
The interdependence of government particularly concerning fiscal resources has implications 
for the assertion of local fiscal autonomy. This is particularly important in African 
governments that for all purposes are expected to direct fiscal resources towards the 
developmental and redistributive nature of service delivery. The next chapter expounds more 
on the framework that devolved fiscal resources in Kenya and South Africa while the 
subsequent chapters reflect on the function of the revenue assignment in these African cities.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
 
CRAFTING MUNICIPAL REVENUE ASSIGNMENT 
 
This chapter provides an account of how the local revenue function has been devolved to sub-
national government in Kenya and in South Africa taking into cognizance the elements of 
regulation and intergovernmental transfers. The purpose of the chapter is to examine the 
regulatory and legal framework that caters for local fiscal autonomy in Nairobi and 
Johannesburg. Initially, the framework for generation of local revenue for Kenyan local 
authorities prior to the adoption of reform measures is examined. The impact of the 
centralized restructuring process on Nairobi’s fiscal tools is then provided. Finally, South 
Africa’s local government reforms are discussed as the context for the realignment of 
Johannesburg’s revenue instruments. 
 
4.1 ENHANCING REVENUE THROUGH REFORM 
 
The rationale that guides the use of fiscal tools in the local generation of revenue involves 
maintaining utility of the revenue, while taking into account the redistribution concerns 
against the operating and capital costs of municipal service provision (Heyns, 1995; Bird, 
1993; Bird, 1999). These concerns driven by the need to generate revenue to finance 
expenditure are always tempered by how much of the tax base can really afford to pay for the 
service and what redistribution options are available to assure equity.  
 
This dilemma is solved in part by the way local government sources revenue through charges 
for trading services that cover cost of service provision and sometimes subsidize other 
services; locally collected taxes such as property tax; licensing fees; grants from central 
government; and municipal borrowing from a variety of options (Bahl & Linn, 1992: 32-41; 
Bird, 2000; UNHabitat, 2009b). These sources of revenue have not always been optimally 
utilized as was earlier discussed in the theoretical section. 
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Fiscal discrepancies between local governments and inadequate financing for municipal 
infrastructure partly motivated the national reform process in Kenya and South Africa. The 
local government reform was intended to align these internal and external sources of revenue 
with corresponding municipal functions and in the case of urban authorities assert the 
municipal capacity to generate a significant portion of city revenues independently. This has 
resulted in the adoption of additional and sometimes novel use of local revenue instruments 
that are regulated by a framework to enhance the fiscal capacities of cities while assuring 
dedicated channels of the grant system to co-finance shared services. In view of the above, 
the following country reflections present the context and the regulatory framework that has 
evidenced an evolution in the revenue of both cities that will be discussed later in chapter five 
and six. 
 
4.2 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF KENYA 
 
Shortly after independence in 1964, Kenya became a one-party state with the merging of the 
Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union. With 
KANU as ruling party, President Kenyatta led the country until 1978 when President Moi 
took over as the country’s leader. Recognition of political parties in 1992 opened the 
discourse and political landscape for multi-partyism. By 2002, when President Moi 
constitutionally retired; the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) which was a merger of 
several opposition parties including the Democratic Party, and the FORD-Kenya
4
, won the 
general election and leadership of the country with President Kibaki at the helm (APRM, 
2006: 40-44).  
 
President Kibaki governed from 2002 to 2012, and President Uhuru Kenyatta was elected in 
March 2013. Local and parliamentary elections take place concurrently during general 
elections in Kenya, thus the local governing term similarly applies as the presidential term. 
Nairobi’s uni-party political leadership also changed in 1992 with the adoption of multi-party 
elections in Kenya. Opposition politics were similarly mirrored in the city’s political 
leadership until 2002 when the ruling NARC secured all the wards as follows: 
 
                                                          
4
 Seven political parties won parliamentary seats after the historic 2002 general elections: NARC; KANU; 
FORD-People; FORD-Asili; Sisi kwa Sisi; SAFINA; Shirikisho Party of Kenya.  
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Nairobi’s Voting History: 
 1992:        FORD ASILI (Langata – FORD KENYA) 
 1997:        DP (Langata – NDP, Westlands - KANU) 
 2002:        NARC  
 2007:        PNU (Langata, Westlands - ODM) 
 2013:      CORD 
The first constitution of Kenya was a constitution charter that was adopted at independence. 
The antiquated constitution remained invisible to the socio-economic aspirations of Kenyan 
citizens during its forty-five year existence, during which the Kenyan government used the 
rule of law in parliament to effect legislation and an executive that centrally controlled 
resources for public services. The centralized management did not necessarily allocate fiscal 
transfers efficiently which was to the detriment of the development of Kenya’s sub-national 
government, according to Smoke (1994). The initial attempt at reforming the constitution 
undertaken in 1997 with limited citizen engagement did not offer substantial changes to the 
archaic constitution or to the national political landscape.  Renewed efforts in 2002 produced 
a new draft that was achieved mainly through the Bomas consultative process that catered for 
civic engagement and provided the leverage for the Kenyan opposition to win the 2002 
elections.  
 
When President Kibaki assumed office, the NARC government committed to adopting a new 
constitution immediately. However, the 2002 version of the draft constitution still remained a 
bone of contention between political parties in the sections concerning executive powers that 
were proposed
5
. This was confirmed when the national referendum of 2005 rejected outright 
the draft constitution (APRM, 2006: 50-52). The draft constitution was refined again 
although without the active engagement of local government structures and stakeholders. 
This exclusion of sub-national government interests meant that salient issues involving 
interdependence of government spheres remained unchanged in the draft. The Kenya 
Constitution was finally adopted in August 2010 (RoK, 2010).  
 
                                                          
5
 These proposals included the dissection of the office of the executive president into that of a ceremonial 
president and a prime minister’s office. 
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National development had previously followed a five year course but in 2008, the 
Government of Kenya adopted a long-term development vision for the country, Kenya Vision 
2030. The vision acknowledged socio-economic challenges facing the country and outlines 
the state’s commitment to utilize available resources to channel towards infrastructure 
investments to improve the public sector machinery in order for the country to become a 
middle-income country.  
 
The development plan takes into cognizance social, economic and political pillars of 
governance and acknowledges the developmental role of local government more openly than 
the country’s previous development intentions (GoK, 2008a).  The long-term vision provides 
the blue print for medium-term planning and also compels local authorities to align local 
development plans with Vision 2030. As the capital city, Nairobi subsequently adopted the 
Nairobi Metro 2030 vision that aims to garner social and economic infrastructure in the 
region to promote development (GoK, 2008b).  
 
In this political context, Kenya has experienced three distinct economic phases. From 1963 
into the late 1980s, the country experienced economic growth that was attributed to peace and 
the security of a stable government. However, dissatisfaction with the de facto state 
evidenced by blatant corruption that had permeated the social and economic fabric of Kenyan 
society resulted in an abrupt freeze of development aid from international donors. The lack of 
this considerable source of funding needed for overall government expenditure also resulted 
in a negative prolonged economic slump in the decade of the 1990s.  
 
The multi-party elections of 2002 and the commitment to remove corruption combined with 
development partners and renewed focus on the vibrant informal economy have resulted in a 
positive trend in economic growth with year-on-year increases in national GDP. Table 4.1 
below shows that even during the economic crisis that rocked the global economy from 2008, 
Kenya continued to experience a positive increase in the country’s annual growth rate in GDP. 
This economic growth is similar to African countries that had experienced slumps caused by 
adoption of structural adjustment programmes and fall in commodity prices which their 
economies heavily relied upon. 
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Table 4.1: Kenya’s Annual Economic Growth 2002-2011 
 
Source: GoK, 2008:1 & World Bank, 2012
6
 
 
Therefore, the political and economic country environment presented above shows that 
Kenya is moving towards an inclusive political economy through multi-party governance. 
The country has reversed the downward trend caused by caused by donor withdrawal of 
development funds and is experiencing a positive gradual economic growth. The section 
below examines the evolution of Nairobi’s revenue within this country. 
 
4.2.1 Revenue History of Kenya’s Local Authorities 
 
Kenya inherited a decentralized state in which its executive authority was delegated to 
provincial and local government but “not the transference of comprehensive high-level 
decision making to lower authorities”; this shows the “centralized monitoring and control” of 
resources was retained by national government (Gildenhuys & Knipe, 2000: 240). At 
independence, the country was demarcated first into nine provinces and then local 
government into distinct categories that comprised: three cities with Nairobi as the primary 
city as it had the highest concentration of population and of investment, town councils, and 
counties used to classify rural constituencies
7
.  
 
                                                          
6
 World Bank provides annual data on countries including the annual economic rate of growth see 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/KE?display=graph  
7
 Previous amendments to the Local Government Act awarded Nairobi provincial status which meant that 
Nairobi was officially the capital with provincial status as well. The Kenya Constitution (2010) replaced the 8 
provinces with 47 counties for the entire republic. The Urban Areas and Cities Act (2011) reclassifies cities, 
towns and municipalities and explicitly recognizes Nairobi as the capital city that is also managed as a County 
Government. These changes were effected after national elections in March 2013. 
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The jurisdiction of the legal instruments for regulating revenue generation of urban 
authorities was restricted to the promulgation of local by-laws with approval from the parent 
ministry of local government. Unfortunately, this was a mechanism that local authorities were 
unable to utilize optimally to generate OSR (GoK, 1996: 40). In terms of the fiscal landscape, 
the regulatory framework for local revenue remained largely unchanged for almost fifty years.  
 
The overall legal framework was the 1967 Local Government Act (Cap 265) that regulated 
the entire political and administrative structures and processes of the 175 local authorities in 
Kenya until 2013. The act also catered for municipal revenue by stipulating the independent 
means of own source of local revenues as well as external revenue from central government 
and other external sources. These local revenue instruments have remained largely unchanged 
with minor modifications. Internally, the utilization of revenue tools includes user fees, for 
instance, imposing charges on water and sewerage services; licensing including the Single 
Business Permit; and rates and housing rentals (ALGA-K, 2006: 20). Other internal capital 
funds include the General Fund and the Road Maintenance Fund that are expected to 
supplement the financing of municipal infrastructure. 
 
Water revenue initially derived authority from the local law that prescribed the establishment 
of an individual local authority water fund into which revenue surpluses were accumulated 
and used at the city’s discretion for water infrastructure. Water revenue has been effectively 
changed by a national water framework that will be discussed later in chapter five. 
 
Externally, central government is a significant source of revenue through the 
intergovernmental transfers of predetermined allocations from national income. The local 
revenues from central government comprise the Local Authority Transfer Funds (LATF); 
Road Maintenance Fuel Levy and specific grants from development partners and non-
governmental organizations (ALGA-K, 2006: 21). Municipal borrowing for capital 
expenditure is also permitted whereby the local council is required to authorize lending on 
approval from the parent ministry. The following legal instruments supplement the local 
government act for revenue mobilization. 
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Income from property rates is prescribed by the Rating Act (Cap 267) that allows the 
imposition of rates on land and buildings as well as by the Valuation of Rating Act (Cap 266) 
that prescribes how local authorities value land for rating purposes. The potential contribution 
of rates to municipal income is yet to be fully realized by Kenya’s local government. This 
limitation is mainly attributed to inelastic rates that are used for assessing property values and 
the deficiencies encountered through the inadequate administrative and valuation processes 
that continue to inhibit growth in rates income (Konyimbih, 1996; Franzsen & Olima, 2003; 
Gachuru & Olima, 1998).  
 
A case in point is the decline in local revenue property rates since 1990 as the “importance of 
rates in Kenya declined in real terms over time, in relative contribution to total local 
authorities’ revenue, and as a percentage of GDP” (Kelly, 1999: 10). The trend is still evident 
from contemporary reflections on municipal revenues (KNBS, 2012). Cities with housing 
stock also obtain rental income that has remained negligible to local revenue coffers because 
rents charged by local councils have stayed well below market levels which contradicts the 
exorbitant administrative and human costs incurred for rental collections (GoK, 1996: 83)  
 
The Trading Licenses Act (Cap 497) require businesses to pay a variety of trading fees to 
operate. Cities and towns with an economic base are the likely authorities that benefit from 
this legislation. The implementation of this trading legislation is also prone to interference 
from national ministries that apportion and collect trading fees from private enterprises. This 
disjointed use of different government tiers extracting revenue using the same instrument has 
raised an outcry in the business community (KAM, 2010).  
 
Legislation for municipal borrowing is supported by the Local Government Loan Authority 
Act (Cap 270) that allows a local authority to “raise loans for such purposes relating to its 
function” from sources and under conditions that are approved by the parent ministry (1967: 
Clause 222). The stipulation permits sub-national government to borrow locally and overseas 
with central government acting as sole guarantor for the local authorities’ long-term debt.  
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This has produced the high indebtedness of local authorities to internal sources as is 
evidenced by the depletion of funds from the Local Government Loans Authority (Chapman 
et al., 2003:1531). Besides, the inadequacies of the legal framework in dealing with the 
growing financial needs of local authorities coupled with the capacity constraints of the 
authorities themselves, has resulted in the increasing dependence on central government for 
fiscal relief and the accentuated erosion of the local structures for revenue mobilization 
(Crane, 2004; RoK, 2007). 
 
The distinction between rural and urban local authorities also had implications on the use of 
local revenue amongst rural authorities that rely almost entirely on central government while 
urban authorities eke out revenue from limited tools that are intermittently supplemented by 
central transfers. To accentuate the fiscal crisis in local authorities, the rhetoric on rural 
development ignores the stylized erosion of local revenue; the District Focus for Rural 
Development (DFRD) strategy is a case in point as the five year emphatic for rural 
development has had negligible results for local revenue autonomy (Wamwangi & 
Kundishora, 2003: 21-23).  
 
Moreover, revenue sharing being more explicit in local financing also conveys the 
inadequacies in local financing of mandated services. Additionally, Crane (2004) maintains 
that the regulatory framework for intergovernmental transfers remains inadequate particularly 
for ensuring the sustained financing with disbursements through the road maintenance fund 
from central government. According to Smoke (1994) writing on Kenya’s local revenue 
twenty years ago, the heavy reliance on intergovernmental transfers and limited use of local 
revenue instruments required structural and legislative changes that would improve the 
intergovernmental transfer system. The enhanced revenue flows from central government 
would in turn increase local revenue. Eventually the local restructuring was driven partly by 
the need to improve accountability of local government in development projects and partly by 
evidence presented by the first national commission appointed by the Kenyan head of state to 
critically examine the affairs on local governance in the mid-1990s. 
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Omamo Commission of Inquiry into Local Government 1995  
 
The dismal state of sub-national government in Kenya continued until the 1990s when 
evidence of fiscal inadequacies was linked to corruption and stagnant development in local 
authorities was made public. The local fiscal stress also went against the increasing 
recognition of the development role that the grassroots tier of government was expected to 
contribute to economic growth as had been repeatedly proposed as a way to enhance 
decentralization (Smoke, 1994). The first comprehensive attempt to reflect nationally on the 
crisis of Kenya’s local authorities was the Omamo Commission of Inquiry that was appointed 
by former President Moi (GoK, 1996). The terms of reference were specifically to 
 enquire into the future structure, powers, legal framework, functions, financing and 
staffing of local authorities at all levels countrywide; 
 look into the elevation of Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru and Eldoret to city status; 
 consider the division of Nairobi City Council and the above cities into boroughs; 
 recommend a system that would increase active local participation in the designing 
and implementation of development plans; 
 examine local authority licences and regulations that inhibit development; 
 enquire generally or in particular into any other matter pertaining to the foregoing. 
(GoK, 1995: ix). 
 
The findings by the Commission reiterate the fiscal crisis of local authorities. The lack of 
revenue autonomy by a majority of Kenya’s local authorities meant that the absence of local 
discretion for revenue mobilization was glaringly evident in the limited local generation of 
OSR. The perpetual dependence on central transfers that were ad hoc at the time exacerbated 
this dilemma (GoK, 1996). The recommendations that were made called for improvements in 
policy, introducing a streamlined grant system as well as additional revenue instruments for 
local authorities. These recommendations are also confirmed by Chapman et al. (2003) who 
explain that the local fiscal stress experienced by Kenya’s local government could be 
alleviated if local revenue autonomy was enhanced. Legal and structural reforms were 
subsequently implemented by the Kenyan central government after the findings and 
recommendations of the Omamo Commission. Kenya’s restructuring of local government 
follows below. 
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4.3 KENYA LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM 
 
Local authorities will be the target of focused intervention to improve 
local economic performance, transparency and accountability. 
Through the Local Authorities Transfer Fund, LATF mechanism local 
authorities will be improving their local service delivery and financial 
management through submitting improved budgets, financial 
statements, debt plans, and local service delivery plans in order to 
annually increase the LATF monies. In addition, local authorities will 
be introducing a local level integrated financial management system 
(IFMS) to assist in the efficient and transparent management of all 
local expenditures and revenues. 
(GoK, 2000: Clause 4.7) 
 
At the height of the local fiscal crisis in Kenya, indications pointing to inadequate resources 
and the limited citizen engagement with the governance structures had resulted in the 
stagnation of provision of local services as well as the financing for the maintenance and 
improvement of critical municipal infrastructure (GoK, 1996; RoK, 2002a; Matovu, 2003; 
Ndegwa & Levy, 2003). These pressures prompted central government to introduce measures 
that would enhance governance particularly in matters of accountability, transparency and 
participation. A national process using legislative and structural changes in local authorities 
through a national reform programme is described below. 
 
4.3.1 Laws Affecting Local Revenue after 1995 
 
Local Authority Fund Transfer Act No. 8 of 1998 
 
The first legislative change for local revenue was intended to enhance the intergovernmental 
transfer system through the Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF) in 1998. In terms of 
regulating intergovernmental transfers, the Local Government Fund Transfer Act replaced 
previous legislation on revenue sharing that had encumbered local authorities’ indebtedness 
to central government. The specific objectives of the LATF were to increase service delivery; 
enhance financial management and eliminate the mammoth levels of municipal debt of local 
authorities. The act also effectively introduced specific arrangements relating to income tax 
revenue sharing among the government tiers. Since 1999, local authorities have been 
annually entitled to 5% of income tax revenues.  
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The LATF expenditure is tied to fiscal rules that dictate 60% of the LATF revenue be 
directed to community development plans and 40% in line with the timely submission of 
financial statements and documents. Since the introduction of the LATF, the stable and 
sustained income source has seen a steady increase of total revenues for local authorities from 
Ksh 1billion in 1999/2000 to Ksh 7.5 billion in 2006/2007 (RoK, 2007:18).  
 
The consistency in local revenue has also boosted municipal spending on capital development 
projects by local authorities; increased financial viability; and reduced the debt ratio of local 
government. The major criticism that has been raised against the LATF is that the increasing 
dependence on intergovernmental transfers from central government erodes local options for 
revenue mobilization (Gitau & Amaya, 2003; Crane, 2004). A review commissioned by the 
national ministry found that the LATF regulations and penalties had forced local authorities 
to improve financial reporting and management and reduce individual debt levels (RoK, 
2007).  
 
Water Act No. 8 of 2002 
 
Previously, the local water sector in Kenya was in crisis as was the rest of the sub-national 
government. At the local level, Nairobi in particular appropriated water revenues towards 
other municipal expenditure; the local financial management was in disarray as evidenced by 
faulty meters and incorrect billing further deflating water income. Besides financing for water 
infrastructure had been minimally utilized which led to further decay of the municipal 
infrastructure (NCC, 2002; NCWSC, 2004; RoK, 2002a). Central government promulgated 
legislation through the Water Act (2002) to institutionalize the centralization of water 
resources by abolishing the historic water and sewerage departments in local government and 
replacing them with autonomous water services providers (RoK, 2002c).  
 
Now the overall structures on water regulation and water services from the national ministry 
downwards to the local level of water service provision are primarily funded from the water 
sector. This water institutional framework in turn directs the financing arrangements for 
water utilities. 
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This deflection from the previous municipal tariff setting process removes the fiscal function 
of water services completely from local government. By 2008 water utilities had replaced the 
water sewerage departments in local authorities with 90 registered water service providers in 
Kenya (WASREB, 2008). The national process is examined further in the next chapter in 
section 5.3 that examines Nairobi’s water utility. 
 
Urban Areas and Cities Act No 13 of 2011 
 
The Urban Areas and Cities Act (2011) replaced the Local Government Act (1967) as from 
March 2013. This legislation determines more explicit provisions for new city demarcation; 
enhanced public participation in local service delivery; and the accountability provisions for 
public office. In terms of local finance, the new legislation retains the old order and 
determines similar imposition of fees and charges for the provision of municipal services as 
well as local lending for sub-national government. The structural changes that were 
implemented by the parent ministry are given to show the centralised nature of reform of 
Kenya’s local sphere. 
 
4.3.2 Structural Reforms  
 
The Kenya Local Government Reform Programme (KLGRP) was established in 1998 to 
guide local government reform for “good governance, efficient service delivery and local 
economic development” which was supported by the parent ministry of local government. 
The local government reforms implemented in Kenya were targeted at both the revenue 
sharing and revenue assignment functions of sub-national government. In the first case, the 
voice of the community was expected to be translated into objectives of service delivery 
through public participation. Additionally, central government made provisions to rationalize 
some of the revenue streams to enhance access to sustainable revenue. These revenue 
changes were also enhanced by the overhaul and introduction of new financial systems in 
order to improve financial recordkeeping, a practice that had eluded Kenyan local 
government. These structural changes were constituted as follows: 
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Single Business Permit 
  
In the past, businesses operating in local authorities were required to obtain a plethora of 
licenses from the respective local authorities as well as from various national ministries. The 
local reform resulted in the Kenyan government ceding to local authorities trading licenses 
which had been merged into a single license. The Single Business Permit (SBP) is now levied 
on all businesses that operate in cities and towns where a progressive standardized tariff 
structure is used by the local authorities at their discretion in setting the annual rates for the 
SBP (Devas & Kelly, 2001). This has produced a steady increase in local revenue for the 123 
local authorities implementing the SBP by the year 2000 (Devas & Kelly, 2001: 388). 
However, not all national ministries that previously levied trade licensing on businesses have 
ceded this licensing function to local authorities. As a result, confusion is evident in the 
apparent overlap of mandate between the regulating agencies in local authorities and central 
government while inefficiencies in the procedures of licensing still plague the SBP (Devas & 
Kelly, 2001; KAM, 2010; MoLG, 2006). 
 
Integrated Finance Management Systems for Local Authorities 
 
The urgent need for verifiable financial records for local authorities was essential for 
financial reporting as well for reflecting the financial position of sub-national government 
(ALGA-K, 2006: 21-23). Prior to reform, communities as stakeholders, central government 
and local authorities themselves were at a loss in reflecting the state of municipal fiscus 
accurately (GoK, 1996; Wamwangi & Kundishora, 2003). This handicap necessitated the 
improvement of local authorities’ financial management systems through the focus on 
revenue and expenditure accounting. A new uniform system for reporting local finances was 
introduced; the Local Authorities Integrated Financial Operations Management System 
(LAIFOMS) was implemented through the parent ministry of local government which 
standardizes the financial reporting systems. Local authorities were also tasked to implement 
revenue enhancement plans within individual departments (MoLG, 2007; OPM/MoLG2009). 
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Public Participation for the LATF Expenditure  
 
Public participation previously involved the DFRD strategies did not align local revenue with 
development projects but was considered to be a “top-down” affair (Chapman et al., 2003). 
This discrepancy was addressed by mandating the participation of resident communities in 
the spending of the LATF revenue allocations. The local authority service delivery plan 
(LASDAP) was adopted by Kenya’s sub-national government to support the expenditure 
process for the LATF. LASDAP constitutes a three-year consultative planning process that 
requires the input of stakeholders who represent the local community. The consultation seeks 
to ensure that community needs for government services are aligned with intended municipal 
expenditure by local authorities on specific development projects. The process involves 
representatives from the NGOs, business organizations, health and professional organizations, 
resident associations as well as individual residents.  
 
LASDAP should be used to identify and prioritize local resources; encourage spending on 
service delivery; encourage participation as well as increase accountability to communities in 
the spending of the LATF (RoK, 2009: 2). The importance of involving communities and 
encouraging local authorities to embrace LASDAP and integrate the plan into other local 
government planning and national processes for development has been emphasized by central 
government (RoK, 2005; RoK, 2009). However, despite evidence on adherence to the 
requirement for participation, citizen engagement has been rather limited particularly in the 
monitoring of the LATF projects (RoK, 2007).  
 
Oyugi (2008) gives anecdotal evidence on the inadequacies of the LATF regulations 
regarding the actual service delivery of disbursed funds; the mammoth municipal debt facing 
Kenya’s sub-national government; and improving the capacities of local authorities to 
generate revenues independently. Although the LATF remains an important revenue stream 
through the Kenya intergovernmental transfer system, the local fiscal capacity for generating 
revenue requires additional legislation. Therefore, the need to build local fiscal autonomy for 
the cities of Mombasa, Kisumu and Nairobi is critical in the financing of municipal services 
and infrastructure and should be considered in Kenya’s legislative framework for local 
revenue. 
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4.3.3 Transitional Measures and Kenya’s 2013 Elections 
 
After the adoption of the Kenya Constitution in 2010, a transitional authority was established 
to guide the transition of the country into a new system of devolved government and give 
effect to the Transition to Devolved Government Act, 2012. The authority was expected to 
develop and adopt guiding principles for the new county structures which replaced provinces 
after the 2013 elections in order to enables the counties execute the new mandate (RoK, 
2010).  
 
The transitional authority also provided procedural guidelines for assumption of office of 
county governors from March 2013. This oversight organ was to ensure that the executive 
structures of counties throughout the republic were operational after the prescribed elections 
(Sunday Nation, 2013).  Nairobi was part of these transitional changes because of the county 
status awarded by national legislation (RoK, 2010). 
 
This means that even after Kenya’s 2013 elections, the dual existence prescribed for Nairobi 
by the new law governing counties and the local government legislation that are now made 
up of areas and cities confers Nairobi with preferential city status as did previous legislation. 
Although the above legislative, structural and transitional measures will contribute to more 
accountability from local government, revenue is still an important piece of the local puzzle. 
The consideration of local fiscal autonomy is not fully reflected in Kenya’s improved 
regulatory and legislative framework for local revenue. Therefore, the reforms have 
positively altered the local fiscal landscape but the regulatory framework has accentuated 
dependence on central government with increases in local revenue.  
 
In summary, evidence reflects that the Kenyan government has implemented legal and 
structural reforms to enhance the revenue function and financial management of the local tier. 
These reforms have been particularly useful in articulating the intergovernmental transfer 
system to assure not only the sustained revenue sharing sources from central government but 
also that development funding is sustained by local authorities. In addition, the reforms aid in 
issuing a standardized financial reporting format to enhance local fiscal governance.  
 
 
73 
 
Nonetheless, the overall local government income has steadily increased since the reforms. 
The streamlined intergovernmental transfers and SBP now confirm the positive revenue 
flows to Kenya’s sub-national government. Table 4.2 below shows a double increase in the 
total revenue of Kenyan local authorities of KSh 9,875.65 million in 2007/08 to KSh 
18,916.16 million in 2011/12. The revenue includes income from the Nairobi City Council, 
hides the reality that Nairobi’s significant income constitutes roughly 60% of total revenues 
of all Kenyan local authorities (NCC, 2009; NCC, 2010).  
 
Table 4.2: Municipal Councils’ – Economic Analysis of Revenue 2007/08 – 2011/12 
          KSh million 
 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11** 2011/12** 
CURRENT REVENUE: 
Direct Taxes (rates) 
Indirect Taxes (licences) 
Income from Property 
Current Transfers* 
Sale of Goods and Services 
CAPITAL REVENUE: 
Loans Raised 
Loan Repayment 
9,407.55 
2,365.28 
993.68 
896.27 
1701.17 
3,451.00 
12,793.55 
2,883.85 
1,874.17 
900.32 
2,187.79 
3,432.50 
13,081.85 
3,247.15 
2,014.35 
798.57 
1,718.11 
5,303.67 
13,429.54 
3,428.31 
2,042.39 
713.92 
2,009.17 
5,235.75 
18,113.20 
4,352.16 
2,957.65 
957.35 
2.589.67 
7,256.37 
468.26 514.92 605.42 601.94 802.96 
463.99 
4.27 
511.68 
3.24 
602.44 
2.98 
598.75 
3.19 
798.67 
4.29 
TOTAL REVENUE 9,875.65 13,308.47 13,687.27 14,031.48 18,916.16 
* Excludes LATF 
**Provisional  
Source: KNBS, 2012: 112 
 
The centralized manner in which the state implemented Kenya’s local reforms limited the 
engagement of local government structures in the conceptualization of reform. The rote 
implementation of the reform requirements by local government typifies a unitary state 
(Gildenhuys & Knipe, 2000). Therefore, the Kenyan local government reform processes do 
not offer a radical alteration to the previous legal and regulatory framework for local 
revenue despite the inroads that have been made to streamline the intergovernmental transfer 
system. Nairobi’s local fiscal autonomy will be constrained by the legislation that in turn 
limits the city’s local fiscal discretion and appropriation, both of which are important in 
ascribing the revenue assignment function. The issue of the experience of Nairobi is further 
scrutinized in the succeeding chapter. 
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4.4 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOUTH AFRICA  
 
In 1994, South Africa was the last African state to attain independence. The first democratic 
elections razed the National Party’s8 fifty-year stronghold on the country’s political landscape 
with the African National Congress (ANC) winning the elections. As the ruling party, the 
ANC continues to govern the country after winning the subsequent three elections. Three 
presidents ruled in this period: from 1994 the late President Mandela ruled for a single 
presidential term; in 1999 and in 2004 President Mbeki was at the helm, and since 2009 
President Zuma has been the leader. During this period, the ruling party has initiated and 
implemented several medium-term development plans that were intended to reverse the 
country’s apartheid legacy and to promote socio-economic development. The political 
leadership in Johannesburg also mirrors this national landscape which has seen leadership of 
the metropolitan municipality of Johannesburg be retained by the ruling party in governance 
since 2000 (CoJ, 2003a: 21). 
 
The South African government has implemented various policies to reverse the apartheid 
legacy that skewed the socio-economic landscape of the country. A total of five medium 
development plans have been adopted since 1994. The country’s first long-term development 
plan that was conceptualized and developed by the National Planning Commission situated in 
the Presidency has been adopted by the ANC government (NPC, 2011). These strategic 
documents are discussed below for framing the local governance context in South Africa.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 National Party changed to the New National Party in 1997 to reinvent the apartheid policies but low results in 
2004 led to the party’s eventual dissolution into the ANC in 2005. 
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Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
 
The RDP policy framework was adopted at the dawn of democracy projected an ideal 
economic landscape to remove the social and economic inequalities inherent in South African 
society. The RDP was based on six guiding principles: namely, the RDP should be an 
integrated and sustainable programme; a people-driven process that involves and provides 
social and economic empowerment for South African citizens; provide peace and security for 
all; seek nation building by reducing the gap between the first and third world within the 
boundaries; ensure that reconstruction and development occur simultaneously; and guide the 
facilitation of the democratization of South Africa (ANC, 1994:4-7).  
 
The RDP comprised of five programmes: meeting the basic needs of all South Africans 
including access to jobs, land, housing, water and electricity; developing human resources 
through education and training; building the South African economy; democratizing the state 
and society, a process directed by the South African Constitution; and eventually 
implementing the RDP (ANC, 1994: 7-12). In 1996, the implementing RDP office was 
dissolved and merged into other line functions. One of the main reasons cited for the demise 
of the RDP, is that the plan in itself proved to be too broad a policy that lacked 
implementation guidelines throughout the spectrum of government. The other explanation is 
that the RDP was ultimately undermined by the very stakeholders that the policy relied on to 
support its implementation. These stakeholders are the political and bureaucratic machinery 
including the private sector that had proved unreliable in transforming the economy to 
achieve the RDP (Visser, 2005: 7-8).  
 
Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
 
Subsequent to the RDP, government introduced the Growth Employment and Redistribution 
(GEAR) policy in 1996. GEAR was expected to specifically address the economic challenges 
of economic growth that would in turn reduce social and economic inequities through job 
creation. GEAR would be directed to attain an annual growth rate of 6% and create 400 000 
jobs per annum by the year 2000.  
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In this assertion, GEAR was seen to place the macroeconomic dimension at the centre of 
national policy (Gelb, 2006). This policy has been largely criticized by the Left for 
emphasizing the economic objective of the ANC government although the policy aided 
government’s objective of sustained growth until the global economic meltdown in 2008. 
 
Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) 
 
The EPWP was first introduced in 2004 and its main objective was to produce one (1) million 
work opportunities in a five-year period through government’s infrastructure programme 
using labour intensive technologies. Shortly after implementation, to make the programme 
more inclusive, other government departments were roped in to facilitate job creation through 
three major sectors. These clusters were the economy, the environment and the social sector. 
National ministries within the economic sector implemented the EPWP through initiatives 
that provide opportunities for small and medium enterprises. 
 
By 2008 the target of 1 million jobs had been reached and a new upscale phase of EPWP was 
implemented in 2009 to run up to 2014 with the intention of 4.5 million job opportunities by 
2014 (Department of Public Works, 2009). This has made the particular policy useful for 
articulating government’s intention to curb South Africa’s unemployment crisis and reduce 
the unemployment figures. As a result, the national EPWP targets have also been translated 
into ministerial and sub-national government targets through the infrastructure and social 
development clusters of these different government functions and tiers. 
 
Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative – South Africa (ASGISA) and Joint Initiative on 
Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA) 
 
The country also adopted strategies that were targeted to address employability discrepancies 
within the formal economy with the intention of driving economic growth. The strategies 
aimed at improving the overall skills available in South Africa to contribute to economic 
development and reduce the levels of unemployment.  
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The ASGISA strategy was intended to address the skills shortage were: build a strong 
foundation in public schooling; focus on areas of greater priority in tertiary education and 
training; initiate and improve work-based training programmes and scarce skills initiatives; 
and establish a joint council in government to strengthen and coordinate the activities to 
address the skills shortage (Presidency, 2006). Additionally, the JIPSA policy was set up to 
identify, prioritize and manage the direction of resources of scarce skills needed for socio-
economic development.  
 
National Development Plan: Vision for 2030 
 
The need to have a longer term development plan was brought to the fore when President 
Zuma established a strategic planning commission and located it in the Presidency 
immediately after taking up office. In 2011, the commission on behalf of the South African 
government amalgamated the previous five year plans into a long-term development plan that 
intends to make South Africa: 
 
a more prosperous country that is progressively addressing poverty 
and inequality, will also over time, eliminate the effects of apartheid 
and colonial discrimination that have so scarred our society. 
(NPC, 2011: 2) 
 
This long-term vision takes a holistic approach that encompasses the entire function of 
government to promote socio-economic development. The plan recognizes the imperative to 
improve the South African public service and also acknowledges the need for local fiscal 
autonomy for larger cities to realize the intended ideal local environment for development 
(NPC, 2011: 24).  
 
It is important now to reflect upon these national development plans in the context of local 
government. The restructuring of local government occurred parallel with the national 
process, and the local protracted process did not enhance the RDP or GEAR given the 
inward-looking nature of the restructuring of the diversely resourced authorities at that time 
that had to be rationalized into a developmental local government after 2000 (CDE, 2000; 
Helmsing, Mogale & Hunter 1996; RSA, 1998).  
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The result of this local process was that most of the above national plans have been 
minimally applied by the municipalities. The exceptional and visibly evident case is the 
EPWP that has been filtered into the country-wide infrastructure, health and environment 
projects; the local integrated development plans (IDP) and municipal budgets (Department of 
Public Works, 2009; CoJ, 2011: 96).  
 
Within the above governance context, the South African economy comprises a vibrant 
mining, financial and services sector that contributes significantly to the annual GDP, placing 
the country as one of the leading economies in the continent. The country, like most 
developing countries, reflects a socio-economic contradiction revealing disparities of 
unemployment and poverty in the second economy (Presidency, 2009). In this disadvantaged 
strata, pronounced socio-economic disparities are reflected in informal settlements, in 
townships and in rural areas with rudimentary access to social amenities. Nonetheless, South 
Africa continued to experience positive economic growth from 1994 to the global crisis of 
2008. Table 4.3 below shows this economic trend from 1994 to 2010. 
 
Table 4.3: South Africa’s Annual Economic Growth 1994 -2010 
 
Source: SARB, 2011: 6 
 
Table 4.3 above reflects this trend that was affected by the 2008 global crisis shown by the 
dip in the curve and immediate recovery boosted by the infrastructure investments brought by 
the FIFA World soccer tournament of 2010. South Africa is a constitutional state which 
recognizes distinct but interdependent spheres of government (RSA, 1996). 
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The constitution mandates service provision for local government and permits the generation 
of local revenues within a legal framework that was promulgated recently on the democratic 
dispensation of local government, a process that runs parallel with the national deliberations 
on democracy. The route to democratic local government is debated below with an emphasis 
on local fiscal reform. 
4.4.1 Local Authorities’ Revenue during the Apartheid Era 
 
The racial classification of local authorities during the apartheid era meant that ability to 
generate revenue was unevenly proportioned. White local authorities (WLA) had a 
supporting legal framework that assured local discretion in the utility of a variety of revenue 
tools for operating and capital expenditure (Cowden, 1968; CSS, 1991; Simkins, 1991). The 
revenue sources for the sub-national government were income from property rates 
(residential and commercial); rent from housing stock; trading services that constituted water, 
electricity, gas, market licensing and passenger transport; and municipal borrowing for 
capital expenditure (Cowden, 1968; JCC, 1984; CSS 1990; CSS, 1991).  
 
The WLA were able to leverage local revenue and in some cases reflect a positive fiscus. The 
former Durban city council is such an example that had accumulated positive reserves by 
means of a well-established capital development fund (Solomon, 1981). In addition, Regional 
services councils (RSC) were also created in the mid-1980s to boost municipal revenue 
through the RSC levies
9
 (Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1986; 
Ernest & Whinney, 1987; Humphries, 1991; Solomon, 1989). The RSC levies were scrapped 
in 2006 because national treasury determined the levy to be an inefficient, inequitable and 
poorly administered tax. Before its demise, this business tax contribution to the larger South 
African cities was evident in the RSC levies that comprised 7% of total local government 
income and had become quite a significant revenue source for urban authorities. Although the 
national treasury made provision through grants to supplement the loss in revenue, 
municipalities have not yet sourced a new tax because of the tedious process involved in 
developing a new tax (Muller, 2010; SACN 2007: 54-56).  
                                                          
9
 The defunct RSC Act 109 of 1985 set up regional service areas in South Africa to “generate additional revenue 
at local level”. The specific revenue tools for the regional service councils were: the sale of regional bulk 
services; business fees in the form of a regional services levy on employee salaries and wages paid by 
employers as well as a regional establishment levy based on turnover. The notion of local fiscal autonomy 
suggested through the regional revenue bodies is disputed by Solomon (1989) 
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The fiscal figures of the WLA show that these local authorities asserted revenue autonomy 
primarily and also because revenue was reported separately from other local authorities and 
thus able to reflect the positive independent sources of revenues including accumulated 
capital reserves (Solomon, 1981; CSS 1991; JCC, 1984).   
 
Conversely, the rest of South Africa’s local authorities had limited access to revenue sources. 
The erstwhile Black Local Authorities Act 102 of 1982 allowed black local authorities to 
operate own financial accounts and impose levies for specific services. The meagre income 
was sourced from housing rentals in the townships
10
 and from profits from sorghum beer 
including sporadic contributions from the WLA rate accounts was insufficient when 
compared against the financing vacuum for municipal infrastructure in these impoverished 
areas (Davis, 1992; Poto, 1989). Similarly, Coloured and Asian communities were treated as 
extensions of the WLA and drew revenue for operating expenditures from the WLA mainly 
from rates and surpluses from the WLA trading services. These local authorities were 
administered by parent WLA and were considered fiscally vulnerable since their financial 
foundations were shaky (AGSA, 1990; JCC, 1990a; Poto, 1989; Simkins, 1991). 
 
The Transvaal rent boycotts of the 1980s were primarily geared to focus attention on the 
fiscal injustice of the apartheid local government that had resourced the WLAs while the 
other local authorities had limited revenue tools to finance local expenditure (Poto, 1989; 
PLANACT, 1990; Tomlinson, 1999). The outcomes of the rent boycotts were multi-
dimensional and useful in crafting the agenda for developmental local government in South 
Africa. The local negotiations acknowledged and thus included the rationale that drove the 
boycotts in crafting a developmental local government (PLANACT, 1990; CCLGA, 1991). 
 
An important consequence of the boycotts was that the local negotiators were compelled to 
consider and provide realistic and developmental alternatives on a myriad of issues. Some of 
the critical issues included writing off of arrears accumulated from non-payment of rents; 
transfer of houses to residents to increase ownership among the disadvantaged population; 
drawing attention to the need to upgrade services; instituting affordable service charges for 
urban poor; creation of a single tax base; establishment of non-racial democratic 
municipalities. 
                                                          
10
 The Transvaal rent boycotts of the 1980s  severely eroded this source of BLA income (PLANACT, 1990) 
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In addition, to deliberate on the exacerbating fiscal crisis of the BLAs as well as exposing the 
vulnerability of the apartheid local government system; and finally preventing the use of ad 
hoc amelioration measures such as bridging finance and RSC levies that had been used to 
guise the fiscal malaise of the BLAs (PLANACT 1990: 17). Translating the contrasting needs 
for these racialised local authorities during amalgamation was extended into the development 
process for a new municipal structure as discussed below. 
4.4.2 Transition to Democracy and Quest for Local Fiscal Autonomy  
 
Local government negotiations for democracy ran parallel with the national process and 
given the magnitude of the socio-economic reflections from a variety of stakeholders required 
that the municipal course follow a protracted process. The White Paper on local government 
was the foundation for South African local reform process. This regulation prescribes three 
phases of local government: the pre-interim phase as the period of negotiations for a 
democratic local government that occurred until 1995 where decisions that envisioned the 
administrative and political local structures in democracy; the transition period after the first 
local government elections, between 1995 and 2000, during which time transitional local 
government leadership and structures were established to guide the move towards democracy; 
the final democratic phase proceeded after the second local government elections in 2000 
(RSA, 1998).  
 
The attempt to ensure local discretion was evident in various presentations by the WLAs to 
enhance local fiscal autonomy, a practice that was long employed by the WLAs. In 1967 a 
united WLA municipal executive made presentations to establish a municipal investment 
bank for municipal borrowing which central government did not favour at the time
11
 
(Cowden, 1968: 234-236). The 1980 Browne Committee assessed available options for local 
government financing in order to consider the increasing transfer payments and the 
importance of property tax.  
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 In 1983 central government formed the DBSA as a development finance organization. Since 1994 the DBSA 
function has evolved into a financier that aims to accelerate socio-economic development of local government in 
the southern region. 
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Although the WLAs made presentations through channels like the institute for municipal 
finance officers, (IMFO) on expanding the local revenue base, no new revenue alternatives 
were suggested by this committee (JCC, 1990a; Solomon, 1981). Another example is the 
Croeser Working Group of 1982 which recommended against transfer payments but proposed 
the development and creation of additional sources of income for the WLAs (JCC, 1990a). 
The presentations continued into the transition period. 
 
The National Council for the Coordination of Local Government Affairs of 1991 
 
During the negotiation phase of local restructuring, revenue mobilization was a critical 
concern. The democratic transition required insightful consideration of how to ensure existing 
local revenue tools were not eroded but also ensure that laws governing equitable transfers 
were implemented. The (1991) national working group on local government, made up of 
representatives from national government, parliament, provincial government, the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and the WLA was tasked to investigate and 
report on a viable system of metropolitan government. The proposals made for metro cities 
included considerations that looked at the financial implications on the possible viability of 
metropolitan municipalities; the economic interdependency between the WLA and other BLA 
within the proposed framework; development work required to bring about equity in the 
townships and, more important, sources of income (OSR).  
 
Proposals were also given to consider the negotiation of long-term loans for financing capital 
expenditure; income from purposeful investment of funds; income derived from levies; 
(un)conditional provincial transfer payments; and local income from utilities, license fees, 
taxes, property rates and regional service levies (CCLGA, 1991:10, 11, 38-41). Parallel to 
this process, other forums like the Transvaal negotiation process were also concerned with 
resolving the Greater SOWETO fiscal crisis and specifically to “establish debt situation and 
negotiate for a writing off of payment arrears” (CWMC, 1992: 8; FWG, 1993). Davis (1992) 
calls for a realistic stance to be adopted in maintenance costs for urban infrastructure given 
the disparate situation between the financing needs between the decaying infrastructures in 
SOWETO as opposed to the expensive high technology in the WLA areas.  
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Managing this contrast of financing demands for municipal infrastructure needed an 
integrated interrogation that would in the end produce a unified model for a metropolitan 
revenue base. These considerations also highlighted the need for financing capital 
expenditure in the context of larger municipalities to include sources from tax revenue; user 
charges; reserves; grants; borrowing; leasing and sale of assets. Alternative financing 
mechanisms for local government in post-apartheid South Africa were also suggested which 
included rates; poll; income tax; local value added or sales tax; business tax; surpluses on 
trading services; motoring taxes; informal taxes; grants; revenue sharing arrangements and 
specialized institutions for financing capital projects (JCC, 1990b; JCC, 1999c; Van 
Ryneveld,1990). The deliberations on municipal borrowing notably by representation from 
WLA also resulted in recommendations for management capital reserves and development 
charges. The WLA history with municipal borrowing pointed to familiar sources of loan 
funds: namely, the domestic capital market; domestic financial intermediaries; government 
agencies; international capital market; foreign governments; and international lending 
agencies (FWG, 1993).  Therefore, the thoroughness of interrogation on OSR during the 
negotiation process meant that revenue assignment remained firmly on the agenda and that 
subsequently legislation would be promulgated in the democratic dispensation that assured 
that OSR remained a significant revenue source for the new municipal government.  
 
During the transition phase of local government, the amalgamation of over 800 local 
authorities into approximately 284 municipalities in three broad categories that were 
constitutionally recognized as independent spheres of government was guided by 
demarcation legislation as well as the Local Government Transition Act of 1993 (RSA, 1993). 
Municipal legislation was also promulgated to manage the restructuring of political and 
administrative structures and processes of South African local government (RSA, 1993; RSA, 
2000). Cameroon (2000) and Cameroon (2005) claim that the local restructuring process 
tended to be disruptive in governance and service delivery particularly in the metropolitan 
municipalities. Moreover, the financial viability of local government in general remained 
precarious during this period into the democratic dispensation. Poor financial management; 
failure to monitor the implementation of municipal budgets; culture of non-payment; and 
ineffective governance were some issues contributing to the parlous nature of local 
government finance as determined by CDE (2000).  
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The final phase of local government was to operate as per the constitutional mandate. Given 
the contradictory nature of municipal service delivery and payment levels inherited from the 
apartheid era, South Africa’s developmental local government attempted to enhance the 
course of fiscal viability of municipalities while improving the delivery of municipal services 
(Yemek, 2005; Savage, 2008). This development context that was supported by national 
legislation promulgated to give effect to the constitutional mandate of local government is 
examined next (4.4.3).  
 
4.4.3 South Africa’s Legal Framework for Local Revenues  
 
Although South Africa’s legal instruments for municipal finance were promulgated in the 
recent past but are seen to be in the infancy stage, the distinction between revenue assignment 
and revenue sharing that reflects on the capacities of the different categories of municipalities 
remains (Nkwinika, 2010). This distinction is important because it highlights the importance 
of OSR to the third tier of the South African government.  While the Constitution provides 
the foundation, additional legislation has been promulgated to support the distinct nature of 
local government to enhance municipalities’ ability to generate local revenue independently 
and also through an intergovernmental framework that allows for the equitable distribution of 
revenue across all spheres of government. These legal instruments are briefly explained 
below. 
 
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, No 106 of 1996 
 
As a constitutional state, South African local government derives its municipal mandate and 
justifies its access to revenue from internal and external sources in the supreme law. The 
ultimate law allows municipalities to impose rates and surcharges on municipal services as 
well as borrow funds for capital expenditure as well as for bridging purposes (RSA, 1996 sect 
229). Municipalities are also eligible for annual revenue allocations through the 
intergovernmental system. These sources of revenue have concretized municipal access to 
revenue particularly for metropolitan municipalities that have higher financial local 
expenditure demands (RSA, 2006; SACN, 2007; SACN, 2011). 
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National legislation has also been passed to support these constitutional stipulations for the 
revenue sharing and revenue assignment function for sub-national government. These 
instruments are discussed here to emphasize their importance to municipal OSR.  
  
Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act, No 56 of 2003 
 
The Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) sets to promote sound management of the 
fiscal and financial affairs of municipalities and municipal entities. The act prescribes 
standards for the management of revenues; reporting and accountability mechanisms for 
municipal finance; as well as budgetary and financial processes that are required for 
coordinating these processes with other spheres of government. Although this legislation was 
adopted in retrospect in the democratic phase, the law intends to guide municipalities’ 
financial management and particularly for larger cities (SACN, 2007; SACN, 2011). 
 
This legislation enables the auditor-general to point out areas of concern and improvement 
that municipalities may institute in overall financial management. This has been evident in 
the financial affairs of Johannesburg that utilized the standards set by the auditor-general to 
ensure the metropolitan municipality emerged from the fiscal crisis after the local 
government restructuring (AGSA, 2010; CoJ, 2011). The audit function is, therefore, an 
important tool for improving the local fiscal capacity of the larger municipalities. 
 
Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Act No. 12 of 2007 
 
This legislation allows municipalities to impose municipal tax and also surcharges with the 
approval of the minister of finance. The importance of this legislation is evident in the annual 
budgeting processes of municipalities. Metropolitan, district and the larger local 
municipalities integrate this legislative mandate in the annual tariff setting for trading 
services and other municipal services into the annual municipal budgeting processes. These 
municipalities with the local fiscal capacity to charge for municipal services are able to guide 
the generation of OSR through the municipal charges and work towards maintaining 
sustainable payment levels for these services.    
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Local Government: Property Rates Act No. 6 of 2004 
 
The Property Rates act regulates the powers of municipalities in rating property and ensuring 
that the rating policy adopted by municipalities includes processes for fairness, equity and 
inclusivity in the valuation criteria. More importantly, this act standardized the administration 
and generation of local revenue through property taxes throughout the country as from July 
2005. The SACN (2007: 54-56) concludes that the implications of implementing standardized 
rating mechanisms by municipalities pose significant challenges particularly to municipalities 
that use the “site value” for rating purposes as opposed to the new “market value” of 
properties.  
 
As result of the transition to the new taxing based on the market value of properties, income 
from property rates has stagnated in the major cities in South Africa, that is, from R 15.1 
billion in 2005 and R 14.9 billion in 2010 to R 16.8 billion in 2010 (SACN, 2011: 18). The 
future creation of an organ for municipalities to address the administrative issues on income 
from property rates will stabilize this local source of the OSR. 
 
Water Legislation 
 
The management of water revenue from municipal water and sewerage policies is 
additionally governed by the Water Act (1997) and national policies on water services to 
oversee the municipal tariff setting processes and policies to maintain the delicate balance of 
water services as a social and an economic good (DWAF, 1999; DWAF, 2002; RSA, 1997). 
This is because the use of market-related pricing for water tariffs to finance water services 
sometimes ostracizes the urban poor. The issue of social justice in water revenues has been 
repeatedly emphasized to highlight the injustice of charging the poor for accessing water that 
is otherwise considered a basic human right (Bond & Dugard, 2008; Harvey, 2007; Muller, 
2007; Public Citizen, 2004). 
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National Treasury Regulations on Municipal Borrowing 
 
To support the constitutional clause on municipal borrowing, national treasury adopted 
guidelines and regulations to promote municipal borrowing prior to adoption of South 
Africa’s democratic local government in 2000 (RSA, 1999). These regulations on municipal 
borrowing prescribe a market-based relationship for local government and remove the 
reliance on central government for loan guarantees. The regulations also emphasize the 
constitutional restriction on municipal borrowing from international markets by means of the 
prohibitions related to borrowing in foreign currencies.  
 
The restriction means that municipalities can focus on lending from the robust local capital 
markets and development finance institutions that Johannesburg accesses repeatedly for 
development projects (Scott, 2000). The need to retain market-based relationships for 
municipal borrowing asserts creditworthiness and enhances municipalities’ ability to engage 
capital markets for credit. Evidence reflects that capacity constraints inherent in the 
democratic local government still limit the number of South African municipalities that are 
able to undertake municipal borrowing (Liebig, Bahrinipour, Fuesers, Knödler, Schönhofen 
& Stein, 2008; Scott, 2000). 
 
Municipal By-laws 
 
In addition to the Municipal Fiscal Powers and Function Act outlined above, municipalities 
are required to pass by-laws that reflect the tariffs for municipal services as well as 
corresponding policies on services on which the tariffs are based. These tariffs form part of 
the annual municipal budgeting processes and the five-year integrated development plans that 
municipalities should follow to guide the provision of services.  
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Intergovernmental Transfers 
 
Section 214 of the Constitution ensures that municipalities annually receive the revenue 
raised nationally among the “national, provincial, and local spheres of government”. This 
requirement compels national treasury to use equitable allocations to distribute revenue to all 
the South African municipalities through the Division of Revenue Act that is promulgated at 
the commencement of each financial year by parliament. This source of revenue remains a 
significant revenue source for rural and poorly resourced municipalities (Momoniat, 2001; 
Department of Finance, 2008). 
 
Thus the legal instruments outlined above adequately cater for both the dependent as well the 
independent sources of municipal revenue. However, the ability to access revenue and 
adequately finance the municipal mandate still remains a concern for the poorer 
municipalities (Savage, 2008; Yemek, 2005). It is important to note that this regulatory 
environment caters for the generation of OSR by the more capable municipalities. 
 
 
Therefore, the South Africa state reflects a blend of characteristics borrowed from both a 
federal and a unitary state that recognizes local government as an interdependent yet a 
distinct government sphere. Historically, although the apartheid state was centralist, 
significant local fiscal discretion was granted to the WLA at the expense of other local 
authorities. In the transition to democracy the WLA, as a powerful constituency of local 
government, was able to negotiate and maintain local fiscal discretion into the constitution 
and subsequent municipal legislation. This has meant that municipalities with local fiscal 
capacity to generate significant local revenue have in place the supporting regulatory 
framework to manifest local fiscal autonomy. This will be discussed later in the case of 
Johannesburg’s revenue in chapter six. 
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Conclusion  
 
Nairobi and Johannesburg generate revenue within a regulatory environment that lends itself 
either to the restriction or enhancement of local fiscal autonomy. The cities have also been 
part of nation-wide restructuring that Kenya and South Africa have implemented to reinforce 
the decentralization objective of function and revenue to sub-national government. These 
reform processes will have an impact on the discretion of local revenue tools that the cities 
have. 
 
In the case of Nairobi, the city has special status within the national framework; previously 
provincial status that was granted in the defunct legislative mandate ascribed the 
decentralization mandate. The position was still maintained through the county status in the 
new legislative dispensation that also recognizes the city’s importance as the primary city of 
the country. The city still operates in a centralized environment which nonetheless enhances 
the city’s ability to generate local income that has included provisions for additional revenue 
streams from national government and additional sources of OSR through the SBP. However, 
this new framework did not engage the local sphere in conceptualizing the local reform but 
rather prescribed the local adherence to the reforms through implementation. This deficiency 
excluded the potential for addressing the lack of local fiscal independence. Besides, the 
political governance processes for improving accountability and service delivery that have 
taken place in Kenya also concurrently occurred in Nairobi, mirror the adherence to the 
centralized function of government. 
 
South Africa’s transition to democracy has resulted in the implementation of medium-term 
policies that are directed towards the socio-economic development of all citizens. The 
country has also adopted municipal legislation that not only promotes the agenda of a 
developmental local government but also reinstates the local fiscal discretion that was evident 
in the previous WLA. The merging of disparate local authorities pushed the WLA stance for 
local fiscal autonomy in the agenda during the local negotiations. The evidence of this strong 
lobby group in the restructuring process has served to craft the legislative process and 
maintain local fiscal discretion particularly for metropolitan municipalities such as 
Johannesburg, eThekwini and Cape Town.  
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Therefore the regulatory environment as has been examined in this chapter issues the two 
cities with the ability to generate OSR and also access development capital. While in Kenya 
local government is not compelled to relate these streams of revenue in local fiscal autonomy, 
in South Africa the underlying emphasis is made for municipal revenue to finance long term 
debt. The next two chapters examines how the case cities of Nairobi and Johannesburg 
leverage the respective legislative requirements to generate OSR and the cities experience in 
asserting local fiscal autonomy. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE PARADOX OF NAIROBI’S LOCAL REVENUE 
 
This chapter presents the findings on Nairobi’s local revenue experience. First, the position of 
Nairobi’s overall revenue is given in the context of the fiscal crisis preceding local reform 
and the resultant effect on water revenue and municipal borrowing. This is shown by the 
comparison of how the city generates and manages water revenue against its ability to obtain 
finance through the source of municipal borrowing required to fund capital expenditure and 
reflect the fiscal capacity to sustainably finance the long-term debt. This comparison seeks to 
provide the evidence or lack thereof of Nairobi’s local fiscal autonomy as proposed earlier in 
the conceptual framework of the study in section 2.3.  
 
5.1 REFORM FOR NAIROBI’S REVENUE FUNCTION 
 
The national local government reforms brought about fiscal changes in Nairobi that were 
specifically directed at the city’s crisis (GoK, 1996; RoK, 2002a). The fiscal crisis facing 
Kenya’s sub-national government examined earlier in section 4.3 was more accentuated in 
the capital city that in the other local authorities because a larger proportion of municipal 
revenue and expenditure is generated by the capital city. The human and financial factors had 
crippled the city’s financial management. The following interview responses from key 
respondents reiterate the contentions that created the fiscal crisis in the city: 
 
Poor discipline, poor record management, revenue losses, loopholes, 
no roles and responsibilities being given, unqualified staff and 
generally when you don’t have good partnership with the residents of 
this city then you are in crisis 
(Interview transcript NO1, 15 August 2012) 
 
Now the issue of management of revenue was the main problem. 
Where revenue money could be collected but there were no good 
internal control systems and that is what actually brought financial 
crisis  
(Interview transcript NO3, 16 August 2012) 
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It is just poor management of the resources and also, we have a lot of 
debtors out there who owe so much and yet they have not cleared 
their dues 
(Interview transcript NO6, 17 October 2012) 
 
We are really not innovative in terms of looking for other ways for 
collecting revenue in the council, we have got so many sources of 
collecting revenue but we don’t explore those sources maximally. 
Another issue is in terms of the staff, in terms of capacity, in terms of 
the training, in terms of integrity, they don’t do what is expected on 
the ground, a very good example is market sections, you are supposed 
to collect money and bank in the council account, but the money 
never reaches that council accounts 
      (Interview transcript NO7, 30 October 2012) 
 
As early as 1996, the Omamo Commission presented particular findings on Nairobi’s dismal 
fiscal state that also included poor financial reporting and the inept generation of OSR (RoK, 
1995). The findings also pointed to the fact that regular and audited financial reporting had 
long been lost in Nairobi’s municipal budget processes. The city’s fiscal disaster was also 
exacerbated by the insurmountable loss of the council’s financial records and other fiscal 
documentation through the use of outsourced consultants who had not apprised council staff 
of services rendered or returned council documents after completion of said contracts 
(Outsource Data Systems, 2003). This fiscal crisis was such that by 2002, the exact financial 
situation of Nairobi could not be ascertained. As a result, the parent ministry was tasked with 
assisting, first, to establish the city’s financial situation and second, to support the 
implementation of reform measures (RoK 2002a; RoK, 2002b).  
 
An overhaul of the financial system required the establishment of new systems and 
procedures that would enhance the city’s financial reporting. Central government gazetted a 
centralized process on financial management regulations that guided Nairobi’s financial 
reporting (GoK, 2007a). These regulations also prescribed the processes on revenue 
collection and financial recordkeeping, emphatically placing accountability of accurate 
reporting on the city treasurer as the responsible official (NCC, No Datea). After the 2013 
elections, the treasurer was replaced by a county treasurer as the official accountable for 
Nairobi’s finances. 
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LAIFOMS represents the standard reporting template that Nairobi uses to capture financial 
data to show meaningful categorization of the city’s revenue and expenditure in relation to its 
“budget performance in the respective departments, sections or functions” (GoK, 2007b). In 
order to improve Nairobi’s poor financial management, city revenue officials were trained to 
facilitate the integration of LAIFOMS that had been lacking in the city’s financial reporting. 
This is echoed in the sentiments of senior officials: 
 
One is to ensure that our records are clean, the records that we have 
here, and not only clean, we made sure that they are accurate by 
getting new records of the new businesses that have been established, 
new owners of property where the owners have subdivided the 
property, we made sure that it is included in our database.  
Then apart from that, we also sensitized our staff, because there was 
also pilferage and we lost some of our resources through 
untrustworthy staff that colluded with the residents to deprive the 
institution of the finances that we require, so we sensitized them and 
we also worked together with our anticorruption body, KACC, in fact 
through integrity testing programme they are stationed here at City 
Hall so we ensure that we are not losing anything from collection up 
to banking we sealed the loopholes thereof. Then we also sensitized 
our staff on the need of us surviving, instead of us collapsing and 
going home, there was need for us to work together so that the 
institution survives so they had the sense of change of attitude so that 
we can work together. 
(Interview transcript NO5, 16 October 2012) 
 
“The interventions that were employed include now the internal 
control systems and the use of computerization for revenue centres 
including the use of now the so called e-payment system and the 
LAIFOM system so if you make your payments anywhere… will be 
reflected in the LAIFOM system. 
(Interview transcript NO3, 16 August 2012) 
 
Furthermore, an integrated financial system was adopted in the 2008/09 financial year which 
would thereafter aid the timely compilation of Nairobi’s financial statements (NCC, 2008). 
The city’s financial statements are now expected to comply with the Standards of Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP); International Accounting Standards (IAS); and the 
International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) which are expected to demonstrate 
the city’s accountability in the use of resources for service delivery to citizens and other 
internal and external government stakeholders. In the future, the city’s financial accounting 
and reporting processes should be more reflective of responsible and prudent financial 
management practice. 
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To enhance revenue mobilization, a revenue enhancement plan has been adopted for the 
respective revenue units. The units comprise property rates; sundry and debtors; car parks; 
rents from upper class housing; tenant purchase system; cash; market income, that is, rental 
from the 53 markets throughout the city; revenue from city administration; Eastleigh rentals, 
comprising poorer council housing; and licensing in the form of the SBP (NCC, No Dateb). 
The weekly, monthly and annual revenue targets will filter into the budgeting process through 
the reporting structures to the assistant town treasurer to report on the overall increase in local 
generation of revenue in Nairobi as indicated in the responses below: 
 
Now one of the interventions we did in decentralization to increase 
revenue was to have the officers to sign for targets. We knew the 
capacity of each ward so we called upon the revenue officers to sign 
for those targets. You either achieve your target and you do all other 
duties in the wards coz in the wards there are a number of duties; 
there are those who collect revenue, there are those who cut grass, 
collect litter, unblock drains. So you either meet your revenue target, 
either daily or weekly or you are assigned other duties and we get 
competent people who are able to meet the targets. So, through this 
way, we have seen revenues increase in decentralization by doubling; 
in fact initially we were collecting around 400,000 but now we are 
collection over 900,000 per day. 
(Interview transcript NO5, 16 October 2012) 
 
Despite the acute fiscal crisis that Nairobi had faced, the capital city was compelled to show 
almost immediate positive results emanating from the local reform process. The rapid results 
approach (RRI) was used to determine the effects of the Kenya local government reforms on 
Nairobi’s overall services delivery. Osiche (2008) reveals that the RRI had accelerated the 
“council’s existing strategies, goals, annual work plans and performance contract targets”. 
These indicators have been coupled with the visible infrastructure developments throughout 
the city such as the clean city binning initiative; outsourcing of public toilets throughout the 
city and the improvements of the municipal road infrastructure. However, the RRI failed to 
reduce the revenue haemorrhage the city continued to experience, attributed to corruption and 
political interference, as some of the factors that conspire to deflate the city’s effort to boost 
local generation of revenue (Osiche, 2008).  
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The minimal interrogation of local government reforms for the case of Nairobi have a 
profound effect on the city’s ability to maximize on its OSR. National government as shown 
in the previous chapter did not provide a space to interrogate the agenda of OSR such that the 
revenue assignment function for local government remained largely unchanged after the local 
government reforms. In Nairobi the discouraging fiscal landscape for OSR raises flags for the 
city’s future fiscal autonomy. This sentiment was echoed by several interviewees who 
bemoan the city’s inability to realize potential of OSR: 
 
We have so many untapped revenue centres and these revenue centres 
cannot be utilised simply because we don’t have proper laws that can 
assist the council to tap this revenue 
(Interview transcript NO3, 16 August 2012) 
 
In most cases you find some people are complaining that they are paying 
but what for? So the council is supposed to provide the services so that 
the people feel proud when they pay. 
(Interview transcript NO2, 15 August 2012) 
 
For local authorities, there are fees that are paid to local authorities and 
until people realise that for growth and development of our cities, we 
need to support it by paying what is due to them even for them to 
reciprocate by providing better services and you know once cities are run 
well, that means it will attract investments that will mean growth, more 
employment and all those kinds of things. It also raises the competitive 
nature of our city with the developed world 
(Interview transcript NO4, 10 November 2012) 
 
 
Nevertheless, the regulatory framework of Nairobi’s revenues reflects a diversity of tools that 
gives the city a variety of revenue instruments with which to generate a significant portion of 
city revenue. This is confirmed by central transfer figures for 2010 that place roughly less 
than 30% of the city’s budget as funds obtained from the intergovernmental transfer system 
leaving the city with significant room to generate local revenue (NCC, 2010). The city’s 
annual operating revenues are sourced from market fees; lease income
12
; property tax; the 
SBP; licensing; house rent; levies and access; other fees; grants from central government in 
the form of CILOR, LATF; and RMF (NCC, 2009; 2011). A snapshot of this revenue 
allocation is shown below in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Nairobi’s Water and Sewerage department was dissolved to form a water utility and the city receives a grant 
from central government as well as lease income to substitute for the loss in water revenue (NCWSC, 2004) 
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Figure 5.1: Composition of Nairobi’s Operating Revenues, 2009  
 
Source: NCC, 2009: 18 
 
Figure 5.1 indicates the composition of funds for Nairobi for the financial year 2009/10. 
Property tax constitutes the highest percentage of own source revenue roughly comprising 
three quarters of total revenues. Licenses and contributions in lieu of rates (CiLOR) 
contribute less than a percent of total revenues while the SBP was 4%. Although the Kenyan 
local authorities introduced the SBP by 1999/ 2000, Nairobi only started reporting on this 
source of OSR from the financial year 2007/2008 (Devas & Kelly, 2001; NCC, 2008: 11). 
The LATF contribution from central government was the only intergovernmental transfer that 
was reported for 2009. Outside of funds borrowed for capital expenditure, the city directs the 
rest of its operating revenue to finance municipal services.  
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The services include primary health care through the council clinics throughout the city; 
primary education; maintenance of public parks; refuse collection; libraries; low cost housing; 
as well as the financing of personnel of the council’s administration and political office (NCC, 
2004; NCC, 2005; NCC, 2006; NCC, 2007). The OSRs depicted above are the result of a 
holistic effort that the council has made to sustainably generate local revenue. A city official 
describes the city’s effort in this manner: 
 
One of it was enhanced revenue collection. The other one was 
increased good will from the Nairobi residents because we started 
providing services; garbage collection, doing street lighting, doing 
lighting in the slum areas, re-carpeting roads making sure there are 
no port holes. That created goodwill from the residents such that they 
are also compelled to pay revenue to the council. We also instituted 
controls in terms of revenue management. There are also several task 
forces that were put in place to collect debt. Staff motivation, some of 
the issues were put forward for them, instead of pocketing whatever 
they are collecting, it now goes to the coffers of the city council. We 
also introduced the idea of computerising most of our revenue 
collections, even that one enhanced revenue collection. 
(Interview transcript NO4, 10 November 2012) 
 
Furthermore, the revenue enhancement plan mentioned earlier has been used in the targeting 
of particular OSRs in order to sustain the generation of the specific revenues. Income from 
property rates in particular has been boosted by the focused attention through the use of 
alternative methods to enhance revenue collection. According to Kelly (2001), the potential 
of property rates income to contribute significantly to the OSR of Kenya’s sub-national 
government was not being utilized. The city’s approach has made inroads in increasing this 
source of OSR indicated by the property rates representing the highest portion of revenues in 
Figure 5.1 above. An official ascribed the city’s effort to boost income from property rates as 
follows:  
 
As far as the main contributor for the short fall of revenue is rates, 
the most common intervention which has been used is to lure the 
people by giving waiver on interest earned on accrued rates so that 
the property owners are encouraged to pay without the interest 
accrued there on so this has somehow helped in encouraging the 
people to comply 
(Interview transcript NO2, 15 August 2012) 
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Therefore, within the local restructuring process, Nairobi has been able to streamline the 
revenue collection strategies through improved financial reporting as well as enhancing the 
administrative attributes of revenue collection to ensure sustained OSR in the future. The new 
legislative framework adopted after 2013 maintains the status quo regarding how the OSR are 
generated. Furthermore, the administrative and structural changes made for OSR were more 
concerned about complying with the standardized financial reporting from central 
government than providing the opportunity for the city internally examine and develop on its 
local fiscal capacity for local fiscal autonomy. The examples of water revenue and municipal 
borrowing in the rest of this chapter examine this issue further. Attention is first focused on 
the management of revenues generated through water and sewerage services in Nairobi.  
 
5.2 ASSIGNING MUNICIPAL REVENUE TO WATER AND SEWERAGE    
SERVICES 
 
Sub-national government should be able to administer, manage and politically account for the 
municipal revenues generated from the related services. This provides the imperative for 
trading services, particularly water and sewerage services, to remain the exclusive domain of 
local government. This revenue autonomy reinforces the proximity and efficiency rationale 
for local services (Bahl, 1999; Bahl & Martinez-Vazquez 2006: 22; Denters & Lawrence, 
2005). The case of Nairobi’s water revenue as explained in this section contradicts this 
assertion on revenue autonomy for water and sewerage services.  
 
Water and sewerage services have been provided in Nairobi as a local government function 
since independence. The legal provisions mandating water supply and costing were originally 
derived from Clauses 178 and 180 of the defunct Local Government Act (1963). The 
municipal mandate for this trading service has been marginally maintained in the new 
legislation (RoK, 2011). Nairobi was previously allowed to pass by-laws and annually 
provide tariffs to meet the costs of water supply. This made the setting of the municipal water 
tariffs, an internal council process that was part of the annual municipal budgeting process 
that was only subject to the parent ministry’s recommendations. Thus the pricing of water 
had remained invisible to the public with no evidence of a tariff policy to guide the social, 
economic and political considerations for costing water supply (Bahl &Linn, 1992: 286-287).  
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This regulatory framework was not utilized to boost the water fund and correspondingly 
finance water infrastructure as intended but rather the water profits were appropriated by the 
municipal council for financing the rest of the city’s municipal function (Nairobi City 
Commission, 1988; Nairobi City Commission 1989). Additionally, this sacrifice made on 
behalf of the city’s water function meant that with time the financing of water and sewerage 
services would prove to be inadequate as the city’s population grew and increasingly 
constrained the overall supply of water and sewerage services (RoK, 1996: 344).   
 
Furthermore, Nairobi’s financial management processes required that the water and sewerage 
department establish a water fund to be specifically operated for water revenues. The 
surpluses generated from this fund were intended to contribute to the financing arrangements 
for water infrastructure.  The anomaly in the local discretion of the water fund was seen in the 
blatant misuse of the water revenue. The city generated and maintained significant water 
revenues that were evident in the water fund  that had steady surpluses of water revenue. The 
water fund for example had water revenue that had increased from Ksh 200 million in 
1997/98 to Ksh 390 million in 2000/01. However, the water fund was used to finance other 
council expenditure through fiscal appropriation, which resulted in the plundering of the 
water fund. The depletion of the water fund was at the expense of sustained maintenance of 
water infrastructure, raised the crisis of financial mismanagement (NCC, 2002; RoK, 2002: 
2.2A).  
 
Revenue management by Nairobi’s water and sewerage services department operated in a 
chaotic state as a result. The stagnant water tariffs meant the costing of water was not in 
“consonance with the economic cost of providing water” which impacted on the sustained 
generation of water revenue. The water fund that accumulated surplus water revenue could 
not finance the capital expenditure needed for water infrastructure because of local fiscal 
misappropriation (K’Akumu, 2006: 533).  
 
The centralized management of the water and sewerage department had opened the 
opportunity for abuse because of the vulnerability to political manipulation that also led to 
gross inefficiencies for water revenue (Nairobi City Commission, 1988; Sammy, 2004: 16).  
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Butterworth & De la Harpe (2009) caution on the emergence of corruption risks that are 
likely to surface with the incidence of fiscal mismanagement in water services and which 
increasingly aggravate actual losses of water revenue. High levels of unaccounted for water 
(UAW) and failure to publish regular annual reports of water accounts are indications of 
“corruption in relation to regular payments: fraudulent meter reading, avoidance or partial 
payment, overcharging” as was reflected in the Nairobi water revenues. 
 
The mismanagement of Nairobi’s revenue was also exacerbated by inept revenue strategies. 
The flaws in the city’s internal controls of the water and sewerage department to produce 
accurate bills are an indicative example that further constrained water revenue. The 
department’s ineptitude was attributed to the following reasons:  
 The sporadic updating of the database of account holders had increased the incidence 
of incorrect billing 
  A large number of the city meters that were “damaged, buried, stuck or inaccessible” 
(UAW) had increased the levels of unaccounted for water and hence reduced water 
revenues 
  The irregular customer reconciliation of accounts had resulted in errors in billing and 
payment allocations  
 Changes in meters were also not timeously recorded 
  Poor computerization, which had been exacerbated by new systems around 2001, had 
increased the prevalence of data loss and processing errors that were evident in the 
abnormal entries not picked up by the water department 
  Consistent meter reading could not be verified 
 The prolonged process of crediting of paid accounts particularly with the consumers 
with higher accounts such as ministries and industries  
 The disconnection policy was not effective even in extreme cases with the larger 
consumers not paying bills over long periods of time 
(NCC, 2002).  
 
At that time, revenue collection of water revenue did not keep pace with the consumption of 
water in the city. In 1988, for example, water billing arrears continued to increase year-on-
year-end even when the city’s population exceeded the one million mark (Nairobi City 
Commission, 1988; RoK, 2001: xxvii).  
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The sustainability of water revenues was further exacerbated by municipal inefficiencies in 
costing water supply, for instance, the water revenue inefficiency
13
 in the early 1990s stood at 
an approximate value of 30%, a weakness that had been perpetuated by the static water tariffs 
that did not incorporate the actual costs of supplying water to consumers (Sammy 2004: 17). 
 
These issues, raised by the auditor general on the city’s financial statements as well as by 
independent audits, were synonymous with the findings on the fiscal problems facing the 
water and sewerage sector by the Omamo Commission (RoK, 1996: 344) that cites: 
 
 Incorrect water meter reading resulting from human error 
or meter readers not visiting properties or inserting 
fictitious figures 
 Issuing of bills late 
 Attitude of City Council personnel in the water accounts 
office 
 Lack of funds to connect system to areas not connected like 
the unplanned settlements 
 
Table 5.2 below shows that during the fiscal crisis, Nairobi continued to generate OSR 
although more than half of the city’s revenue was derived from water and sewerage services 
in both the financial years indicated. Moreover, in both years, the high expenditure costs from 
the rest of the city’s departments were almost double total revenues from the general fund 
and water income combined. As a result, the city acknowledged that it often appropriated 
funds set for infrastructure to finance the vast shortfall in city income and cover the city’s 
operating expenditure (Nairobi City Commission, 1988; Nairobi City Commission 1989).  
 
Table 5.1: Nairobi OSR compared with expenditure in Nairobi for 2002-2004 
 in Ksh 000. 
 2002/2003 2003/2004 
General Fund (combined city income) 1,038,839  1,015,765 
General Fund Expenditure 3,575,927 3,660,513 
Water Income  1,227,555 2,158,933 
Water and Sewerage Expenditure 1,006,921 1,047,749 
Source: NCC, 2004: 17, 18, 19 
 
                                                          
13 Revenue efficiency is the amount of water supplied as a ratio of water revenue (Sammy, 2004). 
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The above example of fiscal misappropriation highlights the constant state of fiscal crisis that 
Nairobi was facing. At the time of the democratic dispensation, which called for enhanced 
accountability of the public office in 2002, the ministry of local government intervened in 
Nairobi’s fiscal crisis by appointing an interim oversight board to ascertain the extent of the 
fiscal crisis and prescribe remedial measures to be done within the framework of local 
government reforms that Kenya was implementing (RoK, 2002a, RoK, 2002b). 
Simultaneously, the local revenue function was also reformed to ensure sustained revenue 
from central government through the intergovernmental transfers as described in the previous 
chapter. The primary water function in Nairobi also underwent a complete overhaul. 
 
Bakker (2002) cites three main reasons for restructuring the municipal water supply: first, 
restructuring in the water sector to improve performance is done through structural reforms 
that promote good governance. Second, restructuring to source financing is useful when 
infrastructure demands can optimize private financing and reduce the burden on government 
budgets. Finally, restructuring may be done to meet new legislative requirements for water 
supply. In the case of Africa, two of these reasons are usually the qualifying criteria for 
restructuring the water sector. First, improving performance of the water sector remains 
critical according to Estache & Kouassi (2002).  
 
Moreover, financial irregularities, misappropriation of water revenues and inadequate water 
infrastructure have resulted in the overhaul of the water sector in Africa where the private 
sector has entered the arena of water supply or the water utilities within the public sector for 
water services have been created (Bayliss, 2001; Kauffman, 2007). The second reason alludes 
to meeting legislative requirements that have been implemented by central government to 
bring coherence to the water sector (Kauffman & Pèrard, 2007). These two reasons also apply 
in the case of restructuring Nairobi’s water and sewerage services.  
 
A national effort that occurred parallel with the local government reform processes that were 
meant to address issues on the access and governance of scarce water resources in Kenya 
resulted in the restructuring of the water sector that even affected water services at the level 
of local government. The Kenya Parliament passed the Water Act (2002) that places the 
national ministry of water at the helm of the new institutional arrangement as shown in 
Figure 5.2 below.  
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Figure 5.2: Institutional Framework for Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Company 
 
Source: Nairobi Water & Sewerage Company website 
  
In the institutional framework in Figure 5.2 above, the ministry is in charge of overall policy 
development and oversight of water resources in the country. Next in the hierarchy is the 
water resource management authority that manages water resources nationally. The water 
services regulatory board has overall responsibility for regulating a sustainable supply of 
water and sewerage. Several regional water service boards are responsible for the efficient 
and economical provision of water and sewerage services in their areas of jurisdiction. 
Finally, water service providers are contracted by service boards to provide quality water and 
sanitation services within local areas. Presently, there are approximately ninety registered 
water service providers operate in Kenya that comprise water utilities that have been created 
from previous municipal water and sewerage departments; community water suppliers and 
private water suppliers (WASREB, 2008: 3; Owuor & Foeken, 2009: 27).  
Nairobi as an urban authority operates a water utility on the basis of these water sector 
reforms. The creation of this utility emphasizes the erosion an important source of OSR as 
one key respondent who states that: 
 
 
Ministry of Water 
Water Resource Management Authority / 
 Water Services Regulatory Board 
Water Resource User Associations/ 
        Water Services Providers i.e.  NCWSC 
Consumers , Users 
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 Privatization of water from the local government under the water 
act 2002 which commercialized water services from a department 
of the council to a private company but wholly owned by the 
council 
(Interview transcript, NO12, 31 May 2013) 
 
5.3 NAIROBI CITY WATER AND SEWERAGE COMPANY 
 
 Sylvia Kanani walks straight into her hovel in Fuata Nyayo slums, 
Nairobi. She is carrying a 20-litre water container on her back … she 
was “lucky” to find a neglected burst pipe on the road. In about 30 
minutes, she had collected 40 litres and carried them to her one-room 
shanty, two kilometres away. This is the third, and she says she wants 
to carry as much “before the plumbers arrive”… Every morning, she 
wakes up early to search for this precious commodity. Any lateness 
would mean she has to queue for long hours without a guarantee that 
she may get even five litres. 
She needs at least six containers per day. For a person who is jobless, 
spending Sh60 per day is not a joke. Ms Kanani’s regimen is no 
different from those of other residents nearby. 
(Maruko, 2011) 
 
The excerpt above typifies the contestations by the various consumers of water and sewerage 
services around the pricing of water revenue as a municipal trading service that must be 
considered and incorporated to ensure that a sustained flow of the OSR is maintained.  Then, 
and perhaps more important for African cities, is to ensure provision of vital municipal 
services for the urban poor and address the need for equity and access of this municipal 
service. These issues should be encompassed in the notion of local fiscal autonomy that will 
allow the fiscally capable city to generate revenue as well as provide evidence of financing 
the equitable considerations within the city’s jurisdiction. 
 
The establishment of water utilities in Kenya to operate as per water sector guidelines had 
been done with additional technical and institutional support from development partners and 
from multi-nationals (Sammy, 2004; Owuor & Foeken, 2009). In the case of Nairobi, the 
notion of technical expertise was frequently and openly questioned against the backdrop of a 
city that was in fiscal crisis (Sammy, 2004).  
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Prior to the establishment of the Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Company (NCWSC), 
public outcry denounced the involvement of international water companies in Nairobi’s 
restructuring process. The plausible objections were instigated by the outsourcing attempts of 
these multi-national companies for the revenue function of Nairobi’s water and sewerage 
services.  
 
In 1999, Vivendi, through its subsidiary Seureca, secured a controversial ten-year water 
billing and revenue contract for Nairobi (Kauffman & Pèrard, 2007). The contract was 
originally worth five million US dollars for billing and accounting services intended to boost 
the revenue collection of Nairobi, and constituted mostly water revenues at the time. Details 
on the contract later revealed that the multi-national would not undertake any investments 
into the incapacitated water infrastructure during the term of the contract. This concern was 
in light of the revenue benefit amounting to 15% of Nairobi’s revenue that the company 
would appropriate for services due.  
 
In this controversial proposal, the water and sewerage department was also required to 
reimburse Seureca for costs of computer hardware and equipment that the company used with 
no provision for depreciation. The company had also proposed a costly feasibility study on 
one of the city’s largest slums for the Kibera Urban Environmental Sanitation Project. The 
contentious contract was later suspended by the government of Kenya in July 2001 (“NCC 
Water”, 2001; “Nairobi Mayor”, 2001; Sammy 2004: 15-16). Nonetheless, the NCWSC did 
make use of technical support from development partners to facilitate the migration process 
of physical, human and fiscal infrastructure from the previous municipal water department to 
operating as an autonomous water utility that is owned by Nairobi (NCWSC, 2004; NCWSC, 
2005).The institutional framework depicted previously mandates the NCWSC as the 
conveyor of water services and not Nairobi, as was previously the case. To align with this 
institutional set-up, the NCWSC was established in 2003 committed solely to the reticulation 
of water and sewerage services in Nairobi. 
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 The water utility remains a subsidiary of Nairobi County
14
. The transition from a municipal 
department to a water utility was facilitated by a tripartite agreement between Nairobi, Athi 
water service board, and the NCWSC that directs the water service delivery and water 
revenue arrangement as legally prescribed. The tripartite agreement also provides for the 
transfer of human, physical and fiscal infrastructure assets from local government to the 
NCWSC.  
 
 
National legislation also prescribes that an annual service level agreement be in place 
between the NCWSC and the Athi water service board for reviewing performance of water 
service delivery (NCWSC 2004: 5). Furthermore, the Water Act (2002) also prescribes that 
the tariff-setting processes for water revenue be managed within the water sector institutional 
framework. The above institutional arrangement allows the NCWSC to establish and operate 
independently (RoK, 2002c).  
 
The new Kenya Constitution (2010) and the Urban Areas and Cities Act (2011) effected on 
March 2013 maintain the municipal mandate for the provision of water and sewerage services 
by local government. This municipal mandate should be evident through local fiscal 
autonomy on generating water revenues as well as the local political oversight of the trading 
service through political governance of the water revenues that was previously the case when 
NCWSC was a municipal department. The paradox of Nairobi’s revenue is examined below 
in the transformed context of water revenue. 
 
At inception, NCWSC inherited the city’s municipal department water and sanitation 
infrastructure that services approximately 183 000 domestic and industrial water connections 
and approximately 130 000 domestic and industrial sewerage connections with a projected 
10 % annual increase in connections (NCWSC, 2004: ix). The vision of the water utility is to 
“be a leading provider of reliable quality water and sewerage services in Nairobi and its 
environs” (NCWSC, 2004: iv). The Nairobi population numbers approximately 3.12 million, 
comprising of 985 016 households with 96% of the city’s diverse population that considers 
the NCWSC as their primary provider of water (KNBS, 2010: 18).  
 
                                                          
14 Under new legislation on county government, Nairobi County replaces the Nairobi City Council 
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The diversity is reflected in water access which varies from privileged access through piped 
and metered services right down to water points known as water kiosks in the slum 
settlements which retail water to the urban poor at exorbitant rates (Crow & Odaba, 2010; 
NCWSC/ AWSB, 2009). The metered consumers that comprise residential and industrial 
consumers contribute to the sustained water revenue for the water utility (NCWSC, 2010). 
The utility intends to subsidize water access to the urban poor through the established water 
points in the water kiosks. Empirical evidence from social justice proponents for water access 
shows that the urban poor do not receive the benefit of this subsidized pricing for water 
(Nyangena, 2008). 
 
The trading service of water and sewerage services is able to generate water revenues that 
cover the costs of water supply and even some aspects that cater for the redistributive 
elements of water supply through the water kiosks. Table 5.2 below reflects the positive trend 
in water revenues since the inception of the NCWSC. The steady increase highlights the 
importance of this municipal service as a trading service that should then in turn increasingly 
contribute to the sustained overall OSR for Nairobi as espoused by Bahl & Linn (1992). 
 
Table 5.2: Water Revenue for the NCWSC from 2001 – 2010 in Ksh billion 
 
Source: Author
15
 
 
                                                          
15
  Derived from annual water revenue figures in NCWSC annual reports 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010 
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Table 5.2 does not show the water revenue that was generated by the city prior to the 
establishment of the water utility. The management of water revenue by Nairobi is now 
discussed in light of local fiscal discretion and appropriation of this particular OSR. 
 
5.3.1 City Management of Water Revenue  
 
 According to Bakker (2002) water utilities are created to enhance efficiency. The creation of 
the water utility removed the water function from the city to capitalize on this aspect for 
restructuring. The underlying challenges that the NCWSC inherited at inception were the 
fiscal inadequacies that threatened the commercial position of the water utility through the 
“billing inefficiencies and illegal use of water, lack of consumer meters in many areas of the 
city, grossly inefficient mater reading, obsolete computer billing systems, delayed billing, 
poor collection ratio” (NCWSC, 2004: iii).  
 
An improvement in the management of water revenues required an overhaul of the present 
billing and collections system under the city department to a utility that independently 
manages water revenues. The PPIAF/WSP (2009) prescribes the procedures for customer 
management of water services which includes the appropriate assignment of the billing and 
collection functions to respective and responsible sections in the water utility. To support 
these functions, additional procedures for meter reading, billing, collection, and connection 
costs are required to enhance water revenue collection. These accountability and transparency 
measures became visible to consumers and enhanced the revenue collection for the water 
utility as reflected by the following interviewee responses: 
  
Nairobi water has adopted various interventions … we decided to 
create some regions to handle the specific areas. We started with 4 
regions now the regions have grown to 6. What has happened is, each 
region has a manager who is handling that area in terms of water 
provision and also water collection. When the regions were created, 
we realized that even after creating the regions, we needed to pick 
few critical accounts, we call them super accounts. We classified 
them as high consumption accounts. These are the 20% of our 
customers who give us 80% of our revenue... The beauty of it is that 
we also hand deliver those bills to customers and we ensure that the 
billing efficiency and the meter reading efficiency is high to the extent 
that we have built a rapport between us and our customers  
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So that has worked well for us because we are able even to track the 
metering, the aspect of metering of these customers, so we are in 
close contact, always, almost on a weekly basis and we are even able 
to link with the customers on the ground. So that has worked well for 
us, especially classification of our customers.  
(Interview transcript NO11, 28 May 2013).  
 
Installing a reliable billing system that was aimed at: Reducing non-
revenue water through physical loss and commercial losses (Unbilled 
water); Changing faulty meters; Public awareness; Stringent 
disconnection policy (For non-paying Customers); Ensuring meters 
are read on actual consumption; and Tariff adjustment 
(Interview transcript, NO12, 31 May 2013) 
 
Furthermore, financial ring-fencing is recommended because of the importance in delineating 
water revenue from overall OSR and municipal expenditure. Ring-fencing is then important 
for water utilities because the production of “more accurate information that can be used for 
making decisions about resource allocation, management, operations and tariffs” (PPIAF, 
2009: 1-2) particularly on financial information shows the performance of the water utility; 
information to determine appropriate tariffs and building financial viability of water utilities. 
The NCWSC has followed this model and ring-fenced its financial and operational activities 
separately from those of Nairobi County. Customers are able to see the utility as separate and 
billing processes are managed by the NCWSC. This separation of water revenue and of 
consumers is confirmed by the following summarized responses: 
 Revenue to NCC is ring fenced only percentage paid to NCC  
 Income from water is not incorporated into NCC  
 Privatization of water from the local government under the water act 
2002 which commercialized water services from a department of the 
council to a private company but wholly owned by the council  
(Interview transcript, NO8, 11 February 2013; Interview transcript NO9, 13 
February 2013) 
 
Nonetheless, as a trading service, water revenue should constitute a critical component of 
local government revenue (Crawthorne, 1997; Cowden, 1968; Bahl et al., 1992). 
Implementing reform measures that detract from this ideal reduces cities’ potential to 
leverage local revenue independently. The water utility’s autonomous management of the 
water revenue function which includes the billing of domestic, industrial and commercial 
consumers means that revenue from the sale of water and sewerage services is ring-fenced for 
the utility’s expenditure (NCWSC, 2004: 5).  
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In terms of financing water infrastructure, although the physical infrastructure was transferred 
to the NCWSC, the medium- and long-term financing costs that are spread between the old 
municipal department and the water utility are still to be fully reconciled. The city still 
grapples with financing these loans as evident in the following statement by the city treasurer 
who emphasizes that: “there are significant amount of loans which were in respect to the 
water projects and since it was incorporated, the liability on the same has not been cleared on 
who to bear” (NCC, 2009: 4). From inception, NCWSC has also gone on to engage 
international institutions for grants and loan that have been used to finance capital and 
operational expenditure such as the three-year IDA grant for operational support and 
institutional strengthening (NCWSC, 2004: 19, 21, 22).  
 
Nairobi has, since 2004, annually received monies from the NCWSC as a percentage of 
annual water revenues as well as supplementary funds in the annual LATF disbursements 
from central government to subsidize this revenue gap (NCWSC, 2004; NCC, 2008; NCC, 
2009). In this case, although the tripartite agreement concedes an annual lease income from 
the NCWSC due from the water revenue, this amount is pale in comparison with the water 
revenue that the city had discretion to before the water sector reforms. The table 5.3 below 
shows the significant drop in water revenue which Nairobi has experienced since 2004. 
 
Table 5.3: Water Revenues in Nairobi 2000- 2010 in Ksh billion 
 
Source: Author
16
 
 
                                                          
16
 The trends are constructed from annual figures of city revenue and the NCWSC revenue. 
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5.3.2 The Pricing of Water 
 
The provision of water and sanitation services remains a contentious terrain in terms of 
access and cost. Various groups including consumers, local government officials, local 
politicians, central government, general taxpayers and international institutions have 
contradicting views on how water should be priced. The government sector comprising local 
officials and politicians as well as national government, aims for the most economical use of 
available water resources to generate the most revenue while ensuring equitable access to 
water in communities (Bahl & Linn, 1992: 280 -282).  
 
The international development institutions have also got vested interests in the efficiencies 
associated with water utilities (Estache & Kouassi, 2002; PPIAF/WSP, 2009) Consumers 
themselves are diverse groups with diverging views regarding the pricing of water. Industries, 
residents and the corporate sector are interested in “value for money” regarding the municipal 
services they pay for. Urban poor on the other hand require access to services on a more 
equitable basis. Crow & Odaba (2010) argue that the urban poor comprise the sector of water 
consumers who pay the largest portions of their income for water services. These competing 
values thus require that the local political leadership consider the social and economic issues 
in pricing water. 
 
Redistribution for example, is an important consideration in pricing water revenue because 
access and affordability by the urban poor is a particular concern when cities opt to charge for 
the provision of this vital service. The cost of purchasing water is seen to be too high a price 
for the marginalized sectors in cities and should thus be kept at the bare minimum for this 
sector of the population. This concern should be taken into account when pricing water 
services (Public Citizen, 2004; Owuor & Foeken, 2009: 10-14). These competing forces 
persist particularly for urban authorities in managing water supply to include matters such as 
providing affordable water services to the urban poor; protecting public health; meeting 
industrial and commercial demand for water; as well as maintaining environmental quality 
are involved (Bakker, 2002: 6).  
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Furthermore, the Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Resources
17
 asserts that water 
revenue continues to take on relative importance as a viable source of OSR for African cities. 
To ensure sustainability, the cities must always mitigate for the consideration of the variable 
and fixed costs of water supply into the water tariffs. The regulatory framework in the Water 
Act (2002) prescribes adherence to the water sector national framework on the annual tariff-
setting processes for the consumption of water and sewerage services that are provided by the 
NCWSC.   
 
The tariffs should also take into consideration social and financial factors which include 
ensuring the sustainability of the NCWSC; promoting access to safe water as a basic human 
right which also caters for access to the poor; reflecting the real costs of water supply; 
ensuring that the tariffs are simple for consumers to understand the charges on their 
consumption levels; and promoting the efficient supply of water (WASREB, 2008: 43-44). 
Marumahuko & Fessha (2011) maintain that the centralized process vested in the minister of 
local government that is used to approve water tariffs annually for Zimbabwe’s local 
authorities ensures access to water and sewerage services by the urban poor in pricing the 
tariffs (Marumahuko & Fessha, 2011: 49). The problem therein is that the centralized process 
forces subsidisation and limits individual city innovations in finding the most suited balance 
between pricing water tariffs and the necessary subsidization which in turn limits generation 
of maximum water revenue  
 
Contrary to the need to sustain the economic provision of the trading service, water tariff 
structures in Nairobi have remained almost static and do not correspond to the cost of 
supplying water in Nairobi (RoK, 1996: 344; RoK, 2002a). Upon the establishment of the 
NCWSC, one of the conditions in sustaining and enhancing the financial viability of the 
water utility was the prior determination that the water tariffs would remain unchanged 
through the transition period. This determination in itself was an indication of local fiscal 
discretion such that the price of water would not be too expensive for the city’s consumers. 
The NCWSC anticipated that improving the billing processes with limited increases in 
personnel and electricity and other input costs could still realize increases in water revenues 
as the NCWSC stabilized its operations.  
                                                          
17
The 1992 International Conference on Water and the Environment issued a statement on Water and 
Sustainable Resources in the Dublin Principles in which Principle 4 recognizes water has an economic value in 
all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good 
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This determination set water and sewerage tariffs for eighteen months after the founding of 
the NCWSC (NCWSC, 2004: ix). The tariff remained static until 2009 even when the 
NCWSC had been in operation for five years. The increase in 2009 shown in Table 5.4 below 
has been the only increase despite the utility’s need to meet the annual increasing costs of 
water supply as well as inflationary costs. 
Table 5.4: NCWSC Water and Sewerage Tariffs from 2000 to 2010 
 
 
Source: Author18 
Table 5.4 above shows the trend in water and sewerage tariffs for Nairobi for the period 2000 
to 2010. This trend also covers the period leading up to the creation of the NCWSC in 2003 
and also reflects the pricing of water in terms of the differentiation of consumers and 
quantities. The tariffs for water kiosks are the lowest water tariffs although evidence reflects 
that this subsidized cost is not transferred to the urban poor by the kiosk vendors (Crow & 
Odaba, 2010). The tariffs remained static even after 2005 and reflect the transitional 
arrangements made as part of the operationalization of the NCWSC into a water utility 
(NCWSC, 2004a). 
                                                          
18
 Figures supplied by the NCWSC Head Office 
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Despite prescriptions to ensure sustainability of water supply through economic costing of the 
resource, the cost of water supply has yet to be fully incorporated into the tariffs shown by 
the limited increases on the tariffs in the table above (WASREB, 2008). The inflexibility of 
this arrangement in the new institutional set up shows that the stagnant tariffs still persist as 
indicated in responses below: “Non-responsive tariff: Lobbying with the Government for 
tariff amendments; Tariff was last amended in 2009” (Interview transcript NO11, 28 May 2013; 
Interview transcript NO12, 31 May 2013).  
  
The implications of retaining a static water tariff to improve the revenue efficiency of water 
supply and sustained maintenance of water infrastructure costs are dire since the implications 
of the sustainable financing of water infrastructure are not always calculated into the costs of 
water supply. The NCWSC has to navigate a centralized framework for tariff setting that was 
previously a part of the municipal budgeting process, as do the other service providers in the 
country who do not face a similar magnitude of urban challenges that the NCWSC faces in 
generating water revenue and improving colonial infrastructure and supply of sustainable 
water service. This predicament puts the utility in a particularly vulnerable financial position 
that is perpetuated by the reliance on central transfers and international institutions. Financial 
dependence will negate the notion of local fiscal discretion in terms of financial sustainability 
which is implied by the notion of financial ring-fencing highlighted previously. The nature of 
local discretion is further examined below with the specific considerations of local political 
governance. 
 
5.3.3 Local Political Oversight 
 
Bakker suggests that municipal government leadership as a governance principle should also 
be evident in the structure of water management. This is particularly useful in reflecting 
indications of local discretion in water revenues. Besides, accountability mechanisms for 
local authorities should be in place to manage the operational activities of water utilities 
directly through to the municipal council in order to maintain political accountability. These 
structures ensure that cities maintain local political oversight so as to “limit abuse of 
monopoly power and ensure(s) protection of vulnerable consumers particularly with respect 
to pricing and disconnections” (Bakker, 2002: 9). 
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In Nairobi, the creation of the NCWSC was done within a national centralized process of 
water sector reforms that watered down this element of local political oversight to the mere 
representation of Nairobi’s political and administrative leadership on the NCWSC board of 
directors. The NCWSC board representation also eroded the important element of local fiscal 
discretion that the city previously had on the water function and more important on water 
revenues. By restricting the level of local public governance that Nairobi had over water 
revenue as an important OSR to the council’s representation on the NCWSC board has served 
to limit the extent of local oversight that had been historically retained by the city on the 
management of the NCWSC. 
 
Table 5.5 below reflects the stakeholder representation on the NCWSC board of directors as 
well as the authority and management structure that is now retained by the water utility. The 
independent board of directors of the water utility is nominated from the private sector, 
professional bodies and non-governmental organizations as well as the county government. 
Representation from Nairobi County
19
 constitutes five members on the utilities governing 
board. This has greatly reduced Nairobi’s political oversight of the water and sewerage 
function from total control to a subsidiary owned by Nairobi and retaining less than 50% 
representation on the governing board.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 Previously mayor, town clerk, city treasurer and two councillors represented Nairobi City Council, After 
March 2013, county governor, county secretary and chief executive officer sat on the NCWSC board of 
directors (RoK, 2011). 
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Table 5.5: Governance Structure of NCWSC 
Incorporation date December 2003 
Board members – number 11 non-executive members and 1 executive (managing 
director) 
Board members – term 5 years 
Board members – removal appointed and removed from respective stakeholders  
Board members – composition of board 
and committees 
5 members from Nairobi, 
7 members from private sector; civil society; professional 
bodies 
Board authority all powers 
Authority delegated to CEO From board of directors 
Authority retained by council NCWSC is a subsidiary owned by the Nairobi County 
Interests through board members from county government 
Other authority Athi Water service board; WRMA; WSRB; national 
ministry 
Financial reporting Annual report 
Payments to city % annual income as per tripartite agreement 
Community involvement Civil society representation on board; customer care 
processes of NCWSC 
Source:  Author 
20
 
 
The increase in political distance from the municipal council acts as a counterbalance for 
political interference as was the case in the past (K’Akumu 2007: 533). From a political 
accountability perspective, the reduced appropriation powers of Nairobi regarding water 
revenue also means that the city has less revenue for redistribution purposes. Second, the 
city’s allocation of water revenues has reduced drastically to a percentage as discussed in this 
section diminishes the amount of OSR generated by the city. Therefore, the above discussion 
on the NCWSC as a water utility that has replaced the provision of this trading service 
previously done by Nairobi’s water and sewerage department highlights the elements of 
centralism by the national government. The national water institutional framework as it 
stands erodes water revenues of this local function from Nairobi as well as the local 
discretion that the city needs to protect the urban poor in the pricing of water revenue.  
 
 
                                                          
20
 Adapted from Bakker (2002:24) with data from NCWSC annual reports 2005 – 2010.  
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This means that the local fiscal autonomy that the city previously employed through local 
fiscal appropriation over water revenue in the past has been depleted through the water 
reforms that occurred nationally through water institutional framework. The city cannot 
exercise political governance over this source of the OSR and exercise discretion that can be 
used to either provide equitable redress in the pricing of water or account for the entire source 
of the OSR in the city’s annual operating revenues. Besides, the reform has also transferred 
the water fund for financing water infrastructure from the city coffers and ring-fenced the 
entire water revenue for NCWSC. Proponent for water utilities call for financial ring fencing 
of water revenue but fail to acknowledge the importance of local political oversight in 
mitigating for subsidization for purposes of equity of access.  
 
The need to provide a sustainable source of OSR is necessary for maintaining payment levels 
and municipal creditworthiness. This proviso is closely linked to sustaining the financing 
needs for development capital by local government (Cowden, 1968). The following section 
examines Nairobi’s municipal borrowing in light of local fiscal discretion and capacity in 
order to determine how the city sources finance for capital expenditure within a centrally 
regulated environment. 
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5.4 NAIROBI’S ACCESS TO DEVELOPMENT CAPITAL 
 
The sustained relay of municipal services is heavily dependent on the provision and 
maintenance of municipal capital infrastructure. The dearth of municipal revenue inspires 
cities to explore alternative options to generate revenue for infrastructure. In Africa, as is the 
case in most of the developing world, the cost of financing municipal infrastructure requires 
significant capital outlays which tax local authorities’ ability to generate OSR. This problem 
is exacerbated by colonial infrastructure that barely services the cities’ contemporary demand 
for municipal services (UNHabitat, 2009: 13; UNHabitat, 2008; Kauffman & Pèrard, 2007).  
 
Financing for capital expenditure also requires that cities have access to long term debt and 
the capacity to generate funds from operating revenues that will also finance the municipal 
debt incurred to its full term. This requirement in loan theory suggests that “municipal credit 
rests upon revenue raising powers” (Cowden, 1968: 197). Furthermore, given that the 
longevity of municipal infrastructure spans more than a single generation of users, it stands to 
reason that the costs of financing should then be borne by both current and future users of 
municipal services (UNHabitat, 2009: 43).  
 
Given this provision, it then follows that cities should be afforded appropriation decisions to 
enter into long-term debt that binds future generations that will be financed by the sustained 
generation of OSR. The regulatory environment should be such that cities can access capital 
markets for development funding and develop the local fiscal capacity to ensure that the 
continued generation of OSR is maintained to sustain the debt. 
 
Historically, Nairobi has been mandated to source development finance from internal and 
external sources (RoK, 1967; ALGA-K, 2006). The internal sources for financing capital 
expenditure were determined to be capital funds that were expected to “defray capital 
expenditure and reduce outstanding debts”; renewal funds that should finance the 
replacement of the city’s assets; the water fund that accumulates water revenues to finance 
water infrastructure; and funds directed specifically to housing development (RoK, 1967; 
Nairobi City Commission, 1989). 
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Lewis (2003) determines that most developing countries follow a relationship-based model 
with central government providing overall guarantees for municipal borrowing. Nairobi 
ascribes to the same model in which the external sources are backed by guarantees from 
national treasury take the form of bank loans, external (foreign) loans, and municipal stock 
and public private partnerships (OPM/MoLG, 2009: 10; ALGA-K, 2006: 20). Funds that are 
borrowed for purposes of capital expenditure should be managed from the city’s consolidated 
loans fund that was established under section 221 of the Local Government Cap 265 (NCC, 
1988; NCC, 2004; NCC, 2005).  
 
In addition, the city’s rate for loan repayment was calculated on the basis of its overall 
income. This call for all loans to “be charged indifferently on all rates and revenues of such 
local authority and all securities shall rank equally without any priority” (RoK, 1967: Clause 
222(2)). This compels Nairobi to ensure that a portion of potential local revenues be 
dedicated to debt repayment and not be available for other municipal expenditures. Besides, 
the city is required to have the local management capacity in place to manage municipal debt 
and sustain municipal OSR to finance the debt (UNHabitat, 2009: 44, PPIAF, 2009: 7). This 
historical access to development finance means that Nairobi has been able to source funds for 
capital expenditure for the project described below.  
 
Municipal borrowing has enabled Nairobi to secure financing from international and 
development institutions to build council housing. The UMOJA/USAID Housing Scheme 
“comprises a housing scheme funded by the Government of the United States of America 
under which tenants acquire houses in Umoja Estate under mortgage” (NCC 2004: 29). This 
scheme was additionally supported by the capital fund that administers tenant purchase 
schemes in Kaloleni, Ziwani, Makadara and Riruta. The capital fund also manages the 
housing development fund for parts of Umoja I and II and the Dandora housing development 
scheme (NCC, 2004: 29). Continuous financial shortfalls in the city’s OSR have precipitated 
the non-servicing of loan arrangements in Nairobi. As early as 1988, defaulting in loan 
repayments to the National Housing Corporation and the Local Government Loans Authority 
as well as fiscal appropriation by the general fund for operating revenues from the renewals 
fund, the consolidated loans fund, water fund and housing development fund were grave 
fiscal errors reported by the city treasurer (Nairobi City Commission, 1989). 
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Nairobi has also been able to secure finance for the delivery of critical municipal 
infrastructure and specifically water infrastructure. Sammy (2004: 15) tracks the historical 
development of water supply in Nairobi that required significant capital outlays for municipal 
infrastructure. He finds that Nairobi’s first water source was commissioned in 1899 from the 
Nairobi River which was followed by the Kikuyu springs between 1900 and 1906. In 1938, 
the first phase of the Ruiru development project was completed and by 1949, a third pipeline 
from the same river served the city. Sasumua Dam was the next development phase that was 
followed by the Chania River. In 1985, the third water supply project was initiated and in 
1996, Thika Dam was commissioned to contribute to Nairobi’s vast water needs. Sammy 
(2004) found that these projects were unable to meet the growing demand for water in 
Nairobi. 
 
The financing arrangements for the water infrastructure above show the city’s ability to 
secure foreign loans. Table 5.6 below provides a glimpse of financing sources for the water 
infrastructure project called the Third Nairobi Water Supply Project (1985) and reflects an 
overwhelming dominance of foreign institutions financing water supply requiring lengthy 
repayment periods that would deflate revenues, OSR, that are apportioned to future payment 
of the municipal debt. It is important to note that the loans “to the Council under subsidiary 
loan agreements under which the government guarantees payment to the lender” points to the 
relationship model the Nairobi has with central government as its guarantor (NCC, 2004: 44). 
As indicated earlier the transfer of this municipal debt burden to the NCWSC awaits final 
reconciliation of the city’s overall debt burden by the inter-ministerial task team (NCC, 2009). 
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Table 5.6: Foreign Loans for Nairobi Water Project as at June 2004 
Foreign Loans Direct/ on 
lent by 
Treasury 
Starting Interest Period of Repayment 
IDA  On Lent August 1985 9.29% 11 years with 4 years grace 
period on principal  
IBRD On Lent  7.45% 21 years with 6 years grace 
period on principal 
IDA On Lent July 1989 8.00%  
OPEC Fund On Lent  Interest free  
OPEC Special On Lent  Interest free 13 years with 5 year grace 
period on principal 
EIB On Lent May 1989 12.00% 10 years with 5 year grace 
period on principal 
ADB/ADF On Lent April 1989 10% and 8% 
respectively 
13 years with 3 year grace 
period on principal 
OECF-Japan On Lent March 1989 10.00%  
Saudi Fund On Lent    
Paris Club 
reschedule arrears 
On Lent    
ADF  
Supplementary loan 
On Lent    
(Source: NCC, 2004: 44) 
 
The city’s financial data shows that financing arrangements for the above water infrastructure 
projects in Nairobi is scarcely evident in the city’s financials. The city acknowledged the 
administrative challenges of capturing and reconciling loan obligations, despite the 1997 
council policy that mandates that foreign loan obligations be reflected in the city’s financials. 
This reporting deficiency meant that with time, inadequate financial reporting on the status of 
long-term debt has left the city bereft of managing overall municipal debt. This is evidenced 
by the inadequacies reflected in the financial years ending 30 June 1998 and 30 June 2002, 
when debt accounts had still not been updated and the city remained unable to project a 
complete analysis of the loan situation (NCC, 2004: 44).  
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Furthermore, the city confirmed that vital documents, such as loan agreements, were not 
available at the treasurer’s office as mandated. Nairobi was, neither able to service loans prior 
to the intervention of the parent ministry within the auspices of the Kenya Local Government 
Reform Programme discussed earlier, nor was the city able to ensure that the servicing of 
loans yet been fully reconciled (NCC, 2004: 44; RoK, 2002a; RoK, 2002b). 
 
In terms of municipal bonds, Nairobi is the only city that has utilized the option of issuing 
stock to generate local revenue in Kenya. The city has had unsatisfying results from this 
venture as discussed later in section 5.4.3 (ALGA-K, 2006; Chapman et al., 2003). Nairobi is 
still able to access development capital despite irregularities in financial management that 
have been highlighted by the city’s key financial officials (NCC, 2004: 2009). Nairobi’s state 
of municipal borrowing is now discussed in light of the city’s legal framework for municipal 
borrowing; availability of information to determine municipal creditworthiness; and 
relationship with central government. 
 
5.4.1 Legal Framework for Municipal Borrowing 
 
The Kenyan government is expected to provide oversight through a regulatory framework 
that primarily determines the relationship between central and local government for 
municipal borrowing and, more importantly, issue fiscal rules by which cities can borrow 
(Cowden, 1968: 196). A policy framework is thus important in prescribing the matters that 
relate to the general statutory limits for local borrowing, management of municipal debt, 
determining safety margins as well as oversight of the elements in the municipal debt market 
(Moodley & Sing, 1996: 2003). 
 
In Kenya, central government acts as a sole guarantor for Nairobi. This protection has been 
maintained in the new constitution as well as in subsequent local government legislation 
(RoK, 2010; RoK, 2011). The lending proposals are channeled through the Ministry of Local 
Government and processed by the national treasury. In the case of the NCWSC, this 
arrangement has changed slightly to reflect the new water institutional arrangement.  
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Given the central government guarantees on Nairobi’s debt and the subsequent assistance in 
debt reduction (NCC 2004: 44), it is not clear from annual reports what the arrangements 
were or what is proposed for the repayment of the municipal debt for water infrastructure that 
was inherited from Nairobi’s water and sewerage department. An official explained the 
sporadic response to the city’s municipal debt in this way: 
Municipal borrowing was done in building Ndakaini dam with 
support from a French loan but central government intervened and 
a municipal bond was issued…we have argued for LATF to go up 
because of loss of water revenue 
(Interview transcript NO9, 13 February 2013) 
 
The new financing arrangement requires that the NCWSC operate within the national 
framework whereby proposals for infrastructure investment are considered by the Athi Water 
Service Board. This has been useful in the restructuring project that is supported by the 
World Bank through the service board that is worth Ksh 1.2 billion (NCWSC, 2004: 2b). A 
key informant concurred with this assertion by stating: 
 
Expansion plans by Nairobi City Water and Sewerage Company are 
done under the Athi Water service board only and the utility is 
allowed to put in proposals for borrowing for infrastructure to the 
service board which is a strict process 
(Interview transcript NO8, 11 February 2013) 
 
The rest of Nairobi’s debts require the use of an inter-ministerial team that was tasked with 
reconciling the loan values and the balances due. This was primarily to reflect on present 
liability with loans on water projects (NCC, 2009). By 2009 the city was only able to partially 
project loan balances on various loans as shown in Table 5.7 below. When compared with the 
city’s overall revenue, figures on total loans show that the debt ratio of Nairobi seems 
significant despite the increasing trend of overall city revenues that are boosted by the stable 
sources of local revenue from the SBP and property rates discussed in section 5.1. 
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Table 5.7: Nairobi Balances of Long-term Loans at 30 June 2009 
  Consolidated 
Source Loan No.  Principal Due Interest Due Total 
LGLA Various 244,097 361,636 605,733 
Government 
Guaranteed 
 1,569,108 1,979,483 3,548,591 
                                      Totals 1,813,205 2,341,119 4,154,624 
Source: NCC, 2009:33 
 
 
The exact amount of municipal debt has been called to question because of the historically 
poor financial record keeping and subsequent sluggish attention that has been given to the 
city’s local fiscal capacity to manage its municipal borrowing function both by the Omamo 
Commission (RoK, 1996) and also by the local government reform process (RoK, 2002a; 
2002b). Partly to blame is the centralized stance adopted in the reform that has not placed 
significant responsibility on the city to emphatically develop municipal creditworthiness or 
the fiscal capacity to service long-term debt. The relationship with central government also 
plays a role in maintaining the status quo as is discussed later in this section. 
   
Table 5.8 below presents this precarious financial situation in a ten-year term during which 
total loans exceeded city revenue until the year 2003/2004. Although revenue is on the 
increase after the final reforms in 2008, reconciliation on the total municipal debt burden is 
still outstanding. The fiscal disjuncture is also confirmed by the findings of the Kenyan 
auditor-general (RoK, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
125 
 
Table 5.8: Nairobi City Revenue Compared with Municipal Debt Burden 2000-2010. 
 
Source: Author
21
 
As Nairobi is a city with access to the municipal debt market, it is allowed to borrow funds 
from the capital markets and through municipal bonds. The former option requires more 
stringent requirements as presented by the market-based relationship for municipal borrowing. 
Meeting these requirements is hindered by Nairobi’s reliance on national treasury for bail-
outs (Martell, 2008; Hernández & Pèrez, 2004). These requirements centre on the city’s 
ability to provide credible financial information, its credit rating and creditworthiness 
determined in the remaining section below.  
5.4.2 Availability of Information for Credit Rating 
 
The availability of information to municipal credit lenders is important for two reasons. 
Information on the fiscal, social and economic situation of the city and respective country is 
used by independent credit rating agencies to determine the local “willingness to repay 
commercial debt at specified times” so as to issue a credit rating (PPIAF, 2009:8). Credit 
rating agencies use information on the local and national economy, debt, financial and 
administrative strategies that reflect local government’s future ability to repay loans (Lipnick, 
Rattner, & Ebrahim, 1999; Jackson, 2006:23).  
 
Municipal creditworthiness and credit rating are important for acquiring long-term debt since 
these factors facilitate local access to loans from capital markets as well as the obtaining of 
credit at favourable interest rates (Scott, 2000; PPIAF, 2009:8). It is also important that the 
                                                          
21
 Figures derived from Nairobi financial statements 2002 – 2009. 
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information provided to credit institutions be useful in reflecting the current and future state 
of debt management (Hernández & Pèrez, 2004). Therefore, highest credit quality is with risk 
factors, which are negligible at “AAA” while “DD” reflects the likelihood of defaulting on 
debt obligations (PPIAF, 2009: 9). These ratings have a bearing on the rates of interest 
attached to municipal debt that the city incurs and require a city to improve on its rating so 
that it may actively draw funds from capital markets (Lipnick et al., 1999). 
 
Although the importance of providing information to credit lenders has been underscored, the 
long-standing fiscal crisis of Nairobi meant that there was a dearth of information particularly 
on the fiscal situation and management of the city. This gap in critical information has 
detached the city from developing the capacity to manage municipal debt, and limited the 
ability to establish municipal creditworthiness since rating agencies are unable to conduct a 
credit rating on the city. Table 5.9 below shows that only a sovereign rating has been 
conducted on Kenya, and the credit rating was only began after the 2008 multi-party election. 
Table 5.9 has no rating for Nairobi which points out that credit rating is not an indicator that 
the city is able to use to determine credit worthiness despite the city’s access to development 
finance from international institutions. 
 
Table 5.9: Long-term Credit Rating: Nairobi 
Year Nairobi Kenya 
2000 - 2007 - - 
2008 - B+ (foreign) 
BB- (local) 
2009 - B+ (foreign) 
BB (local) 
2010 - B+ (Foreign) 
B+ (local) 
Source: Author
22
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 Ratings provided by international rating agencies: Standard & Poor and Fitch  
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Nairobi is allowed to borrow from capital markets, an option that the city has not yet fully 
explored. The city’s inability to meet requirements through credit ratings and the lack of 
certainty of municipal creditworthiness are partly responsible (Jackson, 2006). The capital 
market also remains wary of the city’s ability to manage municipal debt. The city’s attempt to 
enter the capital market has also been met with trepidation as confirmed below by a key 
informant: 
 
We tried doing a structural bond three years ago with the World Bank 
in it, it was the first time that we tried this kind of borrowing and 
these are the issues that came up, we didn’t have a rating  
(Interview transcript NO9, 13 February 2013)  
 
The new city envisages that the local government reforms, particularly intended to improve 
Nairobi’s financial processes and management, and reverse the long-standing dismal history 
of fiscal crisis into transitioning into a new county structure after 2013, will mandate county 
government to borrow funds for capital expenditure. Although the legislation prescriptions 
for municipal borrowing prevail, the challenge in asserting Nairobi’s fiscal capacity to 
engage the local capital markets and municipal stock persists since the local government 
reforms do not emphasize restructuring of the environment for municipal borrowing. This 
means that the local fiscal capacity cannot yet be explored in terms of local fiscal discretion 
and appropriation to manage municipal debt. 
5.4.3 City Relationship with Central Government 
 
The central-local relationship reflects the reliance on national government as a guarantor, as 
well as the municipal capacity to engage (or not) capital markets for municipal borrowing. 
This relationship-based model that is preferred in developing countries has not compelled 
local government to enhance local capacity to repay municipal debt (Lewis, 2003; Leigland, 
1997; World Bank, 2000). The regulatory environment for municipal borrowing which 
Nairobi has operated from since independence, emphasizes a central-local relationship 
whereby central government provides surety for Nairobi when the city sources external loans 
for capital expenditure. The dearth of fiscal rules on the loan regulations and repayment 
capacity of Nairobi resulted in the insolvency and illiquid state of Nairobi’s fiscal resources 
(RoK, 2002a; RoK, 2012).  
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As a result, the central government has had to take over significant responsibility of the 
municipal debt as was confirmed by a senior official: “Bonds were given when Ndakaini was 
built, loans were not being serviced and therefore in the last years the Kenya government 
decided to intervene on behalf of the city and pay” (Interview transcript NO9, 13 February 
2013). 
 
In summary, Nairobi has a prescriptive legal framework that allows the city to engage local 
and international markets for long-term loans. While the city has been able to leverage loans 
from international institutions for water infrastructure and housing developments mainly 
facilitated by the relationship-based model with the national treasury, the city has not 
proactively developed its local fiscal capacity to engage capital markets. These alternative 
options require strict adherence to requirements of municipal creditworthiness which include 
the availability of credible financial information and a stable credit rating. The city has also 
not kept up with meeting its financial obligations on the long-term debt which  reflected in 
the derisory financial reporting of the municipal debt burden that required intervention from 
central government. The unreconciled financing arrangements on the debts for water 
infrastructure between the NCWSC, a subsidiary of the city and the city itself, perpetuate the 
crisis in Nairobi’s state of municipal borrowing.  
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Conclusion 
 
Literature suggests that a regulatory framework is basic in relating the revenue assignment 
function to cities. This requirement is reflected in the political will at national level to 
promulgate legislation that relates local revenue to specific local functions. The laws that are 
in place should enhance the city’s ability to generate local revenue and improve on fiscal 
capacity and thereby reflect local discretion.  
 
In the above case, a centralist perspective from the national government has influenced the 
way legislation has been implemented for revenue enhancement, and in the manner in which 
reform measures have been undertaken in the capital city of Nairobi. Additional revenue from 
the newly reformed SBP has become an important contributor to the city’s revenue. The 
additional emphasis that has been placed on property rates income by the city has resulted in 
this OSR rise to become the premier source of Nairobi’s independent local income.  
 
The interviews and financial data presented converge on the unrealized potential of the 
critical OSR of water revenue and municipal borrowing.  Contrarily, water revenue has been 
eroded from the city’s fiscal discretion through the new national water institutional 
framework that assures the financial ring-fencing of water revenues for water expenditure and 
infrastructure. The city receives an annual water lease income from the NCWSC and an 
additional grant from central government, but this amount does not come close to the water 
revenue the city was fiscally responsible for prior to the water reforms in Kenya.  
 
The result of the local reform on local fiscal autonomy is twofold. The city previously had 
fiscal discretion over the water fund and annual water revenues. The misappropriations that 
were a result required an introspection that should have improved the city’s fiscal capacity to 
manage water revenue and not the incorporation of NCWSC into the water sector. Secondly 
the implications of financial ring-fencing for NCWSC meant that the city now has limited 
political governance over water revenues. The additional drawback has severe implications in 
pricing the water for urban poor who continue to be marginalized in the pricing structure that 
does not ensure that the disadvantaged are beneficiaries of the equity intentions of pricing 
water revenue. 
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Nairobi’s municipal borrowing environment remains in a state of chaos, an unenviable 
situation that is indicative of the city’s fiscal inability to manage and sustain municipal debt, 
even with a framework that permits borrowing from international and national capital 
markets. The reliance on central government which is reflective of developing countries, has 
not only evidenced the national government paying off some of Nairobi’s municipal debt but 
also reflected in the poor record keeping on the status of current and past loans which 
debilitated the city’s creditworthiness.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE CASE OF JOHANNESBURG’S LOCAL REVENUE 
 
This chapter presents the findings on the experience of local fiscal autonomy in 
Johannesburg’s local revenue function. The evolution of Johannesburg’s revenue after local 
government restructuring is first presented to capture the process before, during and after 
local government reform. The next section examines local fiscal discretion and appropriation 
of water revenues within the city of Johannesburg. Finally, the municipality’s state of 
municipal borrowing is presented in light of revenue autonomy.  
 
6.1 REFORM FOR JOHANNESBURG’S LOCAL REVENUE FUNCTION  
 
Bahl & Martinez-Vazquez (2006) prescribe that implementing decentralization through 
reform should be preceded by a national process of adopting decentralization law that reflects 
fiscal decentralization; which includes local revenue autonomy. Local government can 
proceed to implement revenue assignment. This sequencing provides local government with 
the legal mandate within which to generate and manage local revenue streams. This 
autonomy is particularly important in the case of water and sanitation services in which the 
social, financial and economic considerations of water supply are critical and should be 
implicit in legislation (Bahl & Linn, 1992). Johannesburg’s experience of managing and 
generating water revenues contradicts the above regulatory path since the city underwent 
local government restructuring simultaneously as the national government promulgated 
legislation on local fiscal discretion.  
 
The metropolitan municipality of Johannesburg experienced a protracted process of 
tumultuous upheaval during South Africa’s local government transition which required the 
merging of thirteen disparate local authorities (PLANACT 1990; Cameron, 2005; Tomlinson, 
1999). The city’s negotiations were concerned with maintaining local fiscal autonomy; 
dealing with the municipal infrastructure backlogs in the township areas as well as the 
mounting debt levels that increased with the continued non-payment of services (CWMC, 
1992; Davis, 1992; FWG, 1993; JCC, 1990a; PLANACT, 1990). During the apartheid era, 
the WLAs had maintained a steady flow of own source revenue for operating and capital 
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expenditures as well as a favourable risk profile for municipal borrowing (Cowden, 1968; 
JCC 1984; JCC, 1990b; JCC, 1990c). Operating revenues constituted income from trading 
services for WLAs and were mainly drawn from electricity, gas, market, airports, transport, 
water and sanitation surcharges as well as income from residential and property rates (JCC, 
1984: viii; CSS, 1991). Obtaining finance for capital expenditure for the WLAs was regulated 
by the provincial Transvaal Local Government Ordinance of 1939 that prescribed the 
borrowing of funds from local and international markets and issued municipal stock with no 
statutory or automatic limits imposed by the former provincial administration. Central 
government provided guarantees for local lending although local fiscal capacity was 
emphasized for municipal borrowing (Cowden, 1968: 200).  
 
On the other hand, the impoverished Black local authorities experienced crippling 
infrastructure backlogs that mainly pushed the 1980 rent boycotts, which spurred the culture 
of non-payment for services. Critical financing for municipal infrastructure, particularly for 
electricity and for water and sanitation was not sufficient to service the populous townships 
and squatter settlements in the Johannesburg area (CWMC, 1992; Davis, 1992; Simkins, 
1991). During the transition phase, Johannesburg’s disparate local authorities were gradually 
merged to form a two-tier metropolitan structure first with seven substructures then finally 
with four metropolitan local councils, that is, the Northern, Southern, Eastern, Western 
councils under the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council, according to the Local 
Government Transition Act of 1993.  
 
This merger accentuated the fiscal, administrative, human and infrastructural disparities that 
had divided the previous local authorities and rendered the newly formed metropolitan 
municipality incapable of providing constitutionally mandated services to Johannesburg’s 
residents (GJMC, 2000: 4). The city faced crises on three fronts: first, the merger had not 
integrated the levels of municipal services, poor revenue management or payment levels 
persisted in the poor institutional arrangements, and the continued fragmentation of service 
delivery by local transitional structures as confirmed in the officials’ responses below: 
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Did they understand the magnitude of bringing together eleven 
different administrations, not only through culture but the 
understanding of collecting rates, you know the proportional 
subsidization of communities, management skills, you know the 
integration of cultures.. 
 
We now have to run these seven sub structures within a destiny here, 
go in to five structures because what was the policy of the ruling 
party, a uni-city, one tax base, one property rate base, right, so now if 
in one year the democratic elections people are not even beginning to 
understand that we knew the challenge. 
(Interview transcript JC1, 25 April 2011) 
 
There is an organization design which was poor that was between the 
locals and the Metro, it weakened revenue streams. That was the 
diagnosis I made when I came. It was part of the diagnosis of the 
whole thing about the one city, you can imagine this, Metro has to 
buy the electricity from Eskom, sell it on to the local, the local sells it 
on to the customer. There are four locals, all of them are buying 
electricity that is the accounting of it and they sell to the customer. So 
now Eskom sends a bill to Metro and Metro must pay in full. Metro 
sends a bill to local and local has been budgeting as though everyone 
is going to pay. They do not pay, local does not catch, local is not 
paying Metro, they are the last people to pay. So you have got the 
cash flow woes between the Metro and the local which was based on 
the structure of the thing. 
(Interview transcript JO2, 8 April 2011) 
 
Second, the city experienced significant losses in terms of skilled staff that left the civil 
service employ during the city’s restructuring process. The resulting skills shortage 
inadvertently undermined the overall management capacity of Johannesburg in creating a 
uni-city (GJMC, 2000: 5). An interviewee reflected on the implication of the staff exodus on 
the city’s institutional memory in this way: 
 
Staff were walking out of the door. They just resigned; the city lost a 
significant number of people but what it meant was that all wages 
were going up with inflation, our staff salary bills stayed constant. 
But lots of people left and you know lost a lot of institutional memory 
and it’s an interesting thing if you ever do some of this sort of work 
and you compare eThekwini, they did not lose institutional memory in 
the same way at all, you get people now who have been eThekwini for 
25 years you don’t find them in CoJ. A few, because a lot of those 
people walked they have been dribbling out ever since. The skills base 
in CoJ is a lot less. 
(Interview transcript JO2, 8 April 2011) 
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Finally, the fragmented revenues and expenditures that were now brought under the canopy 
of the uni-city severely debilitated the city’s ability to finance municipal services and even 
more so to “maintain the city’s infrastructure and extend service provision to historically 
disadvantaged communities” (GJMC, 2000: 5). The table below reflects the extent of the 
fiscal crisis that the city faced at the time. 
 
Table 6.1: State of Johannesburg’s Fiscal Position in 2000/2001 
 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000 2000/2001 
Budget deficit R 183 million R 134 million Nil Nil 
Overdraft R 405 million R 241 million Nil (Jan 2000) Nil 
Service arrears R2.6 billion R 2.9 billion R 2.8 billion R2.8 billion 
Payment levels 90% 92% 88% 93% 
Operating budget R 7.7 billion R 8 billion R 8.4 billion R 8.8 billion 
Capital budget R 655 million R 369 million R 379 million R 828 million 
Source: GJMC, 2000: 5 
 
The situation was also exacerbated by inherently high debt levels inherited from the WLA 
and fiscal deficits from the other local authorities that had all merged into the metropolitan 
substructures as shown in the responses below: 
 
 The crisis was aggravated by the new municipality using Old order 
financial directives; No proper budget, City could not make payments. 
(Interview transcript JO3, 26 August 2011) 
 
Metro which had all the responsibilities of servicing debt and paying 
for things like the metro traffic department and all those functions 
had no direct revenue powers at all. All the revenue powers went to 
the four local councils and there was an arrangement in terms of 
which they were supposed to pay over on a monthly basis, a sum of 
money to the metro.  
(Interview transcript JO2, 8 April 2011) 
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The culture of non-payment of services had also permeated into the inner city with drastic 
consequences for the revenue collections on services from the high rise buildings in the 
central business district. A senior official explains this predicament on the intensity of non-
payment in the city:  
 
I think at that time the debt was close to 2 billion and when you 
looked at these things, it is not poor people who owed this money. It 
was owed by people who owned probably most of the inner city, 
people who were absent landlords, you cannot even track down you 
keep sending bills, the kind of thing the situation that was there at 
that time. A debt that was created by a lot of people who were almost 
relieved of the discipline of paying and they were let off the hook, the 
rich people who owned most of the buildings where the amount owing 
was over many years. But then also you would have a relaxed 
practice by people at that time, it was kind of tolerated. 
(Interview transcript JO1, 6 April 2011) 
 
The issues above required the city to implement a plan that would provide financial stability; 
service delivery; an accountability framework; efficiency in the city’s administrative 
structures; as well as the provision of defined political leadership (Smith, 2006: 7). As a 
result, Johannesburg adopted a city development strategy that was intended to align its 
administrative structures and processes with the constitutional mandate of service delivery. 
The strategy guided these structures to eventually merge into the uni-city of Johannesburg 
through the iGoli 2002 and iGoli 2010 processes with the goal of one city one tax base (CoJ, 
No Datec; CoJ, No Dated; GJMC, 2000).   
 
These city development strategies were implemented in the context of a long-term plan 
known as Joburg 2030 Vision that directed the city’s resources to strive towards improved 
access to social services and continued economic growth (Allan, Gotz & Joseph, 2001). Later 
in 2006, the city adopted the GDS 2040 strategy to replace the Joburg 2030 Vision. In 
addition, the city developed the Joburg Human Development Strategy which is intended to 
support and realise the objectives contained in the legally prescribed medium-term planning 
of the IDP (CoJ, 2006a). 
 
 
 
 
136 
 
Through iGoli 2002 and iGoli 2010 the municipality formed a unified structure to meet the 
city’s constitutional mandate. The city used a combination of restructuring efforts that were 
targeted at the city’s political governance structures, core administration, utilities, agencies 
and corporatized entities (UAC). The Municipal Structures Act (1998) prescribed political 
governance to be provided through an electoral system that allowed for proportional 
representation and direct representation through wards in metropolitan municipalities. 
Johannesburg has 217 elected councillors with 108 elected from political parties in terms of 
proportional representation while 109 councillors are directly elected from the wards in 
Johannesburg (CoJ, 2009: 26).  
 
Furthermore, to strengthen the city’s local political governance over the urban administration, 
legislation allows the mayor to appoint a mayoral committee from the councillors to support 
the political responsibility of ten specified clusters, such as finance and infrastructure clusters 
(GJMC, 2000: 6). In light of this political process, the metropolitan municipality has been 
governed by the ruling party since 2000 as explained in Section 4.4. The central 
administration is tasked with policy implementation, regulation and coordination specifically 
in “implementing policies; regulating the operations of all service points, including the 
regulation, monitoring and evaluation of utilities, agencies, and corporatized entities” (GJMC, 
2000: 22; CoJ, 2011). Regional administrations manage region specific operations in the 
eight regions that comprise Johannesburg  
 
Three public utilities were created through iGoli 2002 for specific municipal services 
previously classified as trading services that now operate as municipal business enterprises 
with the municipal council of Johannesburg as the sole shareholder of the entities (GJMC, 
2000: 10). Johannesburg Water was created in 2001 for provision of water and sanitation 
services; City Power caters for electricity services while Pikitup merged the previous waste 
management functions of greater Johannesburg into one (GJMC, 2000: 12-14). Gas 
reticulation in Johannesburg that was previously a trading service in Johannesburg was sold 
off to a consortium of private sector companies that now manage this service as iGoli Gas. 
The sale was to enhance the city’s cash reserves that had been eroded by the restructuring. 
The loss of this trading service is explained by a senior official in this manner: 
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For example one of the big privatization initiatives was iGoli Gas 
used to be the gas department of the city of Jo’burg, it was wholly 
owned by the city and sold through iGoli 2002 what they did was they 
looked at that and they said well it’s not a core function. Gas as a 
form of energy is minimal in terms of percentage usage amongst the 
whole of Jo’burg; should the city then still be focusing so much of 
time, energy and resources into that and the answer was well if we 
can sell it lets sell it. 
 (Interview transcript JO7, 10 November 2012) 
 
The city also created agencies that provide specific municipal services which “do not attract a 
direct user charge and are reliant on the rates account for funding” (GJMC, 2000: 16). The 
agencies are the Joburg Roads Agency which manages the road network within the city and 
City Parks was set up in 2000 which is a central entity that manages Johannesburg’s parks 
and cemeteries (GJMC, 2000: 16-17). Corporatized entities were also established to perform 
the rest of Johannesburg’s municipal functions through dedicated units with appropriate 
governance and institutional structures, and these consist of Johannesburg Zoo; Johannesburg 
Fresh Produce Market; Metrobus; Johannesburg Civic theatres; and Johannesburg Property 
Company (GJMC, 2000: 20). Altogether the UAC cater for the array of Johannesburg’s 
municipal services.  
 
Cowden (1968) argues for municipal services and respective revenues to be regarded as a 
“whole and not units which should allow for urban authorities to aggregate profits or losses 
incurred”. Municipal revenue for Johannesburg is sourced internally from service charges 
that constitute electricity, water, refuse removal, sewerage and sanitation and other services; 
property rates; and interest from Johannesburg’s assets that are depicted below in Figure 6.1. 
External sources of revenue for Johannesburg come from national government in the form of 
grants and subsidies; and municipal borrowing from capital markets and development finance 
institutions.  
 
The sustainable generation of OSR is required to finance the city’s vast municipal mandate 
that has its roots in the constitution. Johannesburg continues to experience an upward trend in 
operating revenues which constitute over 80% of total revenues while the proportion of 
intergovernmental transfers is less than 20% as shown in Figure 6.1 below. 
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Figure 6.1: Own Revenues for City of Johannesburg for 2009/2010  
 
Source: CoJ, 2011: 12 
 
In the Figure 6.1  above shows the composition of own revenues for the city of Johannesburg 
during 2009/2010 when the trading services of water and sewerage, refuse, electricity and 
property rates drew in more than two thirds of the city’s total income. The central 
management of revenues by the city after local reforms allows for local fiscal appropriation 
for Johannesburg. However, administrative constraints in the implementation of centralized 
revenue management have emerged as in the case of Johannesburg discussed below. 
 
Revenue and Customer Relations Centre 
 
The iGoli plan envisaged the IT function as a critical function for “ensuring the delivery of 
the iGoli 2002 plan” (GJMC, 2000: 19). This function would assist the city to gain the goal of 
one tax base intended during the restructuring process as well as increase and sustain 
payment levels critical to the fiscal viability of Johannesburg. A series of interventions has 
thus been implemented that has centralized the city’s revenue function into the revenue 
services centre that is responsible for overall billing and collections from the municipality’s 
services.  
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The result of this process is the Regional Shared Services Centre that incorporates the 
revenue management unit, Joburg Connect and the People’s Centres (CoJ, 2002: 84-86; CoJ, 
2003a: 108; CoJ, 2011: 64). The specific revenue issues that this strategy intended to address 
were data cleanup; billing backlogs; statement delivery; meter reading and billing process re-
engineering (CoJ, 2002: 59-60). These issues have remained problematic, despite the focused 
attention directed by the revenue strategy. The magnitude of capturing data, particularly on 
revenue, is depicted in the following responses by a councillor and senior municipal official:  
 
Part of the mess had to do with a loss of skilled IT people over time 
who used to retrieve the data until they internalized it and some got 
lost, and in the establishment of the five councils as and when some 
functions were being consolidated within those functions they were 
also a whole range of things that were not handled properly that were 
rushed and resulted in data integrity issues. So we took a view that we 
needed to move to a city wide revenue collecting system and we 
embark on the process, and we chose Venus to implement that. It also 
had its own problem, you know migrating data from multiple system 
into one, there were huge issues, how long do you keep their own 
legal system particularly if they had credit that date back and that 
need to be investigated you need to go to those legal system processes 
and so on, the data was captured differently so you couldn’t just 
design and do a mapping exercise to transfer data because you are 
transferring from multiple systems with different levels of integrity oh 
it was a gemors 
(Interview transcript JC1, 25 April 2011) 
 
So what they need for example for meter readers and it’s part of 
maybe a BBE approach, is that you get the small companies to come 
and read but these people did not read meters properly.  They often 
estimated it and that caused a major problem; so you would actually 
have a genuine reading and estimates creeping in; so this caused a 
whole range of feuds. Now if a wrong figure is put in it is put in 
basically, so there is a huge citizens’ issue. 
(Interview transcript JO5, 4 October 2012)  
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6.1.1 Restructuring Johannesburg’s Water Function 
 
Historically, the local management of revenue from water and sanitation services in the 
greater Johannesburg areas was vested in the domain of the WLA
23
 which helped the 
privileged authorities to maintain a consistent stream of revenue from water services (CSS, 
1990; CSS, 1991). The former Johannesburg city council as illustration, generated a 
continued increase in income from gross water revenues as shown in the Table 6.2 below 
when compared with the corresponding increased gross expenditure in the water department: 
 
Table 6.2: Water Gross Revenue and Expenditure: 
Water Revenues Gross Income Gross Expenditure 
1983/1984 R 53 697 386 R 55 910 345 
1982/1983 R 51 392 071 R 51 660 696 
 Source: JCC, 1984: viii 
 
Conversely, Poto (1989) and Simkins (1991) find that water income was not a source of 
revenue for other local authorities. The black local authorities in particular were not permitted 
to provide the municipal service and instead relied on white local authorities to manage the 
supply and charge a flat rate for the townships to access water and sewerage service as 
confirmed by an interviewee’s response: 
 
The actual usage that people were paying was actually less than what 
they were paying prior to the prepaid system. Now prior to the 
prepaid system what was happening is people were being charged a 
flat rate. So every month you basically got an account regardless of 
how much water you used, you got a bill for R110, I can’t remember 
what it was – you could have actually used a lot less and our own 
research showed that people who were getting billed R130 a month 
were actually using less than R130. 
(Interview transcript JO7, 10 November 2012) 
 
 
 
                                                          
23
 From 1986 upon establishment, the Central Witwatersrand Regional Services Council was permitted to deal 
with the bulk supply of water as well as sewerage processing and pipes, seen as a trading function shared with 
the WLA and not seen as practical (Solomon, 1989: 79).  
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This meant that all the water revenue was at the discretion of the privileged local authorities. 
Having autonomy over the water revenue meant that the infrastructure for this municipal 
service in the white areas was quite developed and sophisticated in contrast with that of the 
marginalized local authorities. The townships in particular had a “dilapidated water and 
sewerage system” where minimal maintenance was exercised (Davis, 1992). This 
infrastructure contrast was confirmed by key informants: 
 
A lot of that was because of old systems and the way the apartheid 
government basically designed the infrastructure there was if I can 
just show you – if that was the road and those are the individual 
houses, the correct way is you run the water connections here and 
then it feeds in.  Now if this was the neighbour, so this is your back 
neighbour, under apartheid what they basically did was they ran the 
water pipe there so it was easier and less costly so it would feed both 
these houses. But what happened over time was people then extended 
their house and it went over, or they built a garage so you couldn’t 
really access that waterline any more. So if there were water leaks 
there it was gone, you would never be able to fix it. 
(Interview transcript JO7, 10 November 2012)  
 
The engineers design more high-grade stuff which is going to take 
forever to pay off. They do not care about the billing, they are 
actually having fun. Now the billing, it could be a lot better if we 
could bill less because we bill something rudimentary rather than on 
top of the range. In Joburg actually we inherited a lot of very fancy 
technology and there was a sudden outfall so ... which was actually 
world class etc. It really could have been held back a bit. So that was 
a standard story we were putting up. These are structural issues. 
More causes of crises, this is more important, culture of abundance, 
this is what I mean that the insiders were being very lavish with 
money. 
(Interview transcript JO2, 8 April 2011)  
 
This fiscal disjuncture raised two revenue issues that had to be addressed by the Constitution 
during the turbulent transformation period in Johannesburg: a democratic legal framework 
and the local government restructuring process. First, the question around the economic value 
of water had to be maintained and addressed. The pricing of water in the WLA had always 
been based on the “ability to pay principle” and had been fairly well managed; this had to be 
balanced with what was happening in the townships where water infrastructure had to be 
upgraded as a matter of urgency. On the other hand, a culture of payment for government 
services had to be cultivated which went against the grain of the status quo as was reflected 
by key informants: 
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So there was this drive to ensure that. In a way the regions also came 
up and they played a role in trying to encourage the customers or 
people down there to understand that for a service you have to pay. It 
was not an easy thing especially for many of these people came from 
a culture where it was mainly boycotts and that kind of a thing. If you 
are not happy with something you boycott, if you are not happy with 
something you stop paying etc. So they had to also understand that so 
that the problem doesn’t become exacerbated, you are not adding to 
the problem. 
(Interview transcript JO1, 6 April 2011) 
 
… was that under the old system because it was a flat rate even if you 
didn’t pay for water you still continued to get the supply, and that is 
why in a sense payment levels in Soweto were low because there was 
very little in terms of actual cutting off that could happen. 
(Interview transcript JO7, 10 November 2012)  
 
Second, the call for greater autonomy, particularly financial independence to be conferred on 
metropolitan areas, had repeatedly been made during the local government negotiations 
(CCLGA, 1991). This meant that Johannesburg expected to manage its water revenue after 
the local government transition process in 2000. Bakker (2002) highlights the need to 
improve on efficiency as a motive for restructuring water services from municipal 
departments to water utilities. Johannesburg faced a similar predicament that had been 
brought about by the restructuring process in which five different council departments were 
integrated to streamline the management structures and, more important, to improve the 
efficiency of municipal water services (Smith, 2006: 15). It was during the restructuring 
process depicted in section 6.1 earlier, that the city created Johannesburg Water. 
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6.2 JOHANNESBURG WATER  
    
Johannesburg Water emerged as the premier provider of water and sanitation services in the 
metropolitan municipality from the iGoli 2002 process. The water utility presently provides 
water and sewerage services to approximately 3,8 million people who constitute 750 000 
domestic, commercial and industrial consumers. The water utility uses a network of 11 000 
km of distribution pipes, over 100 reservoirs and water tanks to reticulate water to consumers 
and also collects waste through a waste water network of 11 000 km. Johannesburg Water 
purchases over 1000 Ml per day from Rand Water and daily treats 970 Ml of sewerage per 
day (JW, 2010: 5). The payment levels from water and sewerage services, an important 
revenue stream for the metropolitan municipality of Johannesburg, stand at just under 90% 
(CoJ, 2011: 15). Access to water and sanitation services in Johannesburg has improved, as 
shown in Table 6.3 below: 
 
Table 6.3: Water and Sanitation Services in Johannesburg 2001-2010 
 
 
 
City of  
Johannesburg 
Household Services 
Flush Toilet Connected to 
Sewerage % 
 
Weekly Refuse Removal % 
Piped Water inside 
Dwelling % 
2001 2011 2001 2011 2001 2011 
82.3 87.1 90.9 95.3 50.1 64.7 
Source: StatsSA, 2011: 41 
 
The water utility was created by the city of Johannesburg and was initially outsourced 
through a management contract that was a five-year performance management contract with a 
joint venture known as Johannesburg Water Management (JOWAM) comprising the Suez 
group of France and subsidiaries in the UK and in South Africa. The venture also included a 
black empowerment group that had 27% of JOWAM shares. JOWAM was expected to be 
responsible for the operational aspect of water services which includes billing, customer 
management as well as infrastructure development and management.  
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Governance of the water utility initially prescribed dual management by the managing 
director appointed by the utility’s board and the CEO of JOWAM (JW, 2004a; Smith, 2006: 
15; Van Rooyen, De Wet, Marais & Korth, 2009: 17, 18). At inception, the water utility was 
conceptualized to operate as an entity with managerial and financial autonomy that was 
directly accountable to the municipal council of Johannesburg for the provision of water 
services and management of water revenues (JW, 2003). 
 
Van Rooyen et al. (2009) assert that the efficiency of the water utility improved during the 
five-year term under the JOWAM contract. On operational efficiency, residents’ access to 
water and sanitation services increased to over 90% by 2005/06 including improvement in the 
quality of water and waste water to satisfy the national prescribed norms. The financial 
viability of the water utility was also enhanced as reflected by increased year-on-year 
revenues. The overall improvements in operational efficiencies and financial viability have 
prevailed even after termination of the JOWAM contract (Van Rooyen et al., 2009). 
 
Water utilities can enhance managerial autonomy, particularly in water revenues through 
financial ring-fencing, to ensure that the revenues are utilized for financing water-related 
expenditure and infrastructure without the element of fiscal appropriation from local 
government. Moreover, financial ring-fencing is important in boosting water revenue and 
should help in aligning and setting water tariffs to reflect costs of water supply as well as 
providing proportional pricing of water to different categories of consumers including the 
urban poor (WSP/ PPIAF, 2009; Smith 2009: 7-8).  
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It is also important to reflect on the evidence of executive political leadership of water 
utilities. The leadership should provide political accountability on behalf of the city’s 
consumers for the water services (Bakker, 2002: 21; Bahl & Linn, 1992). The 1992 Dublin 
Principles
24
 asserts that the economic value of water continues to take on relative importance 
as a viable source of local revenue for African cities. Integrating the fixed (infrastructure) 
costs and variable costs of water supply ensures that the water tariffs calculated contribute to 
pricing that gives a predictable and sustainable source of water revenues. Nyoni (1999) states 
that, with the use of a blended price to ensure cost recovery in Zimbabwe, water pricing still 
adversely affects small subsistence farmers as opposed to large commercial farmers in 
Zimbabwe.  
 
The present structures of the Johannesburg municipality that separates municipal function 
through the UACs proved useful in the merging of municipal functions in differently 
resourced areas during the municipal reforms. In the case of water and sewerage services that 
were also disparately financed throughout the former various local authorities; Johannesburg 
Water has made inroads in reversing the inequalities to access to the municipal service in 
impoverished areas in the city. Previously, archaic water infrastructure in the WLAs had been 
incrementally developed during the apartheid area and limited the full potential of water 
revenue being realized. The minimalist financing of the water and sewerage infrastructure 
also reinforced the minimal levels of townships access as highlighted by Davis (1992). This 
has also kept the gap in water infrastructure between the well-resourced areas and the poorer 
areas in the city. A city official explains the city’s motivation for realignment to reverse the 
water crisis in this manner: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 The underlying importance of these principles is the acknowledgement that the pricing of 
water services must include the costs of water supply despite opposition that has been 
repeatedly raised by social justice activists (Harvey, 2007; Public Citizen, 2004). 
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A lot of that was because of old systems and the way the apartheid 
government basically designed the infrastructure there was if I can 
just show you – if that was the road and those are the individual 
houses, the correct way is you run the water connections here and 
then it feeds in. Now if this was the neighbour, so this is your back 
neighbour, under apartheid what they basically did was they ran the 
water pipe there so it was easier and less costly so it would feed both 
these houses. But what happened over time was people then extended 
their house and it went over, or they built a garage so you couldn’t 
really access that waterline anymore. So if there were water leaks 
there it was gone, you would never be able to fix it. 
(Interview transcript JO7, 10 November 2012) 
 
Furthermore, the ability to finance access to water for the urban poor in the townships should 
be considered in the pricing of water which is a basic human right as determined by Public 
Citizen (2004). Bahl & Linn (1992) find that charging for water services in developing 
countries requires the costing of water to take into account financial, administrative and 
equity considerations, more than concerns for efficiency in water supply. These 
considerations should also dictate the processes on tariff setting to cover water supply costs. 
The evidence of local discretion may be evident in the fiscal appropriation of trading profits 
regarding other municipal services or the redistributive elements for equity and access to 
water and sanitation services. These issues that emphasize the need for local fiscal 
autonomy are examined further in this section below. 
 
Bahl & Martinez-Vazquez (2006) and Smoke (2001) stress the importance of a regulatory 
framework that determines how local revenues can be generated for local services, 
emphasizing the need for revenue autonomy. Several laws prescribe the regulatory 
environment for the generation of water revenues for the city. Based on the constitutional 
mandate to provide water and sanitation services in a sustainable manner, Johannesburg is 
allowed to impose “surcharges and fees for services provided” within a national legal 
framework (RSA, 1996).   
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The Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Act (2007) prescribes the norms and values for 
service charges, which include maximum charges for consumption levels and the annual 
tariff increases (RSA, 2007). The Municipal Finance Management Act (2004) allows for the 
setting of water tariffs that must include the consultation on these tariffs with the 
Johannesburg community as is required by the Municipal Systems Act (2000) (RSA, 2000; 
2004). Finally, the Water Services Act (1997) specifies the revenue requirements for water 
and sewerage tariffs such that the tariffs should also ideally cover the cost of raw water, 
capital invested, and operational cost including cost of replacement and refurbishment (RSA, 
1997) . Besides, the right to access water for the urban poor through subsidized costs is 
considered mandatory (DWAF, 1999; 2002).  
 
Johannesburg may also legislate and pass by-laws on “water and sanitation services limited to 
potable water systems and domestic waste water and sewerage disposal systems” (RSA, 
1996). This legal framework allows the metropolis to set water and sewerage tariffs for its 
industrial and domestic consumers annually, taking into account economic and social equity 
principles. Therefore, the city is required to promulgate by-laws that cater for social, 
economic and financial considerations in charging for water and sanitation services with a 
guiding tariff policy. 
 
The utility engages with Rand Water as the responsible water board for bulk supply of water 
and complies with the legal framework shown above in determining annual water tariffs. 
Tariffs are done through the municipal council as part of the city’s annual budgeting 
processes in the city budget office in line with national treasury guidelines. The revenue 
function for Johannesburg Water is managed centrally by the city’s regional services centre 
which includes customer and billing management as set out in Johannesburg’s by-laws on 
water services, credit control, customer, and debtor management. The Regional Services 
Centre acts as the customer interface that submits water utility charges and received water 
revenue through a consolidated bill that shows municipal charges on water and sanitation, 
property rates, electricity and refuse collection (GJMC, 2000). 
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Water revenues were previously partially managed by Johannesburg Water on the 
understanding that the utility would eventually manage its water revenue function. However, 
the revenue function was eroded from the utility over time. From inception to 2010, the 
utility only managed the billing function of top customers and the city annexed the water 
revenue function entirely through the revenue services centre in 2010 (JW, 2001: 9; JW, 2004: 
4, 5; JW, 2010: 19). In maintaining local fiscal autonomy, the city management of water 
revenue and local political oversight are important in this municipal service as trading 
services whose revenues are more likely to be appropriated by respective urban authorities to 
show local fiscal autonomy (Cowden, 1968). These issues are examined further in this 
section. 
6.2.1 Local Political Oversight 
  
The issue on local political oversight comes into play to enhance local fiscal autonomy which 
assumes that overall control of local revenue remains as close as possible to local expenditure 
for purposes of expenditure. Besides, municipal government leadership should be evident in 
the regulatory framework (Bakker, 2002: 21). This is reflected in how the city maintains 
political oversight through the political structures of the municipal council; portfolio 
committees and through open and regular engagement with the governing board of 
Johannesburg Water. Johannesburg Water operates within the municipality’s institutional 
framework as depicted in the Figure 6.2. The utility is located within the infrastructure and 
services sector in the city. Within this framework, the city maintains oversight through the 
Shareholding Unit and the Contract Management Unit located in the city administration as 
shown in Figure 6.2 below.  
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Figure 6.2: Institutional Framework for Johannesburg Water 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: City of Johannesburg, (2008: 13) 
 
 
Smith (2006) maintains that this institutional set up in itself severely curtails the autonomy of 
Johannesburg Water as had been earlier proposed in the JOWAM agreement with the 
intention of assuring financial ring-fencing for water utilities. The regulatory function of the 
contract management unit and the centralized revenue function illustrate the subservience of 
the utility to the city. Johannesburg Water is also expected to adhere to the city’s policies and 
development plans with relation to water services. This means that the financial and 
management processes are under the close scrutiny of the council to ensure that the municipal 
mandate of providing sustainable water and sanitation services as well as the generation of 
local revenue are adhered to. Smith (2006: 12) believes that this close proximity may lead to 
political interference, as reflected in the following sentiments from a key informant: 
 
 
 
 
Executive Mayor 
City Manager 
Infrastructure and 
Services Cluster 
Johannesburg Water 
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But part of the logic of this is we would set up a utility, you are going 
to put a professional board there. The board is going to count as 
CEO, you know. Joburg would appoint the board and in theory it is 
then the board‘s business. So that was logic behind that because now 
you do not get political micro management, you get a board 
protecting the organization and the board was very driven to deliver 
outcomes, that sort of thing 
(Interview transcript JO2, 8 April 2011)  
 
The municipal legal mandate supersedes the water utility and issues the metropolitan 
municipality with executive and political authority over Johannesburg Water as illustrated 
above. According to Smith (2006), the political governance of the water utility is also 
maintained through the board of directors and reporting structures. The municipal council is 
responsible for the appointment of the utility’s board of directors as per council regulations as 
well. The level of political oversight that the municipality has over the water utility is shown 
in Table 6.4 below.  
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Table 6.4: Governance Structure of Johannesburg Water  
Incorporation date 21 November 2001 
Board members – number 5 (min) 11 (max) 
Board members – term CEO term – 5 years 
Other board members not prescribed 
Board members – removal Municipal council 
Board members – composition of 
board and committees 
No board members are council members 
No board members are city officials 
No board members are members of national/provincial  
legislature 
Hiring process regulated by municipal council procedures 
Board authority All except those reserved for municipal council 
Authority retained by council Board size and composition 
Appointment and remuneration of board members 
Financial reporting Part of prescribed annual municipal budgeting and IDP 
process; Annual report 
Payments to city Entire water revenue appropriated 
Community involvement IDP and budget consultation process;  
Customer care of regional services centre 
Source: Author
25
 
 
Therefore, the local reforms that Johannesburg implemented during the democratic transition 
resulted in the placing of its water utility within the institutional framework of the city. This 
has served to ensure that the municipal council asserts local political oversight through the 
tights reins that are legally prescribed for governance. The reporting structures that are 
required from utility’s board of directors show a significant level of oversight of 
Johannesburg Water (JW, 2010). As a result, the municipality is able to affirm authority over 
the direction of water revenue generated by the utility for the city’s broad municipal mandate. 
This asserts the local fiscal appropriation for the municipal council because the council is 
able to make decisions such as subsidising costs for the urban poor. 
 
 
                                                          
25
 Adapted from the governance model proposed by Bakker (2002:24) and information from Johannesburg 
Water’s Articles of Association (JW, 2004b) 
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6.2.2 City Management of Water Revenue  
  
Johannesburg centrally manages Johannesburg Water revenues and appropriates the entire 
water revenue to the municipality. The billing and customer management functions remain in 
the regional services centre despite the “service level agreement signed in 2001 to transfer the 
function” to Johannesburg Water (Smith, 2006: 12). The water utility initially controlled 15% 
to 40% of its revenue function that constituted customer billing for the top customers until 
2010 when this portion of customer billing reverted to the city (JW, 2001: 9; JW, 2004a: 5; 
JW, 2005: 20; JW, 2010:12).  
 
This has given full control of the water revenue function to the municipality and erodes the 
utility’s autonomy for financial ring-fencing (Smith, 2009: 7, 8). Water utilities are seen to 
perform more efficiently if they are autonomous and, more important, if the water revenue is 
ring-fenced for water infrastructure (PPIAF/WSP, 2009). However, Johannesburg’s 
municipal mandate supersedes the JOWAM intention of an autonomous water utility as 
mentioned earlier in section 6.2. These tensions were repeatedly highlighted in the water 
utility’s annual reports until 2010. A councillor heading the infrastructure cluster summarized 
this tension as follows: “Utilities cited losing fiduciary duties needed guarantees” (Interview 
transcript JC1 25 April 2011) 
 
This form of local fiscal appropriation enables the city of Johannesburg to ensure 
redistribution through the city’s indigent policy to provide water access to urban poor. The 
maintaining of a zero tariff to a majority of the urban poor ensures equitable access that is 
prescribed by a national framework for free water services in South Africa. The city also 
appropriates revenues for other municipal services that are not able to generate enough 
revenue to finance the respective expenditure that relies on the rates account for funding 
(GJMC, 2000: 16).  
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However, the centralization of local revenues has brought problems with it evidenced in the 
city’s billing processes and faulty data management. This ineffective data management spans 
from the transition period to the present, despite significant investment in reversing the crisis 
(Smith, 2006: 35). Johannesburg residents have repeatedly complained about the billing crisis 
that obviates the city’s resolution to maintain and sustain a steady flow of the OSR through 
the various revenues including water revenue. The billing crisis remains unresolved (The Star, 
2013). A senior city official emphasizes the magnitude of the billing crisis that still plagues 
the city in the following manner: 
 
… which is centralizing so even those components that were in the 
MOEs have been pulled to the centre and what you are basically 
seeing is just a change that is hurting the institution level or at the 
level of mechanisms  .... you find a very big part of it is, you see the 
name ‘customer relations’ and ‘revenue management’ so there might 
be this semblance of an emphasis of this ‘customer relations’ but I am 
not seeing how even that new approach – customer relations- 
emphasizing on relations of the customer has really had so many 
outputs. What are the outputs there because it seems like that is 
probably the philosophy, good customer relations will lead to good 
revenue management. I think the CoJ is still struggling 
 
 So basically it was a much more elaborated institution for revenue 
generation and I personally do not feel that it made such a huge 
difference because in a way what happened now, what you are 
finding is a very centralized ... You know, it’s not really looking at the 
systems of how revenue is coming in 
(Interview transcript JO1, 6 April 2011)  
 
 
The centralized management of city revenues is, therefore, plagued with administrative woes. 
Nonetheless, the centralized management of the water revenue and, more important, the city 
revenue function has been beneficial in providing for equity and access. The fiscal 
appropriation is necessary for ensuring access to the financing of water services through the 
pricing of water as examined in section 6.2.3 below. 
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6.2.3 The Pricing of Water 
  
The process of setting water tariffs forms part of a municipal process that integrates an annual 
budgeting process into the municipal five year plan, the IDP. The annual tariff policy adheres 
to national regulations that prescribe the inclusion of an indigent policy in the tariffs that will 
afford the urban poor access to water and sanitation services (DWAF, 1999; DWAF, 2002). 
This regulatory framework prescribes that Johannesburg ensure that its urban poor are able to 
access water and sewerage services in the pricing of water.  
 
By appropriating long-term debt for capital expenditure particularly for the water and 
infrastructure sector from 2000 and through initiatives such as Operation Gcina Manzi and 
Project Thonifho, Johannesburg Water installed pre-paid meters in townships. The Gcina 
Manzi project was intended to move away from the “non-payment paradigm” and reduce the 
high levels of unaccounted for water through infrastructure that would introduce a pre-
payment system for water in the townships commencing with SOWETO (JW, 2004a: 69). 
These water charges were for consumption that went beyond the prescribed six free kilolitres 
per month.  
 
The Public Citizen (2004) confirms citizen dissatisfaction with the pre-paid meter system in 
Johannesburg.  The Mazibuko court case is an instance of public outcry for equity where 
legal representatives of urban poor who are vehemently opposed to the pre-paid system took 
the matter as far as the Constitutional Court, which found in favour of the City of 
Johannesburg to install pre-paid meters (Bond & Dugard., 2008; JW, 2009: 5-6). By 2008 
almost 100 000 pre-paid water meters had been installed (JW, 2008: 17). Harvey (2007) finds 
that the local communities have been adversely affected by the commoditization of water 
through pre-paid systems in Johannesburg’s townships and proposes an alternative 
framework within which the countermovement against pre-paid meters may engage.  
 
 
 
 
 
155 
 
The prominence that has been given to this pricing aspect of water and sewerage services has 
compelled the municipality to emphasize the number of households that access the basic level 
of water and sanitation services (CoJ, 2011: 172). The pricing trend for water and sanitation 
services is shown in the tariffs in Table 6.5 and Table 6.6. The tables also show the zero 
charges for both tariffs, an indication of subsidisation in pricing water revenue so that 
Johannesburg’s urban poor get to access to the basic level of services.  The utility uses water 
tanks to transport water to informal settlements to enhance water access to this marginalized 
sector of Johannesburg’s municipal population (JW, 2009; 2010). 
Table 6.5: Water Tariffs for Johannesburg Water 2000-2010 
 
Source: Author
26
  
Table 6.6: Sewerage Tariff for Johannesburg Water 2000-2010 
 
Source: Author
27  
                                                          
26
 Constructed from annual water tariffs provided by Johannesburg Water in annual budget and municipal IDP 
2000-2010 
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Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 above indicate that the annual water and sewerage tariffs have 
increased steadily from the time the utility was incorporated in 2001 to 2010
28
. This steady 
increase corresponding with the annual inflationary costs that are incorporated into the 
metropolis’s domestic and industrial tariffs is confirmed by Muller (2007: 36). The 
centralized management of water revenue explained earlier in section 6.2 erodes 
Johannesburg Water’s autonomy control, the billing processes of its customers, debtors, cash 
collection and limits the utility’s ability to manage a significant portion of its business (JW, 
2001: 7, 15-18; JW, 2004: 8, 10).  
 
The utility can thus not fully incorporate the fixed and variable costs of water supply into the 
water pricing since the tariff setting process is managed by the city’s central budget office. 
The political consideration of cross-subsidization of municipal services is also maintained by 
the executive mayor through the budget office which further erodes the notion of financial 
ring-fencing that was earlier envisioned in the JOWAM agreement. A senior council official 
summarizes the centralized management as follows: 
 
The bottom line is, as much as Joburg Water is seen as corporate 
entities, they still firstly all policy matters had to be approved by the 
council. So for example Jo’burg Water couldn’t go and increase rates 
by 50% because it wanted to show a better margin – the rates had to 
go through public processes, it had to go out, people could lodge 
complaints and objections against increases like it has done now, 
there was no unilateral decision making that was taking place. None 
of those entities were owned by private sector, they operated like 
businesses but there was no private sector ownership in any of them, 
so at least those assets still remain within the sort of family jewels in 
a sense. 
(Interview transcript JO7, 10 November 2012) 
 
Smith (2009: 7) confirms the similarity in costing water supply exists in the majority of water 
utilities in South Africa, where the economic value is yet to be fully integrated in costing 
process and reflected in financial ring-fencing of water revenue. It is important to note that 
the national prescriptions regarding the setting of tariffs which do include a pro-poor 
component and reduce the UAW losses have been maintained by Johannesburg Water (JW, 
2004a; JW, 2010).  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
27
 Constructed from annual sewerage tariffs provided by Johannesburg Water in the annual budget and IDP 
2000-2010 
28
 No consolidated figures on greater Johannesburg for 2000 were available 
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Therefore, the objective of creating Johannesburg Water to streamline the efficiency of the 
provision of water services in the city has been partly realized; the utility has managed to 
maintain a steady increase of revenues as well as access consumers to water and sanitation 
services. Financial ring-fencing which was suggested as an important component to sustain 
the autonomy of water utilities does not seem to be integrated into the operation of the water 
utility (PPIAF/WSP, 2009; Smith, 2009). This aspect of autonomy eludes Johannesburg 
Water since the revenue and billing functions as well as the tariff setting process are centrally 
managed by the revenue services centre, and form part of the city’s budgeting process.  
 
In summary, the centralization of water services from the fragmented water departments into 
Johannesburg Water in the municipality has enhanced operational efficiencies and increased 
water access, particularly to the urban poor in Johannesburg. The centralized billing function 
by the revenue shared services centre has raised concerns regarding customer management 
which has also isolated Johannesburg Water from the utility’s fiduciary function of financial 
ring-fencing.  Nonetheless, the city has been able to assert local fiscal autonomy maintaining 
fiscal discretion and appropriation for its water revenue. The revenue autonomy that was 
evident in the OSR for the former WLAs has, therefore, been transferred to the metropolitan 
municipality through the restructuring process. Maintaining discretion over water revenue is 
important to ensure that the city’s OSR are sustainable in the long run. OSR are also 
important in reflecting local fiscal capacity which Johannesburg needs in order to access 
development capital which is explained in section 6.3 below. 
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6.3 JOHANNESBURG’S ACCESS TO DEVELOPMENT CAPITAL 
 
Development capital is important to Johannesburg because the city must finance municipal 
infrastructure across the vast jurisdiction, addressing apartheid backlogs and moving the city 
to meet its contemporary infrastructure needs. Historical access to capital markets has 
required the city to realign its diverse fiscal capacity to be able to access long-term loans. 
This course of realigning Johannesburg’s local fiscal discretion is examined here. 
 
Matovu (2003) notes that there are critical specific issues that should be met so as to improve 
overall municipal financial capacity and enhance governance. These concerns should address 
and provide clear and internally consistent systems of local revenue generation as well as the 
provision of prudent conditions for municipal borrowing. Urban authorities in particular 
should reflect the capacity to manage this relationship between the generating of local 
revenue and the capable financing of long-term debt. This requires that a portion of potential 
local revenues be dedicated to debt repayment and not be available for other use, which calls 
for the cities to have the local management capacity in place to manage municipal debt and 
sustain municipal revenue generation (UNHabitat, 2009b: 44, PPIAF, 2009: 7). This requires 
that Johannesburg rely on its own resources to finance municipal debt over a long period.  
 
Furthermore, it stands to reason, given that the longevity of municipal infrastructure spans 
more than a single generation of users, that the costs of financing should then be borne by 
both current and future users of municipal services (UNHabitat, 2009b: 43). This requirement 
permits the municipal council to appropriate future income generated from the OSR and use 
the future monies as collateral to incur long-term debt to finance municipal infrastructure 
displaying local fiscal appropriation. 
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Prudent conditions for municipal borrowing are provided in two ways: first, in the role that 
central government plays in the lending environment as a guarantor and, second, through the 
regulatory environment that urban authorities use to access long-term loans. The central-local 
relationship reflects the reliance on national government as a guarantor and determines the 
responsibility with which local governments engage (or not engage) capital markets for 
municipal borrowing.  On the other hand, the market-based relationship between central and 
local government compels local agencies to take deliberate measures for present and future 
management to enhance local fiscal capacity and increase municipal credit worthiness for 
local lending.   
 
These advancements are slowly gaining recognition in developing countries as shown in 
empirical evidence from Brazil and South Africa (Martell, 2000; 2007; 2008; Liebig et al., 
2008). Besides relationships, a policy framework is also important in prescribing issues that 
relate to the general statutory limits for local borrowing, management of municipal debt, 
determining of safety margins and oversight of the elements in the municipal debt market 
(Moodley & Sing, 1996). 
  
Local lending is reliant on three specific conditions which are: central government oversight; 
availability of information to the municipal credit market; and own resources to repay 
municipal debt. In South Africa, there are various avenues for municipal borrowing that can 
be sourced from central government, capital markets and the issue of municipal stock 
(Cowden, 1968: 193).  
 
At the commencement of the local democratic dispensation, Johannesburg had aspects of a 
well-developed history of municipal borrowing in place. The city’s borrowing history was 
inherently transferred from the WLAs during local restructuring. This institutional memory 
had been developed from the WLA legal mandate to borrow for capital expenditure on the 
strength of local fiscal capacity. This was achieved by ensuring sustained OSR and obtaining 
municipal council approval to get into long term debt with minimum interference from 
provincial or central government. Johannesburg’s regulatory framework is examined in 
section 6.3.1 to shed light of the city’s municipal borrowing trends. 
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6.3.1 Legal Framework for Johannesburg’s Municipal Borrowing 
 
Martell (2000) and Martell (2007) concludes that fiscal institutions determine the central-
local relationship for municipal borrowing as well as the fiscal discipline that local 
government adopts regarding long-term debt. These institutions are inherent in the regulatory 
environment, particularly through legislation. Previously, in the greater Johannesburg area, 
the former WLAs were mandated to acquire long-term debt through the Transvaal Local 
Government Ordinance no 17 of 1939 which allowed the WLA councils discretion to borrow 
for capital expenditure. The exceptions to this rule were issues related to health and capital 
investment in township areas; these required engagement with central government (Cowden, 
1968: 203).  
 
During the transition period of local government restructuring, the Local Government 
Transition Act (1993) maintained this local discretion through schedule 2 (25) which allowed 
transitional local structures the authority to borrow money with the approval of the provincial 
administration. However, attention on the local restructuring that encompassed municipal 
administrative and political reform eclipsed capital investments that were not funded through 
the intergovernmental revenue sharing arrangements.  
 
In the democratic dispensation, the Constitution allows Johannesburg to borrow funds for 
capital expenditure and prescribes that national legislation support this mandate (RSA, 1996: 
section 230). The MFMA stipulates that long-term debt intended for the municipal purpose of 
capital expenditure and refinancing of old debt may be secured with municipal council 
approval and accompanied with security, disclosure and guarantee conditions that will be 
carried by the municipality. Municipal borrowing from international markets and institutions 
is prohibited (RSA, 2003).  
 
The MFMA also permits municipal entities to acquire long-term debt that is aligned with 
respective municipal IDPs and requires the entities to adhere to similar debt conditions as 
those required of municipalities. Municipal entities are allowed to borrow but this must be 
underwritten by the municipality. As a municipal entity, Johannesburg Water is allowed to 
incur debt only if the loans are underwritten by the metropolitan municipality. In practice, 
this means that it is the municipality that accesses loans and then indicates to which capital 
expenditure or municipal entity the funds will be directed.  
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Central government, through national treasury regulations prescribes Johannesburg’s 
municipal borrowing. The policy first provides the institutional framework for long term debt 
which guides investors in municipal markets; the regulator is identified as the Financial 
Services Board (FSB); and market facilitators include credit rating agencies that assess 
municipal creditworthiness for the capital markets (RSA, 1999: 7). The policy also protects 
central government from implicit and contingent liabilities of municipalities and prohibits 
borrowing in foreign currencies. 
 
The policy firstly identifies various stakeholders who facilitate and operate in the municipal 
lending market. The credit rating agencies provide services on the credit worthiness of 
municipalities. International rating agencies have been useful in opening the municipal 
borrowing market for local authorities in developed countries (Lipnick et al., 1999). Dethier 
(2013) determines that unfettered access to municipal borrowing for sub-national 
governments in developed countries has resulted in urban fiscal stress from the global crisis 
and in some cases has led to the insolvency of some local authorities. Secondly, financial 
advisors are useful in assisting municipalities to develop and implement funding strategies. 
Financial underwriters may assist with the preceding matter prior to the issue of municipal 
debt. Existing financial institutions that play the dual roles of trustee and paying agent and the 
other groups comprise legal counsel and bond insurers for municipalities (RSA, 1999).  
 
These regulations from the national treasury elaborate on the municipal borrowing 
environment. The borrowing policy acknowledges the importance of sustainable OSR which 
includes “trading services” that need to be substantiated in order to finance capital investment; 
hence the need for municipal borrowing. Therefore, in essence, this policy requires that 
capable municipalities develop their local fiscal capacity to manage municipal debt. The 
policy also reinforces a market-based relationship with central government for municipal 
borrowing as explained in section 6.3.2 below.  
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6.3.2 City Relationship with National Government 
 
Previously the WLAs operated in an open regulatory environment that permitted local and 
international borrowing for municipal debt. The former Johannesburg City Council is an 
example of WLAs that were able to issue stock and borrow from local and foreign financial 
institutions (JCC, 1984: 162-163). Financial statements also show that the sustained 
generation of OSR was important in developing the municipal borrowing environment as 
earlier suggested by Cowden (1968). A former senior official confirms this: 
 
Look originally the borrowing powers were subject to provincial 
approval, but that was watered down largely as a result of an endless 
series of petitions and lobbying and so forth, and in the end the major 
cities were given some form of discretion.  But their borrowing 
powers were pretty wide; in fact I think the need to approach the 
province was mainly nominal from the 80s” onwards. 
(Interview transcript JO4, 30 August 2011) 
 
Although the internal municipal capacity for borrowing was maintained into the transition 
phase, a proviso inserted in the regulations (see section 6.3 above) curtails foreign lending. 
During the local reform era, even previous borrowing that was considered during the 
transition period was summarily halted. This subtle change is shown in the following 
comments by senior council officials:  
 
I think that would have given Johannesburg the break through which 
as an international city it really needed; to have access to foreign 
markets and to make itself independent of constant governmental 
control and all the rest of it.  But the loan was stopped, there was a 
consent that was issued on the Friday and on the Tuesday the loan 
was to be floated – in fact we were already all in London to run 
through the briefing sessions for the presentation on the Tuesday. The 
Monday we got a telephone call from our lawyers to say The Gazette 
had gone out on Friday forbidding all loans in foreign currencies. 
(Interview transcript JO4, 30 August 2011) 
 
So what happened in 1997, there was an attempt to raise an offshore 
loan, it was disallowed 
(Interview transcript JO2, 8 April 2011) 
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Therefore, this action by national government entrenches the municipal borrowing 
regulations that remove higher government guarantees on Johannesburg’s long-term debt and 
reinforces a market-based relationship for the municipality and national government. With 
the adoption of the democratic dispensation, municipal borrowing in foreign currencies is no 
longer permitted. The sole reliance on Johannesburg’s internal capacity is assessed below in 
the municipality’s lending environment. 
 
6.3.3 Johannesburg’s Fiscal Capacity for Municipal Borrowing  
 
Leigland (1997) asserts that during apartheid the capacity and discretion for municipal 
borrowing in the WLAs was enhanced by specific effort that had been directed to “strengthen 
credit quality and build market for municipal borrowing”. Borrowing could also be done 
internally through municipal stock or various external sources, including foreign loans 
(Cowden, 1968: 193,199). This had garnered increased capital expenditure by the WLAs as 
indicated in the following perspective on WLA infrastructure spend:  
 
Just prior to that there were huge investments that were made, one in 
the Civic Theatre, there was a good couple of hundreds of millions 
that went into that upgrade.  Whether or not it was necessary, 
whether or not it was something that needed to happen at that point in 
time was debatable. There were huge amounts of money spent on 
upgrading the Johannesburg Stadium, again hundreds of millions. 
(Interview transcript JO7, 10 November 2012) 
 
Although the former WLAs had managed municipal debt, the emerging challenge was to 
enlarge the institutional capacity of this function during the restructuring process to 
encompass the jurisdiction of the metropolitan municipality. According to Davis (1992), the 
local fiscal capacity and discretion that was evident in the WLAs was very different from 
the fiscal capability of township areas regarding local financing for capital expenditure. In the 
latter case, the RSC levies were instances of not only funds having been used to finance 
infrastructure but also serving for bridging finance in fiscal crises, for example, CWRSC 
financed the BLAs R1444.2 million in 1993/4 (Moodley & Sing, 1999: 203).   
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The merging of the apartheid local structures meant that the transition needed far greater 
funds for municipal infrastructure. This need required that the new urban authorities to 
develop the fiscal capacity to manage the escalating need to finance municipal infrastructure 
while concurrently developing municipal legislation to address municipal borrowing. 
Rationalizing this merger during the municipal fiscal crisis after the advent of local 
government reform meant a scaling down of capital expenditure when rationalizing urban 
administration. The contracting revenues that were highlighted earlier in section 6.1 could not 
meet the capital expenditure needs of the city. This dilemma is encapsulated in a councillor’s 
comment as follows: 
 
It had to do with very ambitious expenditure programme that the CoJ 
embarked for which empowered, had to do with heightened 
expectations with the set of councillors coming into office with very, 
very high desires to transform the lives of people of Joburg, in 
particular the poorest of the poor within the shortest possible time 
given to them. So there was a revamp of expenditure on the capital 
programme.... I suppose quite ambitious expenditure programme. 
Unfortunately you can only spend what you have and there was a 
huge mismatch between the revenue and expenditure. 
(Interview transcript JC2, 16 May 2011) 
 
After the restructuring, Johannesburg had a fiscal crisis which meant a rethink on the 
borrowing against the pressing need for infrastructure investment. The need to balance the 
pressing financing needs for archaic municipal infrastructure against the declining payment 
levels on OSR is as indicated by a senior official as shown here: 
 
There was just no money for CAPEX, we had to work out how we 
were going to get money for CAPEX and we had called all of our 
loans onto one page and we were managing them properly and our 
first loan is actually in 2000/2001 we were debt restructuring but, 
and at that point we wanted to see if we were credit worthy and we 
wanted to go out in order to borrow. But our advice at that point was 
we should not proceed with the full credit rating because we are not 
going to succeed that was in 2001. 
 (Interview transcript JO2, 8 April 2011) 
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Table 6.7: Capital Expenditure in Johannesburg 1995 -2010 
 
Source: CoJ, 2002: 57; CoJ, 2011: 68 
 
Table 6.7 provides an illustration of a fifteen-year trend on how Johannesburg’s capital 
expenditure was influenced by the city’s restructuring process. Table 6.7 shows that capital 
expenditure was minimized during the restructuring period to stabilize the fiscal crisis in the 
city. The dip in capital expenditure that was between the years 1997/1998 and 2000/2001 is 
attributed to the reduced financing for capital expenditure which was instead redirected 
toward the local restructuring process. The emphasis on restructuring is inherent in the 
following responses: 
 
DBSA gave a loan provided we see the RSC levies income and that 
become one of my ambitions to get rid of that session. We basically 
said you can take our (revenue)... if we fail to pay you …in  early 
1999 we were preparing for this budget what we had projected was to 
spend R60Mlln, the only reason it raised to R309million. was because 
we got a restructuring grant from National Treasury that was that 
R525Mlln over three years and we used a couple of hundred of that 
as CAPEX to get us up there. But otherwise this city had stopped 
investing in CAPEX just out. 
(Interview transcript JO2, 8 April 2012) 
 
Treasury gave Johannesburg a restructuring grant to support the 
iGoli intervention to bring in change (took about 4 – 5 years). The 
Treasury also supported through monitoring and evaluation of the 
municipality’s budgeting processes 
(Interview transcript JO6, 14 September 2011) 
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Johannesburg’s institutional capacity was restructured to support the political decisions to 
improve the city’s financial condition that had been allayed by the protracted restructuring 
process. In terms of administrative restructuring, legislation requires that a metropolitan 
municipality establish a central unit in the administration to strategize the municipality’s 
capacity for risk and liquidity that is essential for long-term lending (CoJ No Datea; CoJ, No 
Dateb). During the 2003/4 budget Lekgotla, the city established an Asset and Liability 
Committee (ALCO) “as an enterprise wide management vehicle, which oversees the 
implementation of Treasury and financial risk management policies, with the objectives of 
achieving sustainable and good levels of liquidity, and also increase tenure of the City’s 
investments to match the underlying liabilities” (CoJ, No Datea: 18; CoJ, No Dateb: 11).  
 
The centralized management of the municipality’s capacity to engage long-term debt is 
reflected in the issuing of debt and is a reflection of fiscal appropriation in which funding for 
the diverse capital needs, including water infrastructure, is centrally pooled. The containment 
of the entire revenue function within the municipal budgeting process has also enhanced the 
discretion Johannesburg has over revenue-raising powers which are critical in determining 
municipal creditworthiness (Cowden, 1968; UNHabitat, 2009b).  
 
For Johannesburg, the restructuring process assures central management of the municipality’s 
debt through the ALCO to centralize the liquidity and risk factors for municipal borrowing. 
Placing a central unit to manage the city’s risk profile has meant that the financing needs for 
capital of the UACs are centrally managed which enhances the political governance aspect of 
the municipality. This local fiscal appropriation by centralizing the risk function that was 
entrenched during the city restructuring has been useful for Johannesburg in issuing 
municipal debt as was described by a city official: 
 
We also developed this liability profile, just watch all the loans and 
then we just started working on core funding this started becoming 
important later it is where we got the idea of bonds it was in this kind 
of context. Politically, it was through a committee called ALCO 
(Interview transcript JO2, 8 April 2011) 
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Once the city’s core administration and the UACs were in place, the municipality was able to 
steadily increase the capital expenditure of the varied municipal functions. The city 
proceeded to work on its fiscal crisis through its integrated units to reduce debt levels, and 
ensure sustained payment levels through the various revenue streams. Additionally, the 
restructuring grant from the DBSA sustained the operating costs as the utilities stabilized and 
enhanced revenue collection.  
 
Hard budget constraints required to enhance local fiscal capacity are prescribed through the 
MFMA and prescriptions of the GAMAP compelled the city to improve payment levels, to 
centralize the revenue function of the city’s trading services; to address specific risk factors 
associated with municipal borrowing such as municipal creditworthiness; to minimise 
Johannesburg’s reliance on IGT funds; and to ensure sustained OSR flows from other 
municipal services (CoJ, 2011: 60). As a result, Johannesburg is the most indebted 
municipality in South Africa (SACN, 2011: 30-32). 
 
The proceeds from this particular capital funding are directed towards roads infrastructure; 
municipal clinics providing primary healthcare; water, sanitation and electricity infrastructure 
services provided by the city’s UACs (CoJ, 2007b). The vast municipal mandate requires the 
city to be able to borrow from a robust capital market. The city has been able to obtain 
development finance from the DBSA, and local capital markets. These loans are reliant on 
the city sustaining the long-term range and generation of the OSR for municipal services that 
are payable by future generations.  
 
The steady revenue trends from the various sources of municipal revenue, the improved 
financial management practices on debt management, credit control, and payment through the 
GAMAP and the MFMA requirements have served to reflect a positive financial environment 
for the city. Johannesburg followed this course of realigning local fiscal capacity to enhance 
the city’s creditworthiness. The availability of the financial and economic information 
coupled with Johannesburg’s willingness to undergo credit rating positively reflects on the 
city’s creditworthiness. Johannesburg has actively engaged the municipal markets as shown 
in Table 6.9 below which reveals the profile of Johannesburg’s long-term borrowings in 2010. 
 
 
 
168 
 
Table 6.8: Profile Johannesburg’s Long-term Debt as at 30 June 2010 
Long-term Borrowings R’000 
Structured loans 934 378 
DBSA 1 585 829 
Local registered stock loans 30 000 
Municipal bonds 6 601 000 
Johannesburg bonds 55 109 
Other financial liabilities 1 881 467 
Total 11 087 783 
Source: CoJ, 2011: 76. 
 
The responsible borrowing in Table 6.8 above shows that the city borrows more significantly 
as city revenue grows. As a result, Johannesburg has emerged from the fiscal crisis with the 
highest municipal debt ratio in the country and is the first South African municipality to issue 
a municipal bond in the democratic dispensations, the Jozi bonds issued in 2007 with a two; 
three; and five year maturity (Viljoen, 2010; CoJ, 2007b). 
 
The city’s ability to access long-term loans relies on the sustained generation of the OSR as 
suggested by Cowden (1968). Johannesburg should be able to generate local revenue from 
the various local revenue tools and the basis for future revenue provides the collateral against 
which the municipality engages the lending markets. Table 6.9 below shows how overall city 
revenue compares with city capital expenditure and the overall indebtedness the city had 
from 2000 to 2010.  
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Table 6.9: Johannesburg Overall Revenue compared with Capital Expenditure 2000-
2010 
 
Source: Author
29
 
 
According to Table 6.9, when compared with overall revenue trends, the debt ratio of over 50% 
of the city is high which as confirmed by findings from by Viljoen (2010) and Liebig et al. 
(2008). The trends depicted in Table 6.10 points to the steady increase of revenue against 
total external loans and capital expenditure for the city of Johannesburg. This shows that as 
the city grows its revenue, it also increases spending on the corresponding capital expenditure 
programmes which should be synonymous with urban conurbations (UN Habitat 2008; 
2009a).  
 
Therefore, what the trends in Table 6.7 that represents Johannesburg’s capital expenditure 
and Table 6.9 city revenue, long term loans and capital expenditure reveal is that the 
institutional memory for municipal borrowing was maintained even through the fiscal crisis 
and local restructuring. This means that the local fiscal capacity for municipal borrowing 
remains inherent in the metropolitan municipality and is captured by Johannesburg’s high 
indebtedness as given in section 6.3.4 below.  
 
 
 
                                                          
29
 Drawn from Johannesburg’s financial statements 2000 - 2010 
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6.3.4 Availability of Information for Credit Market  
 
The availability of information to municipal credit lenders is important for two reasons. 
Information on the fiscal, social and economic situation of the city and respective country is 
used by independent credit rating agencies to determine municipal “willingness to repay 
commercial debt at specified times” and to issue a credit rating (PPIAF, 2009: 8). Credit 
rating agencies use information on the local and national economy, debt, financial and 
administrative strategies that reflect local government’s future ability to repay loans (Lipnick 
et al., 1999; Jackson, 2006:23). Creditworthiness and credit rating are important in municipal 
debt since they enable local access to loans from capital markets and also enable the 
obtaining of credit at favourable interest rates (PPIAF, 2009:8).  
 
It is important that the information provided to credit institutions is useful in reflecting the 
current and future state of debt management (Hernández & Pèrez, 2004). The provision of 
Johannesburg’s financial information and information about the city’s political governance in 
directing socio-economic development using municipal infrastructure within a cooperative 
governance framework assists the rating agencies to provide a risk profile over the long term. 
Furthermore, given that Johannesburg is a primary city, the direction of economic and 
industrial policies would highlight the “concentration of a significant portion of urban 
population, control of flows of capital, financial transactions, industrial production and 
national revenue” (UNHabitat, 2009: 26). The socio-economic responsibility placed on 
Johannesburg as a primary city compels the municipality to enhance local fiscal capacity to 
manage long-term debt. 
 
The rating agencies then provide a rating for the municipality which influences its risk profile, 
access to loans, and interest rates. As a result of the city’s overall improved financial 
performance and provision of credible financial information, the city is able to improve its 
credit ratings which have a bearing on the municipality’s ability to source finance from the 
robust local capital market (Liebig et al., 2008). Table 6.10 below shows a ten-year trend of 
international credit rating of Johannesburg alongside South Africa’s sovereign rating that has 
positively influenced the city’s state of loans and growing capital expenditure.   
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Table 6.10: Long Term Credit Rating: Johannesburg  
Year Johannesburg South Africa 
2000 BBB+ (Fitch) BBB+ (Foreign) 
BBB+ (Local) 
2001 BBB+(Fitch) - 
2003 A-(Fitch) 
A (CA)
30
 
BBB- (Foreign) 
BBB+ (local) 
2004 A- (Fitch) 
A(CA) 
BBB- (Foreign) 
BBB+ (local) 
2005 A- (Fitch) 
aA1.za (Moody’s) 
BBB (Foreign) 
A- (local) 
2006 A – (Fitch) 
aA+.za (Moody’s) 
BBB(Foreign) 
A (local) 
2007 A+ (Fitch) 
aA+.za (Moody’s) 
BBB(Foreign) 
A (local) 
2008 AA- (Fitch) 
aA1.za (Moody’s) 
BBB+(Foreign) 
A (local) 
2009 AA- (Fitch) 
aA2.za (Moody’s) 
A3 (Local - M) 
A3 (foreign – M) 
Source: Author
31
 
 
In summary, Johannesburg inherited the local fiscal capacity to manage municipal debt from 
the former WLA. The local government restructuring and massive demands for municipal 
expenditure in the impoverished areas required that the municipality boost the existing local 
fiscal capacity for municipal debt. The furnishing of municipal financial information which 
shows the sustained generation of OSR and the maintaining of a credit rating even in 
tumultuous times highlight the long-term projections needed to manage municipal debt. The 
local fiscal capacity and discretion have correspondingly increased Johannesburg’s debt 
burden to finance municipal infrastructure. 
 
                                                          
30
 Local rating agency provided credit rating for Johannesburg until 2007 when CA was incorporated  into 
Moody’s Investors Service, an international credit rating agency 
31
 Ratings provided by CA; Fitch; Moody’s credit rating agencies (CoJ, 2004a: 30; CoJ, 2011: 77) 
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Therefore, from the above discussion, the generation of OSR by Johannesburg has now been 
enhanced through local government restructuring and an amended municipal regulatory 
framework that entrenches local fiscal autonomy for metropolitan municipalities. The 
administrative improvements for the income from the property rates through the Property 
Rates Act (2004) should henceforth improve the income from this source of OSR. The 
legislative framework should also allow the city more local discretion and appropriation in 
the generation of OSR that are considered trading services or in the accessing of development 
capital.  
 
Dethier (2013) cautions against the unchecked increase in municipal indebtedness by sub-
national government in getting loans indiscriminately because it may lead to urban fiscal 
stress. This has been recently experienced by American and European cities during the global 
crisis. These sub-national governments gained unfettered access to domestic and international 
capital markets which had led to insolvency.  
 
As a fairly young municipality, finding and maintaining the balance between sustained OSR 
to fund both operational expenditure and also finance Johannesburg’s long term debt should 
take precedence than increasing the municipal debt levels. Therefore, the oversight that is 
maintained through political governance over the generation of OSR both current and long 
term is what reflects local fiscal autonomy when the city remains cognizant of the needs of 
the urban population against the regulatory environment in which OSR must be generated.  
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Conclusion 
 
Johannesburg has enhanced its revenue function as a result of the municipal financial 
legislation that was adopted in democratic South Africa that entrenches local fiscal discretion. 
The city has been able to increase the overall revenue base year on year. Of significance to 
OSR is the importance placed on trading services to sustain revenue autonomy for the city. 
The creation of Johannesburg Water through iGoli 2002 city development strategy that was 
done by the municipality assured that water revenue remained at the city’s fiscal discretion 
for the redistributive aspect of water services to urban poor as well as for subsidizing other 
municipal entities. However, administrative challenges that have surfaced from the 
centralization of the revenue function particularly for water revenue have also reduced the 
associated efficiencies of revenue collection that would have been realized had the water 
revenue function been managed autonomously by the water utility.  
 
 
On the part of municipal borrowing, the emphasis of the market-based relationship with 
central government has forced Johannesburg to implement fiscal discipline not only to get out 
of the imposed fiscal crisis that was a result of local government restructuring, but also to 
prove that the city could manage municipal debt after the restructuring process. The 
rationalizing of the municipal borrowing environment was made more difficult by the 
inherited disproportionate municipal borrowing environment inherited from the apartheid 
local authorities The resultant bad debt had severe implications for the city’s credit rating and 
corresponding municipal creditworthiness. National treasury provided some fiscal relief 
through restructuring grants, but the city had to rely on its own revenue sources, fiscal 
management capacity as well as credit ratings to manage the municipal debt. 
 
Johannesburg’s local fiscal discretion can, therefore, be determined to be enhanced through 
the peculiar regulatory framework that borrows traits from both centralist and federal states. 
These contrasting characteristics allow the city to navigate the local revenue environment. 
The caps placed by the hard budget constraints and prohibitions on foreign borrowing point 
to the market relationship-based model that South Africa adopted for municipal borrowing. 
Therefore, local fiscal autonomy for Johannesburg is reinforced by the regulatory framework 
in which the municipality generates its OSR. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
EXPOSITION ON LOCAL FISCAL AUTONOMY 
 
This chapter examines the findings that are presented in the preceding chapters in light of the 
discourse on fiscal decentralization that gives a framework of local fiscal autonomy for cities 
with the urban capacity to generate local revenue and to manage municipal debt. The 
preceding two chapters presented Nairobi’s and Johannesburg’s overall revenue functions to 
examine how the revenue examples of water revenue and municipal borrowing to illustrate 
local fiscal discretion and appropriation in OSR. The implication of local fiscal autonomy in 
these two cities is discussed here.  
7.1 Independence of the Local Revenue Function 
 
This study was concerned with how the case cities are able to independently leverage OSR 
using examples of water revenue and municipal borrowing. The two country contexts offer 
the legislative environment in which the said revenue mobilization occurs. Additionally the 
countries have also implemented decentralization through reform initiatives that have had 
varying effects on these cities’ generation of OSR. 
 
Based on South Africa’s experience with local government restructuring, Smoke et al., (2003: 
278-280) suggest that more research work on sub-national reforms should be done to 
examine what the effects have been on decentralized governance after restructuring. Besides, 
the these authors find nuances that point to the localized “political nature of decentralization” 
will reveal issues that are particular to African cities Smoke et al. (2003: 280). This 
knowledge gap is premised on the understanding that fiscal decentralization does not occur in 
a vacuum. Rather it is a nationally determined process that is informed by a national 
development agenda and political inclinations that are intended to enhance the capacity of 
local government towards a more independent way of financing municipal service delivery.  
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In this vein, the regulatory framework with which urban authorities generate OSR affects 
the manifestation of local fiscal autonomy and eventually municipal income. In this instance, 
national government is expected to promulgate laws that develop local fiscal capacity as 
suggested by Crawthorne (1997). Furthermore, the larger cities should expect special 
treatment in their revenue function within this framework (Dethier, 2013: 5). Normative 
emphasis is made in local government reforms that decentralization policy should first be 
adopted before the actual restructuring for fiscal decentralization takes place (Boex, 2009; 
Bahl & Martinez-Vazquez, 2006).  
 
The reform experience in Kenya and South Africa shows that these governments had already 
dispensed laws that catered for a decentralized form of government with the corresponding 
revenue functions. The countries rather amended present laws in the case of the former or 
promulgated new legislation in the latter case to give effect to generation of OSR. What 
distinguishes the two country’s experiences is the effect that these legislative changes have 
had on the local fiscal capacities of their respective cities. 
 
In Kenya, the local government reform process either altered the legislation to enhance 
revenue or designed new municipal legislation to give effect to the developmental democratic 
mandate for its sub-national government. Previously, the country had a legal framework in 
place that conferred special city and provincial status to Nairobi. The municipal legislation 
enabled the city independent OSR while central government provides guarantees to access 
funding for capital expenditure. These revenue instruments ascertained that Nairobi had full 
discretion of significant revenues and access to external sources of revenue.  
 
Despite the significant fiscal independence the financial state of the city remained in disarray 
because of the city’s misappropriation of the various OSR notably water revenue and reckless 
borrowing. Additionally, city’s inadequate checking mechanisms show the inability to 
entrench local financial management. To reverse this situation, Nairobi received special 
attention during Kenya’s local government reform process through the parent ministry of 
local government to address the city’s fiscal crisis. Nairobi’s implementation of LAIFOMS  
has resulted in improved financial reporting. The standardized reporting process ensures that 
the city is able to depict all revenue instruments and relate the income to corresponding 
municipal expenditure.  
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The targets in the revenue enhancement plan ensure that the focus on generation of OSR both 
individually and collectively by the various revenue instruments is preserved by the city 
throughout the municipal budget year (NCC, 2009; NCC, 2010). The system has also been 
made more visible to the public through the annual publication of tariffs and charges and 
visible evidence of provision of critical municipal services which have served to encourage 
city residents to make service payments in order to increase revenue. An interviewee 
commented:  
 
One of it was enhanced revenue collection. The other one was 
increased good will from the Nairobi residents because we started 
providing services; garbage collection, doing street lighting, doing 
lighting in the slum areas, re-carpeting roads making sure there are 
no pot-holes. That created goodwill from the residents such that they 
are also compelled to pay revenue to the council. We also instituted 
controls in terms of revenue management. There are also several task 
forces that were put in place to collect debt. 
(Interview transcript NO4, 10 November 2012) 
 
Thus the country’s local government reform process and recent elections have amended and 
also passed laws which allow the city to generate more revenue from additional revenue 
instruments as the SBP as well as enhance the regular flow of revenue from central 
government. The national water framework now compels Nairobi to cede water revenue to 
the water sector but maintain that water and sewerage as a local function. This represents a 
contradiction of sorts since the city needs water revenue to integrate social considerations in 
the pricing of water for the urban poor as well as cross-subsidize other municipal services. 
 
With respect to development capital an important OSR for financing municipal expenditure, 
concrete measures had not been implemented to address city’s limited capacity to manage 
municipal debt. Additionally, the regulations on municipal borrowing have not been altered 
by these restructuring changes but rather the city continues to grapple with this OSR which 
cannot be effectively leveraged to finance municipal capital expenditure.  
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More importantly, the limited involvement of the local sphere in the conceptualization of the 
local government reforms is an indicator of this superficial restructuring of local government 
that adopted a rather centralist approach. The Omamo Commission provided evidence and 
justification for revenue autonomy which requires that local expenditure be aligned with local 
corresponding instruments as well as the need for local fiscal autonomy (RoK, 1995, Bird, 
1999; Bird, 2000; Smoke, 1994). The literature also shows the premium placed on the 
generation of OSR through the local utilization of trading services such as electricity and 
water; the need to improve the administration of the incomes from property taxes; as well as 
the importance of local fiscal capacity towards municipal borrowing are seen as important in 
asserting this discretion in local autonomy (Bahl & Linn, 1992; Bahl, 1999b; Franzsen & 
Olima, 2003; Kelly, 2000; Liebig, et al., 2008).  
 
Separating these instruments of OSR in Kenya’s local restructuring process means that the 
objective of revenue autonomy for Nairobi as an important component of the country’s sub-
national government remains largely ignored. This obstacle restricts the city from manifesting 
local fiscal autonomy. Additionally, the benefits gained by the improvements in the other 
revenue instruments may soon be overtaken by the growing demand for municipal services 
by the city’s increasingly vibrant economy and population if the city does not local manage 
its water revenue or municipal borrowing. A local councillor articulates this apprehension 
about the limited revenue tools at Nairobi’s discretion in the following manner: 
 
You realize that most of the fees were set several years ago as early 
as early 80s and they were not increased so you find that like the 
local authority houses you will find a double roomed house, people 
are paying as little as 300 shillings and these people don’t pay for 
water, may be they will pay for electricity but they don’t pay for any 
other services so you cannot even break even with the little money 
they pay so what we thought as politicians is that the economy has 
actually changed so we tried to a little bit increase the fees and 
charges of these particular places, so I think is has improved it 
somehow though I think that you are aware that all the local 
authorities are not allowed to levy taxes, they can only charge fees, 
may be rental fees and may be single business permit fees, nothing 
else so we are limited to that extent so we cannot say that we are 
going to expand or enlarge what we are supposed to get from the 
people, it is not possible. So that’s where the problems are. 
(Interview transcript NC1, 16 October 2012) 
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Furthermore, although the local government reforms assisted Nairobi to gradually improve 
the precarious fiscal positions that had plagued the city in terms of revenue management, the 
city has yet to introspectively restructure local fiscal capacity to enable it to manage the 
critical and sustainable revenue concerns for municipal borrowing. The city’s inability to 
overhaul the ineffectual financial system which had consequently perpetuated corruption, 
decay of municipal infrastructure, and the sustainable financing of municipal services is 
being addressed at a snail’s pace by the intergovernmental process that should be more 
municipally inclined to enhance local capacity than it is (NCC, 2010; RoK, 1996: 352; RoK, 
2002a; 2002b). The official’s response below reiterates the chaos that was caused by the 
inadequate systems: 
 
Nairobi, council has got, I can say a broader revenue base but now 
the issue of management of revenue was the main problem. Where 
revenue money could be collected but there were no good internal 
control systems and that is what actually brought financial crisis. 
(Interview transcript NO3, 16 August 2012) 
 
Therefore, the local government reforms in Kenya and the resultant regulatory framework 
clarify the IGT process and processes for revenue enhancement. Nairobi as part of the 
reforms was able to improve on its financial reporting and eventually on the overall local 
financial management capacity by requiring the city to provide periodic and sustained 
evidence of local financial accountability. The opportunity for Nairobi to improve local fiscal 
capacity to independently manage revenues of critical trading services and to improve the 
city’s own municipal creditworthiness was lost in the reform process and new legal mandate. 
 
South Africa, on the other hand, with a constitutional foundation that acknowledges the 
independent role and function of the local sphere, proceeded to restructure the local sphere 
and to pass municipal laws that would give effect to this constitutional mandate. The southern 
country previously had laws that emphasized revenue autonomy for the select WLAs but not 
for the rest of its local authorities. Internalization of the local restructuring process has 
brought more profound effects to the grassroots sphere. The country’s new municipal legal 
framework was developed after municipalities had been realigned with a constitutional 
mandate and provided for the capable metropolitan and larger municipalities to assert fiscal 
independence.  
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Although this regulatory framework also caters for revenue through the IGT system, a 
majority of municipalities have been unable to utilize the funds because of the limited fiscal 
capacities of the individual authorities. The disconcerting municipal inability to maximize on 
the robust fiscal legislation has been corroborated by Dickovick (2005) and Elhiraika (2007). 
 
Two negative critical revenue consequences of the evolved fiscal architecture are the 
administrative burden imposed by the property tax and the abolition of revenue from the RSC 
levies. The introduction of the improved Property Rates Act has added to the administrative 
burden of municipalities. The act prescribes that income from property rates must be based 
on a composite rate that includes land values and improvements. This stipulation requires 
municipalities generating revenue from this instrument to subsequently align their local tax 
administration.  
 
In due course this revenue source will provide steady inflows to the local sphere although the 
administrative process of introducing these new changes to the tax does not realize all the 
potential income from property rates (Muller, 2010; SACN, 2007). Conversely, the removal 
of the RSC levies benefits the business community but not local government. Recent periodic 
surveys on the state of South African cities confirms that when the national treasury scrapped 
the RSC levies, a significant portion of local revenue was eroded and that none of these larger 
municipalities have engaged the respective urban authorities in developing an alternative tax 
as was proposed by national treasury (Muller, 2010; SACN, 2007; SACN, 2011). 
 
Johannesburg underwent significant restructuring that presently maintains the municipality’s 
prudence in the independent generation of a significant portion of its local revenues (CoJ, 
2010; CoJ, 2011). The restructuring process preceded the promulgation of municipal fiscal 
legislation which saw the city pioneer and charter details on the municipal revenue function 
that would subsequently guide the national regulatory framework. An official in the national 
treasury noted the integration of Johannesburg’s fiscal restructuring into municipal legislation 
as follows: 
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Johannesburg operated with fledgling of legislative framework which 
was one constitutional section on municipal finance now developed 
into the MFMA… for example, the Constitution has also been 
amended:… section 230 (a) introduced giving municipalities 
borrowing powers to bind future council of present municipal 
decisions to loan. 
(Interview transcript JO6, 14 September 2011) 
 
The municipality was also able to centralize the local revenue function within the city 
administration (GJMC, 2000). The localized centralism has also made the charging of 
municipal services more prominent than it was during the apartheid era of cross subsidization. 
An official explained the emphasis on charging for municipal services in Johannesburg in this 
way:  
 
From the Southern metro council side they tried to convince people to 
start paying rates and they introduced user charges in places like 
libraries and increased charges in the sports and recreation spaces. 
The swimming pool tariffs were I think inappropriate.  People don’t 
understand that swimming pools are generally meant for the poor; 
rich people don’t use public swimming pools. Another one was the 
zoo; the zoo became a corporate entity; they charged separately so it 
became inaccessible to the poor.  
(Interview transcript JO5, 4 October 2012)   
 
Therefore, the experiences of local government reform in South Africa and in Kenya reflect 
the contrast in which they were implemented. These contrasts mirror reform initiatives that 
have been conducted in advanced Anglo-American countries (Dollery et al., 2008). Like 
Kenya, Ireland has minimally incremented local government reforms and preserved local 
revenue sources as local taxation from commercial property; charges for the use of municipal 
services; and allocations from central government (Callanan & MacCarthaigh, 2008).  
 
On the other end of the spectrum, federalism asserts local fiscal autonomy as evidenced in 
Canada where local government reforms have augmented local fiscal autonomy (Garcia & Le 
Sarge, 2008). Local government reforms in the United States reflect three important changes 
in the composition of municipal revenues: the increasing reliance on user fees and charges as 
a key source of local revenue; the declining value of property tax as a source of local income; 
and finally the growing reduction of the IGT particularly from the federal states (Svara & 
Hoene, 2008: 141). South Africa has asserted local discretion as in the latter cases 
particularly for the larger urban authorities. 
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The nature in which legal instruments are developed to give effect to revenue autonomy 
frames the way a city manifests local fiscal discretion. In South Africa, the acknowledgement 
of an interdependent sphere of government has resulted in municipal fiscal laws that place 
local responsibility on capable municipalities to sustainably utilize independent revenue 
sources. Larger municipalities such as Johannesburg are compelled to improve financial 
reporting and management as well as the utility of available revenue instruments to maximize 
operating and capital revenues.  
 
In Kenya, urban areas and cities are now able to be more transparent and accountable in the 
generation and utility of operating revenues through implementation of the LAIFOMS system. 
The preferential treatment of Nairobi as the primary city has served to enhance the 
administration of individual and collective revenue instruments through the use of closely 
monitored revenue enhancement plans. This determination concurs with the provision of an 
enabling regulatory requirement for purposes of fiscal decentralization in the literature (Bahl 
& Martinez-Vazquez, 2006; Smoke, 2001).  
 
These findings present evidence on the premier importance that should be placed on the 
revenue function of larger cities in the continent as has been suggested by Dethier (2013: 5). 
The regulatory framework in both countries delineates tariffs for the various municipal 
services as well as funding for capital expenditure. The distinction in revenue sources should 
afford cities opportunity to use local fiscal capacity to generate OSR and access development 
capital. The revenues of Nairobi and Johannesburg confirm the local fiscal capacity to 
generate OSR and reflect a steady trend that has been maintained even after both these cities 
have undergone local reform measures. 
 
However, the generation of particular OSR will highlight nuances in the respective regulatory 
frameworks that either affirm or impede the independence of local revenue for these case 
cities. These OSR, which are the autonomy of water revenue and municipal borrowing are 
examined below in light of this regulatory framework. 
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7.1.1 Autonomy in Water Revenue 
 
Water revenue is an important component of municipal income because the internal source is 
able to finance the capital costs of the municipal service, and also in the redistribution of 
water and other municipal services (Cowden, 1968; PPIAF/WSP, 2009). This trading service 
is based on the principle of the ‘ability to pay’ and requires local discretion to promote and 
ensure that revenue efficiency of water supply is realized with the redistributive needs of the 
urban poor in cities.  
 
In the case of Nairobi, local fiscal discretion has been eroded by the moving of the 
municipal water and sanitation function into a national water framework. National priority is 
prescribed by the Kenyan government to manage scarce water resources supersedes the 
mandated municipal function and corresponding financing arrangements. The creation of the 
NCWSC thus compelled Nairobi to cede control of water revenue which has also limited the 
utilization of water revenue specifically to water infrastructure. The framework also 
prescribes financial ring-fencing for the water utility. The NCWSC is independently 
responsible for the overall management of water revenue including the billing and customer 
management processes (PPIAF/WSP, 2009; NCWSC, 2004). The water utility has been able 
to project steady increases in revenue that are boosted by the improvements in the metering 
system and procedures for water supply (NCWSC 2004; NCWSC, 2005; NCWSC, 2006; 
NCWSC, 2010). Nairobi presently receives an annual lease income from the NCWSC and a 
contribution from CILOR (NCC, 2007; NCC, 2008; NCC, 2009).  
 
Another result of this centralized arrangement negatively affects the pricing of water and 
subsequent revenue efficiency of water supply. The national water framework stipulates an 
arrangement by which annual tariff setting arrangements are centrally regulated and managed 
through the water resources management authority that should “develop guidelines for the 
fixing of tariffs for the provision of water services” including recommendations on “the cost-
effective and efficient management and operation of water services” (RoK, 2002c: section 
47).  
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By 2008, the NCWSC was able to show full cost recovery of water supply and continues to 
rely on “justifiable tariff adjustments” to improve on financial performance (WASREB, 2008: 
21). The negotiations that are conducted annually between the governance structures of the 
water utility with those situated in the national framework on tariff increases have had limited 
results as summarized by one official as: “non-responsive tariff: lobbying with the 
government for tariff amendments”(Interview transcript NO12, 31 May 2013) 
 
Keeping the water tariffs static over long periods of time does not relate to the utility’s need 
to increase the revenue efficiency of water supply and subsequent sustained water supply in 
Nairobi. Although the justification for redistribution still exists for Nairobi’s poor, the fiscal 
effort to provide a basic service is limited to improving the quality of the water supply to the 
distribution points in the water kiosks but not free access (NCWSC/ AWSB, 2009). Nairobi 
has also experienced a drastic reduction in political oversight of water revenue in comparison 
with the time when the function operated as a municipal water and sewerage department. The 
political representation on the utility’s governance board now means that arbitrary political 
decisions cannot be taken regarding water revenues.  
 
The downside of this arrangement of financial ring-fencing for water revenues is the erosion 
of local political oversight for Nairobi. The principle of horizontal accountability calls for the 
governance by local councillors not to be restricted to the provision of single units of service 
but rather to the delivery of municipal services as a whole. The curtailing of local 
accountability to the governance board and not entire service suggests an arms-length 
engagement with this critical municipal services which goes against the ideal of bringing the 
governance of services closer to the accountability structures that represent the local 
population. Ndegwa & Levy (2003) reiterate the need to keep governance processes closer to 
the local population but this has evidently not happened for Nairobi’s water revenue. 
 
In the case of a more streamlined regulatory framework, the experience of local fiscal 
autonomy means that larger cities are expected to develop and sustain local fiscal capacity. 
Johannesburg’s uni-city structure means that the metropolitan municipality centrally manages 
the customer management, billing and water revenues of Johannesburg Water. This has 
helped the city to draw from the cumulative revenues and finance overall municipal 
expenditure (CoJ, 2010; CoJ, 2011). Additionally, Programme Phakama that was 
implemented in March 2005 intended: 
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to establish a single revenue management value chain across all 
relevant business units; to establish a single customer interface value 
chain across all relevant business units; to ensure that both value 
chains are supported by a single integrated IT system across all 
business units; and to establish a new customer service and revenue 
organisation, re-built from bottom to top.  (CoJ, 2006c: 107)  
 
 
The revenue services centre has experienced chaos perpetuated by the administrative 
challenge of the mammoth revenue function which haves filtered to the water utility. This 
was compounded by the eventual confiscation of the consumer and revenue function from 
Johannesburg Water. This appropriation undermines the efficiencies of financial ring-fencing 
that were initially envisaged in creating the water utility (PPIAF/ ESP, 2009). This is evident 
as the utility’s inability to “control a larger proportion of its revenue base left it relatively 
powerless to address significant commercial losses resulting from poor data, erroneous billing 
patterns and high non-payment levels” (Smith, 2006: 12). Thus the notion of revenue 
autonomy for the water utility remains elusive. 
 
The national institutional set-up in which Johannesburg Water purchases bulk water from 
Rand Water which carries the fixed and variable cost of water supply to the point of sale 
means that the responsible municipality prices water and sewerage to cover supply costs. This 
has resulted in a steady increase in domestic and industrial tariffs as confirmed by Muller 
(2007). These tariffs also comply with national regulations that prescribe assured access to 
water by the urban poor. Consumers residing in informal settlements access water services 
for free as well as the benefit that accrues to each water consumer in Johannesburg of the six 
free kilolitres of water per month.  
 
According to Dinar & Subramanian (1997), international experience in developing countries 
shows that providing free access to water services for the urban poor as human right remains 
problematic and more unlikely to be realised. Johannesburg within its regulatory environment 
has achieved this social advancement as has repeatedly recorded in the provision of water and 
sewerage services by the municipality (CoJ, 2006; CoJ, 2011). 
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Therefore, the efficiency argument for the financing of local goods finds resonance in the 
fiscal devolution of tools for related local functions. The experience of water revenues as a 
trading service runs contrary to the need for local discretion over water revenue. In Nairobi’s 
experience, legally the water and sewerage services remain a city function while the 
management of water revenue resides within a national framework that erodes local political 
oversight. The NCWSC is not able to leverage much needed increases in the tariff structure 
due to the alignment in Kenya’s water sector. This represents a contradiction of sorts for 
water revenue since financial ring-fencing has taken over what was the local discretion that 
an urban local authority would have had within a national framework to enable the city’s 
administration to engage with the water sector institutional framework over the pricing of 
water as South African municipalities’ experiences show in the pricing of water services 
(Muller, 2007).  
 
Furthermore, the corresponding political accountability is diminished by limiting the political 
representation to the governance board representation and not overall management of water 
revenues. Questions then arise regarding the new legislation on urban areas and cities that 
prescribe public participation and integrated development planning in local governance 
processes and how this new legal framework really guides the local participation in the 
delivery of municipal services and in particular the aspect of revenue management of trading 
services. 
 
Johannesburg, on the other hand, has been able to leverage significant revenue and provide 
for access to urban poor through the tariff structure that caters for the redistributive objectives 
set by the national norms that require universal provision of water services in municipalities 
(ANC, 1994; DWAF, 1999). Conversely, Johannesburg Water remains a utility that cannot 
improve on the efficiencies of water revenue specifically for water infrastructure since the 
revenue function is centrally managed by the parent municipality. This contradiction reduces 
the utility’s overall accountability regarding fiduciary duties. Indeed the investigation on 
water revenues reveals that centralist tendencies exist both in a centralized and decentralized 
framework and both experiences have positive and sometimes adverse revenue implications.  
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7.1.2 Local Capacity and Discretion in Municipal Borrowing 
 
Access to development capital is important in financing municipal infrastructure as it 
compels cities to engage local capacity and improve credit rating and financial reporting in 
order to obtain favourable lending rates (PPIAF, 2009; Jackson, 2006). The experience of 
Johannesburg and Nairobi shows that both cities have a history of long-term borrowing that 
was entrenched by a regulatory framework that supported the long-term funding of capital 
expenditure. The emphasis of municipal debt directed to capital expenditure is reflected in the 
respective countries’ legal stipulations which have resulted in a significant concentration of 
the municipal debt being carried by the two cities in their respective countries (Leigland, 
2008: 110; Viljoen, 2010; Wamwangi & Kundishora, 2003). However, the cities’ states of 
long-term debt also reveal a stark contrast in the local fiscal capacity for municipal borrowing.    
 
The borrowing environment for Nairobi has not enhanced the city’s development of its local 
fiscal management capacity mainly because of the relationship-based model between Nairobi 
and central government. Although Nairobi has been able to access local and international 
loans to finance water infrastructure and housing developments on the basis of guarantees 
from national treasury, the borrowing did not utilize the city’s fiscal management capacity to 
improve on creditworthiness and sustained financing of municipal debt. The deficiency 
attributed to the absence of legal instruments for local fiscal discipline has not filtered to the 
city’s municipal debt burden. While the repayment of the loans remains problematic and the 
national treasury picks up on the shortfalls of these debts, the city has yet to establish 
municipal creditworthiness by providing rating agencies with credible financial information 
that is necessary to leverage additional finance for municipal expenditure (Lipnick et al., 
1999). Nonetheless, although financial reporting has improved in the aspect of revenue 
management for Nairobi, fiscal discipline is yet to filter into the city’s municipal debt burden 
despite the special legal status Nairobi enjoys in the regulatory environment regarding local 
lending. 
 
This relationship-based model is reminiscent of other developing countries. In Indonesia, for 
example, “local government loan repayment has been more than a little problematic” with 
debt incurred from similar channels as Nairobi, that is, local development funds and 
international institutions (Lewis, 2003: 1059). The high incidence of loan defaulting has 
prompted a move towards a market-based system in Indonesia through improved local 
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financial management (Lewis, 2003). A similar predicament is shared by local authorities in 
Zimbabwe where the “debt recovery system is poor” (Ndoro, 2010: 338). Therefore, 
according to Martell (2000) in her study on Brazil’s sub-national debt, the relationship model 
for municipal borrowing does not compel local government to improve local capacity to 
manage long-term debt despite increasing access for development capital. 
 
Conversely, a market-based relationship for municipal borrowing places the onus for 
managing long-term debt on local government with no national treasury guarantees. The legal 
instruments and stakeholders that are prescribed in the regulatory framework require that 
local government first develop the local fiscal capacity to manage municipal debt through 
discipline regarding financial management and establishing municipal creditworthiness 
(Liebig et al., 2008: 110). The importance of sustained municipal revenue-raising powers also 
bears on the sustained financing of the municipal debt (UNHabitat, 2009b; Cowden, 1968).  
 
In the democratic dispensation, Johannesburg faced a mammoth task of reconciling the 
tedious demand for capital investment in the city’s impoverished areas while assuring the 
sustained generation of local revenues to finance the city’s debt burden. This predicament 
simultaneously occurred during the tumultuous restructuring period when the city 
experienced a drop in overall payment levels from overall local revenues as well as limited 
access to capital revenues. Moreover, the market-based model rooted in the national 
regulatory framework compelled the city to improve on local financial management through 
provision of credible financial reporting and improvement of its rating status. As a result, 
Johannesburg’s debt ratio is the highest in the country with a corresponding steady increase 
in capital expenditure (SACN, 2011; CoJ, 2011). 
 
Therefore, the experiences of both cities in the local revenue function in general and 
management of water revenue and the local fiscal capacity for municipal debt in particular 
reflect the historical existence of a regulatory framework in Kenya and South Africa that 
permits fiscal decentralization to illuminate the aspect of revenue assignment for the larger 
cities. It then follows that local revenue autonomy should reflect particular facets of local 
discretion and appropriation. These nuances in city OSR are examined in more detail in the 
following section. 
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7.2 Implications of Local Fiscal Discretion 
 
While the course of fiscal decentralization does not necessarily follow a predetermined 
sequence as espoused by Bahl (1999b) and Bahl & Martinez-Vazquez (2006), the 
manifestation of the function of revenue assignment shows that periodic contemplation is 
necessary to effect revenue transformation that keeps cities abreast of the vast financing 
needs of local public goods. The colonial legacy of decentralization that Kenya adopted at 
independence conferred the revenue assignment function to Nairobi as the country’s primary 
city. Legislative and structural reforms have somewhat watered down the city’s local fiscal 
discretion. The South African local government reforms, on the other hand, proved to be 
protracted and have had more far reaching in realizing local fiscal autonomy for 
municipalities’ specific local revenue instruments 
 
Ebel & Talierco (2004) state that changes in the fiscal architecture of sub-national 
demographic, economic and institutional composition determine its municipal ability to 
sustain and improve on revenue generated from the local tax base. Nairobi’s population has 
grown exponentially in recent decades; this continues to place an unprecedented demand on 
municipal services and increasing municipal infrastructure to support this demand. These 
changes precipitated the city’s fiscal crisis which required an overhaul of the local fiscal 
capacity. The economic base from which the primary city draws its revenue has also 
increased with the city’s administration to manage local revenue as shown in the emphasis of 
SBP as an important OSR. However, the city’s reluctance to engage the fiscal nuances for 
generating OSR which include  cross-subsidization of OSR to ensure access to municipal 
services by urban poor as well as improve municipal creditworthiness. 
 
 Johannesburg’s massive jurisdiction required that the city contemplate the local fiscal 
capacity in light of rapid urbanization and economic growth in the region. This re-
demarcation during the democratic transit called for introspection of the local financing 
arrangement for municipal revenue. After implementing iGoli 2002 and iGoli 2010 strategies, 
the city had adopted a centralist stance in managing OSR. 
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Fiscal discretion allows cities to “tailor outputs to local tastes” while enabling the cities to 
generate local revenue (Rosen, 2005: 516). Additionally, fiscal discretion engages local fiscal 
capacity to “undertake experimentation and pioneering by few communities” as well as 
innovation in locally produced goods (Rosen 2005: 516; Bahl, 1999: 4; Eckstein, 1967: 37). 
Through Operation Gcinamanzi and Project Thonifho, Johannesburg Water installed prepaid 
water meters and improved sanitation facilities in the townships, moves  intended to reduce 
the levels of unaccounted for water (UAW) and improve water revenue (JW, 2009; JW, 
2010). The municipality of Johannesburg also utilizes an indigent policy to assure water 
access by urban poor. This subsidization in the pricing of water highlights the social 
considerations that are incorporated in costing water supply which is maintained at the 
governance level by the annual approval of the water tariffs by the municipal council. 
 
Taxes that can be administered through OSR glean more revenue when imposed on local 
residents and provide no competition to taxable sources for central government income (Bird, 
2000). These OSRs require cities to strengthen tax administration in order to enhance the 
income generated from these local revenue instruments (Tanzi, 2001: 10). Johannesburg was 
compelled to realign its administration of property rates with new legislation which now 
reflects as a fifth of the city’s total OSR (SACN, 2011: 40). In Nairobi the SBP income has 
also became a stable contributor to OSR as echoed in an official’s comment below:  
What we have seen, what has worked very well is in terms of the task 
forces that we have formed, the special inspection team that goes 
around to inspect the fake licence to ensure revenue is collected as a 
requirement by the council. Again what has worked well is the stake 
holders involvement in terms of the EACC and the traders themselves 
coz these are the people, the traders, who give us their money, for 
example in the markets, the retail markets that were at Landhies road, 
the chairman of the association of the traders, is involved in the 
collection, is involved in the audit so it has worked very well. 
(Interview transcript NO7, 30 October 2012) 
 
The market-based relationship for municipal borrowing in South Africa with the national 
treasury providing a capacity-building role has helped Johannesburg improve its fiscal 
capacity and conditions for long-term debt. Martell (2008: 30) determines that the factors 
affecting municipal borrowing include history, debt burden, debt security, pledged security, 
national legislation and constitutions. The constitutional and legal provision for municipal 
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borrowing in South Africa directs that municipal capacity be based upon municipal 
creditworthiness and sustained-revenue raising powers (Cowden, 1968). This is confirmed by 
Gildenhuys who argues that “an analysis should be made of the short-as well as the long term 
financial consequences...especially the long term financial impact” on the generation of OSR 
(2012: 140). 
 
Conversely the absence of local discretion is shown in the financial ring-fencing experience 
of the NCWSC and management of Nairobi’s long-term debt. The national institutional 
framework that makes management of water resources and services a national concern 
compels Nairobi to cede control of water revenue while the special status accorded in the 
legal framework has not improved its creditworthiness.  
 
Using de Mello’s framework that provides policy recommendations for revenue alignment 
and fiscal discipline to enhance municipal borrowing, Martell (2000) maintains that while the 
debt limit in Brazil is centrally determined, the regulatory framework provides no incentive to 
improve on local fiscal autonomy and that these regulations make credit limited and costly. 
Kenya’s relationship-based model that engages municipal borrowing under the auspices of 
the parent ministry of local government places no onus on Nairobi to improve local fiscal 
capacity as indicated in the following responses by treasury officials: “Treasury only does 
remittances; Ministry of Local Government quite powerful and provides directives to specific 
local authorities” (Interview transcript NO10, 15 February 2013). 
 
The importance of the parent ministry of local government on the continent is also evident in 
the municipal tariff-setting process and veto over municipal borrowing in Zimbabwe as 
highlighted by Ndoro (2010). The importance of local fiscal capacity in the critical aspect of 
development finance is paramount and requires a shift toward a framework that does afford 
local discretion. Appropriation of local revenue is important in showing how local 
governance exerts political accountability and to ensure that the redistribution of local public 
goods is also carried into the generation of OSR. The implications of appropriation are 
discussed in the following section. 
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7.3 Implications of Local Fiscal Appropriation 
 
Income from trading services has a dual manifestation of local appropriation which requires 
close political proximity in these cases to assure that the OSR generated indeed finances the 
fixed and variable costs of municipal service supply, that is, municipal infrastructure for the 
specific trading service. In addition, the OSR should cover the redistributive elements in the 
local supply. Regarding the acknowledged need for provision of water services by the urban 
poor, the NCWSC instituted the lowest tariffs to water kiosks in Nairobi while Johannesburg 
Water provides the first six kilolitres by Johannesburg Water free of charge to every resident. 
Additionally the costing of water supply into the tariffs should present a sustainable stream of 
water revenues as aspired to by both water utilities. 
 
However, managing the revenues of water infrastructure as opposed to overall municipal 
infrastructure presents the disjuncture of political accountability by the two water utilities. 
The cumulative result of Johannesburg’s central management of total OSR has had a positive 
impact on the financing of capital expenditure over the long term which is augmented by the 
added option of using the surpluses to finance municipal debt by trading services (Cowden, 
1968; Solomon, 1989). This enables the city of Johannesburg to apply local discretion in 
“making expenditure decisions more rationally and to apply own values to government 
programmes” (Eckstein 1967: 36). 
 
The caution that has been raised in fiscal decentralization literature that the various OSR 
devolved must be related directly to the specific municipal function to which they apply. This 
distinction ensures that the local revenue is “for different treatment of function” where water 
services are financed mainly from water revenue; community services from licensing fees; 
and capital expenditure from development finance (Prud’homme, 1995: 209).  However, 
Cowden (1968: 117) argues that “municipal services should be regarded as a whole and not 
units” when he suggests that municipal revenues are not distinct in themselves and that this 
perspective should move from a silo perspective of funding the various municipal services. 
This means that the revenue function is thus centralised such that the city can always 
maintain local oversight over all the OSR. The oversight allows the cities to make decisions 
over the pricing of municipal services; cross subsidization across municipal services and 
decisions on development capital. 
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Thus the centralisation of the revenue function as presented by Cowden allows for the cities 
to assert appropriation over OSR where the “aggregation of profits or losses from municipal 
revenue is necessary” (1968: 118). This is particularly important for the financing needs of 
municipal infrastructure which may cut across municipal service provision. The local fiscal 
appropriation is also particularly useful directing OSR especially in the case of municipal 
borrowing where the municipal councils incur municipal debt that will be sustained over the 
medium and long term by the current and future consumers of municipal services. This form 
of appropriation relies on the sustained source of OSR and allows the cities to manifest 
revenue autonomy with minimal reliance from the IGT. 
 
As a result, local appropriation is necessary for providing for political accountability; for 
enabling the cities to consider the holistic revenue requirements of their municipal mandate 
as well as for specific municipal services that thus “provide local goods that best reflect 
citizen preference” (Jackson, 1993). This assertion by cities is important for the independent 
generation of OSR. 
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7.4 Lessons Learnt for Local Fiscal Autonomy 
 
The experience of fiscal decentralization and of the assignment of revenue autonomy in the 
African context proves to be particularly complex in each individual experience. 
Prud’homme (2003) acknowledges this complexity by calling for the experience of fiscal 
decentralization in African countries to be prudently examined. The contemplation on fiscal 
devolution should whether decentralization is “tailored to the priority goals and 
circumstances of each country” which shows the appreciation and “understanding of the 
instruments available, the objectives or impact areas...and the mechanisms linking the 
objectives and instruments” (Prud’homme, 2003: 26).  
 
African states have made provision for a decentralized state in one form or the other which 
historically acknowledged in the existence of a national regulatory framework. Furthermore, 
in Kenya and South Africa, fiscal decentralization has been maintained through the 
democratic transition and local government reform. Through the reform, there was also the 
need to holistically provide an environment that filters local political accountability for the 
local population as well as local fiscal capacity for revenue autonomy is critical for the 
financing of the urban services of African cities. 
 
This makes the OSR of African cities of particular importance regarding the aspect of 
revenue autonomy. The financing needs of municipal services should reflect the ability to 
respond to the diverse needs of the urban population. The larger African cities have a 
municipal infrastructure that does not always correspond to the demands of the municipal 
populations. Cities such as Cairo and Kinshasa with populations of close to 10 million 
inhabitants and Lagos, with over 20 million (UNHabitat, 2008) require devolved revenue 
autonomy that matches the municipal mandate and enhances local political accountability. 
The revenue requirements of these cities in some cases do not always correspond with the 
OSR available which has adverse implications on the availability of critical municipal 
infrastructure and subsequent supply of local goods to the urban populations (Dirie, 2006). 
 
 
 
194 
 
The integration of the political economy into the nature of fiscal decentralization is also 
important in the theoretical assertion of local fiscal autonomy. The assertion acknowledges 
that while the distinct role of urban authorities remains, the interdependence of the national 
and sub-national government to enhance the socio-economic aspirations of citizens through a 
political-administrative framework requires the local financing of government activity even at 
the grassroots level. Oates (2008) concurs with this assertion which “recasts the basic 
framework of the problem to encompass both rent-seeking political agents and explicit 
systems of legislative and electoral behaviour” in order to “characterize fiscal 
decentralization and provide new insights into the conditions”. 
 
This corresponds with the determination of the key fiscal issue around laboratory federalism 
that asserts fiscal decentralization to essentially include the “capacity to foster innovation in 
fiscal institutions and public policy more generally...laboratory or experimental federalism 
has been the source of many approaches to addressing a wide range of fiscal or regulatory 
issues” (Oates, 2008: 330). In the cases of Nairobi and Johannesburg, the assertion of revenue 
autonomy within the different country contexts shows aspects of centralization from central 
government or from urban authorities that erode certain aspects of local fiscal discretion and 
appropriation for the cities. Johannesburg has been able to manifest local fiscal autonomy to 
generate OSR while Kenya’s centralised regulation curtails Nairobi’s fiscal discretion and 
appropriation in the city’s OSR.  
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Conclusion 
 
The need for fiscal decentralization is particularly important for African cities that have the 
local fiscal capacity to leverage OSR for municipal infrastructure and services. Firstly, the 
cities must drive and sustain the generation of OSR which finance municipal services. The  
sector of the urban population with the knowledge base that drives the cities’ economy 
provides an economic base on which local taxes are used to sustainably generate OSR in the 
medium and long term. Secondly, the diversity in the urban population requires that urban 
poor are afforded access to basic municipal services as a human right through the pricing of 
municipal services. The rational for revenue autonomy has been presented in the two case 
cities of Nairobi and Johannesburg as African cities. 
  
The decentralized form of government and local government reforms implemented by South 
Africa has also had meaningful impact on the revenue autonomy of their respective cities. 
The evidence presented in the Johannesburg’s experience of local fiscal autonomy mirrors the 
developmental national agenda that is enshrined in the constitutional mandate. The 
centralisation of the city’s local revenue function allows for the local centralization of OSR 
within the metropolitan administration. The centralised revenue management allows the 
municipality to manage OSR in a manner that shows local fiscal discretion and appropriation 
on sustained generation of OSR; pricing municipal services which will cater for the concerns 
around redistribution of government services.  
 
Fiscal discretion also directs the financing for capital expenditure to ensure the sustained 
overall economic development that will sustain the OSR for the larger municipalities. The 
local fiscal autonomy works well to improve municipal capacity for municipal 
creditworthiness. Conversely, the city’s centralized revenue management faces a mammoth 
administrative task for any individual OSR as shown in the example of water revenues that 
deflate from the overall revenue strategy. 
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Nairobi retains special county status in the new legal framework and has improved the city’s 
overall OSR trend through revenue management strategies that are a result of the local 
government reforms. However, these are not sufficient to enhance overall revenue autonomy 
because discrepancies persist in the city’s fiscal capacity. Financial ring-fencing of water 
revenues, for instance, means that political accountability over this revenue is drastically 
reduced for Nairobi while the local fiscal capacity for municipal long-term debt also needs 
improvement. These issues point to the erosion of local fiscal appropriation and discretion in 
Nairobi’s OSR.  
 
The literature confirms these contrasting pictures of fiscal decentralization. The two 
experiences have presented the nuances of local fiscal autonomy in African cities that capture 
the essence of fiscal discretion and appropriation that is also shown in the cities’ local fiscal 
capacities. In the case of Nairobi, the study shows that states that are centralist are more 
inclined to draw most revenue functions towards central government. This centralism persists 
even when the regulatory framework confers special status to Nairobi as the primary city. 
This contradiction alters the manifestation of local fiscal autonomy by the city in generating 
OSR particularly trading services such as water revenue. As a result, the city has not been 
able to leverage local fiscal capacity to improve its municipal creditworthiness as well as 
manage municipal debt.  
 
In Johannesburg the study shows that countries that favour a decentralized form of 
government devolve local function and revenue function to sub-national government. The 
fiscal devolution has allowed Johannesburg to rationalise the generation of OSR particularly 
in ensuring the pricing of trading services like water revenue still subsidizes water supply to 
the urban poor. The city has also improved its capacity to manage municipal debt and is the 
most indebted city in the country. However, centralist tendencies still persist even in this 
local government which has resulted in the administrative quagmire of the revenue sharing 
services centre. The centralised revenue management has also depleted Johannesburg’s 
autonomy as a water utility. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The purpose of this study was to reflect on the experience of local fiscal autonomy in the 
African cities of Johannesburg and Nairobi within the respective legal and institutional 
frameworks that the cities operate in to independently generate a significant portion of local 
revenue through OSR. Local fiscal autonomy in the revenue assignment function is 
conceptualized as the use of fiscal discretion and appropriation of particular OSR of these 
cities. The key argument of the study was to examine the influence of the political economy 
and regulatory framework on local fiscal autonomy.  
 
The study firstly recognized that the multi-dimensional demand for municipal services on the 
cities stem from competing factors which include the access to basic services from urban 
poor that are an unfortunate result of urbanization; and the demand for sustained municipal 
services by the economic and knowledge hub in the cities driving economic growth. This 
requires African states to promulgate a regulatory framework that acknowledges and 
stipulates the unique financing needs of African cities. 
  
In this context the study firstly determined how the regulatory framework provided special 
attention to the cities’ financing needs for the diverse municipal mandate. Despite the vast 
municipal mandate that the larger African cities bear, little research attention has been paid to 
reflect upon the constraints that the cities have in their use of revenue autonomy. This study 
sought to examine the manifestation of local fiscal autonomy of two cities with similar 
contemporary urban demands but contrasting approaches to revenue assignment in the 
African context.  
 
A perspective based on the efficiency rationale for fiscal decentralization provided the 
theoretical basis to analyse local fiscal autonomy in the cities. The demand for municipal 
services requires that the efficiency rationale for fiscal decentralization justify the devolution 
of revenue autonomy to the cities (Oates, 1999). This perspective informed the use of an 
illustrative case study through the examination of the two particular African cities’ 
experience of the revenue assignment function.  
198 
 
 
The study findings suggest that the country contexts historically provided a legal mandate 
that acknowledged and catered for revenue assignment in the respective cities. Local fiscal 
autonomy was evident in this decentralized form albeit in extreme cases which partly drove 
local government restructuring efforts in Kenya and in South Africa. Although the cities have 
been able to leverage revenue significantly since local government reforms, the regulatory 
environment that the cities’ significant OSR operates in does occasionally detract from the 
manifestation of local fiscal autonomy. These findings concurred with the similar 
determination of a recurring central issue within the discourse of fiscal decentralization that is 
essentially: 
 
a trade off between the capacity of a centralised solution to provide 
coordination of local outputs, that is internalise spill-over effects and 
the ability of a decentralised system to tailor outcomes to the 
preferences of the local jurisdiction   
(Oates, 2008: 330). 
 
8.1 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
The central research question on the evidence of local fiscal autonomy of African cities was 
answered by the study with the corresponding research sub-questions which examine the 
experiences of Nairobi and Johannesburg as the case cities purposefully selected to highlight 
the experience of municipal revenue assignment in larger cities on the continent.  The study 
findings are summarised as: 
 
1. How do the respective national frameworks establish local fiscal autonomy in the African 
cities Johannesburg and Nairobi?  
 
The study found that the cities of Nairobi and Johannesburg are constituted within a national 
framework that asserts cooperation and interdependence among the different spheres of 
government. The study confirms that in both countries, the legislation framework for revenue 
autonomy historically provided for fiscal decentralization and conferred the cities with 
special treatment for the generation of OSR. Local government reforms enabled both cities to 
assert certain aspects of revenue autonomy. 
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Although literature confirms the need for an enabling framework for decentralization, the 
historical regulation in support of revenue assignment in African countries is not readily 
acknowledged (Bahl & Martinez-Vazquez, 2006; Prud’homme, 2003; Smoke, 2001). As a 
result, analysis of the local reform effort did not always acknowledge the institutional 
memory that was inherently transferred through the restructuring processes.  
 
 
2. What are the instruments that leverage significant local revenue?  
 
The revenue assignment function for Nairobi and Johannesburg is evidenced by the cities’ 
ability to generate significant municipal revenue to finance municipal services. Water 
revenue and municipal borrowing were purposefully examined because regulatory framework 
prescribes these OSR instruments’ fiscal mandate be vested at the discretion of the cities. 
Restructuring enabled the cities to create utilities, specifically, Johannesburg Water and 
Nairobi Water and Sewerage Company with corresponding impact on water revenue. 
Municipal borrowing gave the cities access to capital markets for funding for capital 
expenditure. Managing long term debt required the cities to enhance their local fiscal capacity. 
These two cities have a contrasting experience in asserting local fiscal autonomy. 
 
3. What are the emerging issues as the cities assert local fiscal autonomy? 
 
Although the revenue assignment function is prescribed in the regulatory framework in 
Kenya and in South Africa. The nature of these states ultimately has a bearing on the 
manifestation of local fiscal autonomy for the case cities. In the case of Nairobi, although the 
reform was instituted through central government, the city was able to refine its financial 
reporting processes as well as individual OSR through revenue enhancement plans. The 
autonomy that had been associated with vital OSR particularly water revenue was eroded 
through the parallel water sector reform process, while the city did not improve its local fiscal 
capacity to manage municipal debt. Therefore local fiscal discretion and appropriation was 
not manifested in the water revenue or municipal borrowing. 
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In Johannesburg’s case, municipal reform was introspectively implemented through the iGoli 
2002 and iGoli city development strategies. As a result the revenue function was centralised 
in the revenue shared services centre for all OSR.  This has enables the metropolis to 
manifest local fiscal discretion to manage municipal debt. Local fiscal appropriation has been 
useful in subsidising the pricing of water supply for the urban poor. The envisaged financial 
ring-fencing that was proposed at the inception of Johannesburg Water was not realised 
which has reduced the autonomy of the utility in dispensing fiduciary duties as a company. In 
addition the centralised management of OSR has presented the city an administrative 
quagmire. 
 
The existence of a regulatory framework guides the generation of OSR to meet the financing 
needs of the two cities. In the generation of OSR the cities used opportunities provided in 
municipal legislation which unearthed specific issues that emphasised the need for local fiscal 
autonomy for the cases. These findings contained the study’s contribution in the discourse on 
the governance of public and local finance.  
 
8.1.1 The Conceptualization of Local Fiscal Autonomy 
 
The study initially provided the theoretical basis on which revenue autonomy may be 
determined for cities. Local fiscal autonomy is conceptualized as the manifestation of fiscal 
appropriation and discretion in OSR. The researcher used Cowden’s (1968) approach to 
justify the fiscal jurisdiction that cities have over the generation and use of OSR. The cities 
should be permitted to ascertain through local capacity the sustained trend of generating OSR 
using significant revenue instruments like trading services, and also be permitted to enter into 
long-term debt.  
 
Additionally, the perceived ability to sustain the generation of local revenue particularly 
through OSR justifies council decisions to enter into municipal debt and commit current and 
future generations of consumers of municipal services not only access to services provided by 
the municipal infrastructure but also to finance the long-term debt.  
The notion of local fiscal discretion is drawn from Bahl & Linn (1992) whose study shows 
that pricing water supply is affected by various factors which include social, political and 
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equity concerns more that economic efficiency concerns. These authors argue that political 
concerns drive the pricing of trading services such that pricing redistribution should also 
reflect local discretion for the purpose of equity. The local fiscal discretion should then direct 
the financing of municipal services to urban poor which does not preclude them from 
accessing the municipal service. This conceptualization sought to provide the basis on which 
cities are ascribed revenue to perform the allocated function of government. Fiscal 
decentralization literature suggests that the magnitude of the municipal expenditure in the 
cities alienates central government from responding to these local goods. The rationale of 
economic and political efficiency remains important for African cities that are required to 
rely more on OSR than on transfers from central government to provide mandated municipal 
services.  
 
The cities provide similar functions albeit in different scales. Trading services such as water 
and sewerage services that are required by both the industrial and residential consumers; 
municipal clinics; markets that offer trading spaces for informal and small scale traders in the 
inner city and schools; and a variety of trading and advertising licences. This preclusion 
provides leeway for cities to finance the bulk of this municipal expenditure independently. 
Municipal legislation should, therefore, prescribe local fiscal autonomy for cities to 
independently manage the manner in which significant OSR is generated as well as tailor 
local tastes and preferences to the generation of OSR. The regulatory framework of the two 
case cities confirms the enabling environment for fiscal devolution as presented by Smoke 
(2001) as well as by Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2006). 
 
 In the African context, the focus on an enabling environment to boost socio-economic 
development at the regional level must be integrated with city resources that enhance 
economic activity to boost economic growth at regional and country level. This fiscal 
devolution should be highlighted more in the allocation function of government for its third 
tier and in the regional and continental agenda to boost economic growth.  
 
The ability of African cities to cognitively assert local fiscal autonomy enhances the 
sustained generation of OSR and a building of the local fiscal capacity of cities. The 
assignment of the revenue function should then show that the cities are able to independently 
and responsibly make critical decisions which are reflected in local discretion and 
appropriation in the generation of OSR to finance the bulk of municipal expenditure.  
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On the basis of this premise, the function of local revenue assignment in African cities, the 
theorization on local fiscal autonomy provides the voice to leverage significant OSR 
independently. This legal mandate in turn allows for the local OSR to be examined at the 
intersection of political accountability and management of OSR by the city administration to 
reflect how much discretion cities hold on these streams of local income. The evidence of 
these concepts in generating OSR through trading services and development capital provides 
for the existence of local fiscal autonomy in these cities. 
 
8.1.2 How Revenue Assignment Manifests Local Fiscal Autonomy 
 
The sequential scrutiny of fiscal decentralization as proposed by Smoke (2001) and Bahl & 
Martinez-Vazquez (2006) was useful in ascertaining how cities derive the revenue 
assignment function. The study however found that regulation does not always precede local 
fiscal function as determined in the two case cities. The regulatory environments in which the 
cities generate OSR provide the precursor for local fiscal autonomy. The evidence of revenue 
autonomy previously presented in the centralist country of Kenya, and the hybrid blend of 
centralism and federalism in South Africa reveal extreme examples of local fiscal autonomy.  
 
In the former case, previous revenue autonomy conferred on the city manifested local fiscal 
appropriation in Nairobi and limited political accountability. As a result, the city plunged into 
a fiscal crisis that still requires central government intervention to enhance its local fiscal 
capacity. The centralisation of reform in Nairobi’s case has subsequently eroded Nairobi’s 
local fiscal autonomy. 
 
 In the latter case, the preference afforded to the WLAs by the apartheid government meant 
that local fiscal autonomy was used to sustain select local authorities with the capacity to 
generate significant OSR and incur municipal debt at the expense of future generations. 
Through local government restructuring and an amended municipal regulatory framework, 
the revenue autonomy has been transferred to the metropolitan municipality of Johannesburg. 
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Subsequently, the introspection through local government restructuring has had profound 
effects on the city’s significant OSR. Localized introspection in Johannesburg has resulted in 
entrenching local fiscal capacity for the city’s revenue function which has enhanced the 
environment for municipal borrowing. On the contrary, the centralisation of Johannesburg’s 
revenue function has impeded the administrative environment to centrally manage OSR 
which has been brought on by local appropriation of OSR and particularly water revenue. In 
Nairobi the centralized reforms have enhanced the city’s revenue management strategies but 
eroded its discretion regarding the trading service of water as well as local fiscal capacity for 
municipal borrowing. 
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8.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY 
 
The implications for theory were discussed in the theoretical consideration of significant OSR 
in cities. By examining two critical OSR that should be devolved to increase revenue 
autonomy shows the importance of local fiscal autonomy in the fiscal function for cities. 
Water revenue as a trading service and municipal borrowing are significant OSR that require 
local introspection of local fiscal capacity to ensure that the cities maintain and sustain the 
generation of these OSR. The local fiscal capacity in turn will be shown through the local 
fiscal discretion and appropriation that cities have over the management of OSR. This 
proposition concurs with arguments made by the proponents of fiscal decentralization who 
emphasise the need to ascribe to significant OSR to local government and show revenue 
autonomy (Oates, 1999; Bird, 1999; Bird, 2000). Furthermore, to the manifestation of local 
fiscal autonomy is the use of local political governance in the management of the OSR. This 
is presented in the evidence from the case cities in the pricing and management of water 
revenue as well as municipal creditworthiness. 
 
 
The prescription of local function through a legislative framework allows cities to generate 
revenue that is essential for the financing of local services.  Municipal financing is in turn 
achieved through the generation of OSR and the city’s ability to incur municipal debt. This 
has proved useful in making a case for local fiscal autonomy in the African cities that 
continue to grow exponentially and are often seen to be in a state of flux. This study had 
findings similar to those of Martell’s (2000; 2008) empirical work on Brazilian municipal 
borrowing on the importance of developing local fiscal autonomy in local revenue 
instruments. Therefore, local fiscal autonomy could also be determined through the 
introspection of cities to improve local fiscal capacity to sustainably manage the generation 
of OSR. 
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8.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE 
 
Literature has repeatedly emphasised revenue autonomy in sub-national government. This 
fiscal devolution is particularly important for African cities that face pressing demands to 
independently generate revenue for municipal expenditure. Smoke (1994) and EISA (2010) 
both call for more devolution of revenue tools to local government generally while the 
administration of property tax and trading licences has gained prominence in Africa (Asibuo, 
1998; Devas & Kelly, 2001; Kelly et al., 2001; Muller, 2010).  
 
The simultaneous municipal generation of OSR particularly in the use of trading services and 
municipal borrowing shows that revenue autonomy is increasingly becoming an important 
aspect of fiscal decentralization (Liebig et al., 2008; Bahl & Linn, 1992; SACN, 2007; SACN, 
2011). The delegation of local political governance through regulation is also important in 
generating OSR. African cities with a pressing demand for municipal services should also be 
provided with the municipal mandate to make political decisions over the generation of 
critical OSR such as water revenue and municipal borrowing. The sustained generation of 
OSR in Johannesburg and Nairobi confirms that while the legal mandate for fiscal 
decentralization exists, local fiscal capacity remains paramount for the use of local fiscal 
autonomy.  
 
The rapid urbanization and robust economic activity that contemporary African cities face 
require that the respective country contexts provide adequate regulatory frameworks that 
guide the financing needs of the cities without compromising the revenue needs of the central 
governments. Trading services and municipal borrowing have been shown here to be local 
revenue instruments that compel the introspection of cities towards local fiscal capacity for 
the sustained generation of OSR. Therefore this study proposes that attention should be paid 
to cities’ local fiscal capacity to manage the generation of OSR. 
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8.4 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
With regard to future research, it may be interesting to interrogate the capacities and 
regulatory frameworks of other large African cities to explore the nuances that may manifest 
in local fiscal autonomy. It would also be interesting to examine the interface between 
consumers of municipal services and the urban administrations to provide a primer that may 
be used to balance the particular city’s need for OSR and manage equity concerns in the 
evolving nature of African states. In conclusion, it is hoped that this study provided a clearer 
understanding of the element of local fiscal autonomy and its importance in the function of 
revenue assignment. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET  
 
My names are Angelita Kithatu-Kiwekete. I am a postgraduate (PhD) student at the Graduate 
School of Public and Development Management, Wits University. Presently, I am conducting 
a research on revenue mobilization of African cities: Nairobi and Johannesburg.  
The interviews are scheduled for senior 230ouncilors and senior officials that helped shape 
the positive fiscus of the (name of city). 
The purpose is to solicit information to better understand the processes that went into shaping 
the city’s turnaround. The information provided will be confidential.   
You have been approached to describe your involvement as a (politician/official) during this 
transition period and I would be particularly interested in obtaining information regarding 
your insights into and experience of the turnaround of the revenue mobilization process of 
(name of city). 
The interview will run for less than an hour and your consent will be established before the 
interview commences. Please note that you are free to discontinue the interview at any time 
in the duration. Thank you for your time.  
(At the end of the interview): I will analyse the information that you and other interviewees 
give me for my dissertation. On completion, I will be happy to send you a copy if you are 
interested. Thank you once more for sharing your experience and your time. 
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CONSENT FORM 
The research process I sought for my interviews was in-depth interviews with key informants 
who constituted officials and politicians who had been involved in the transition process of 
both cities. The key informants were purposefully selected because of their insightful 
proximity to the fiscal processes of the city in question during and immediately after the 
fiscal crisis. The positions they held in municipal council was also instrumental in crafting 
the direction and agenda for fiscal revitalisation. Some of the key informants may have since 
left the cities and are either working in higher government departments or the private sector.  
Peabody et al. (1990) assert that such interviews are potential high yield ways to obtain 
insightful information that is not often recorded in written form such as archival material, 
policies and books. Furthermore, the key informants who may have moved on to other 
positions have retained their “institutional memory”, hence are often a strong data source and 
comfortable with the practice of scholarly research (Peabody et al., 1990: 453). It is for the 
above reasons that verbal consent will also be obtained prior to the interview. 
As a key informant, please understand that your participation is voluntary and you are not 
being forced to take part in this study. The choice of whether to participate or not, is yours 
alone. If you choose not to take part, you will not be affected in any way whatsoever. If you 
agree to participate, you may stop participating in the research at any time  Furthermore, any 
study records that identify you will be kept confidential to the extent possible by law.  
 
CONSENT 
I hereby agree to participate in research on the “Revenue Mobilization of African cities”. I do 
understand that I am participating freely and I also understand that I can stop participating at 
any point should I not want to continue and that this decision will not in any way affect me 
negatively. 
I understand that this is a research project whose purpose is not necessarily to benefit me 
personally in the immediate or short term. 
I understand that my participation will remain confidential. 
I retain / decline the right to remain anonymous during and after the interview.  
 
…………………………….. 
Signature of participant                               Date:………………….. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
NAIROBI OFFICIALS’ INTERVIEW SCHEDULE: 
 
My names are Angelita Kithatu-Kiwekete. I am a postgraduate (PhD) student at the Graduate 
School of Public and Development Management, Wits University. Presently, I am conducting 
a research on revenue mobilization of two African cities: Nairobi and Johannesburg.  
 
The interviews are scheduled for senior councillors and senior officials that helped shape the 
positive fiscus of the City Council of Nairobi.  
 
The purpose is to solicit information to better understand the processes that went into 
shaping Nairobi’s turnaround. The information provided will be y regarded as confidential. 
The interview will run for less than an hour and your consent will be established before the 
interview commences.  
 
The Nairobi City Council was plagued with financial woes until the recent local government 
transition processes.  
1. What brought on the fiscal crisis in Nairobi?  
2. What interventions were employed to reverse the city’s fiscal crisis?  
3. What specific interventions to revenue mobilization were adopted by the city?  
4. To what extent did your unit advance the revenue mobilization effort of the city?  
5. What has worked well? Please elaborate.  
6. What revenue mobilization strategies should be discontinued? Why?  
7. What revenue mobilization strategies should be scaled up? Please provide justification.  
8. What were some barriers that you encountered? Staff turnover? Lack key support?  
9. How did you overcome the barriers?  
10. What effect, if any, did you feel the revenue strategies have had on the city?  
11. What recommendations for revenue mobilization can you give for cities with similar 
context in region/continent?  
12. Is there anything more that you would like to add?  
 
I will be analysing the information that you and other interviewees provide for my thesis. On 
completion, I will be happy to send you a copy if you are interested. Thank you for your time. 
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APPENDIX THREE 
NAIROBI COUNCILLORS’ INTERVIEW SCHEDULE: 
 
My names are Angelita Kithatu-Kiwekete. I am a postgraduate (PhD) student at the Graduate 
School of Public and Development Management, Wits University. Presently, I am conducting 
a research on revenue mobilization of two African cities: Nairobi and Johannesburg.  
 
The interviews are scheduled for senior councillors and senior officials that helped shape the 
positive fiscus of the City Council of Nairobi.  
 
The purpose is to solicit information to better understand the processes that went into 
shaping Nairobi’s turnaround. The information provided will be regarded as confidential. 
The interview will run for less than an hour and your consent will be established before the 
interview commences.  
The Nairobi City Council was plagued with financial woes until the recent local government 
transition processes.  
1. What brought on the fiscal crisis in Nairobi City Council?  
2. What political interventions to revenue mobilization were adopted by the council?  
3. What has worked well? Please elaborate.  
4. What revenue mobilization strategies were scaled up? Please provide justification  
5. Which revenue mobilization strategies were discontinued? Why?  
6. What were some barriers that the council encountered?  
7. How did the council overcome the barriers?  
8. What effect, if any, did you feel the revenue strategies had on the city?  
9. What recommendations for revenue mobilization can you give for cities with similar 
context in region/continent?  
10. Is there anything more that you would like to add?  
 
I will be analysing the information that you and other interviewees provide for my thesis. On 
completion, I will be happy to send you a copy if you are interested. Thank you for your time. 
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APPENDIX FOUR 
JOHANNESBURG’S OFFICIAL INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
My names are Angelita Kithatu-Kiwekete. I am a postgraduate (PhD) student at the 
Graduate School of Public and Development Management, Wits University. Presently, 
I am conducting a research on revenue mobilization of two African cities: Nairobi and 
Johannesburg.  
The interviews are scheduled for senior 234nalyzing234 and senior officials that 
helped shape the positive fiscus of the City of Johannesburg. 
The purpose is to solicit information to better understand the processes that went into 
shaping Johannesburg’s turnaround. The information provided will be regarded as 
confidential.   
The interview will run for less than an hour and your consent will be established 
before the interview commences 
The City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality was created during South 
Africa’s democracy era following a lengthy local government transition process in 
2000. However, at that time the city was experiencing a severe financial crisis. 
1. What brought on the fiscal crisis in Johannesburg in the late 1990s? 
2. What interventions were employed to reverse the city’s fiscal crisis? 
3. What specific interventions to revenue mobilization were adopted by the city? 
4. To what extent did your unit advance the revenue mobilization effort of the 
city? 
5. What has worked well? Please elaborate. 
6. What revenue mobilization strategies should be discontinued? Why? 
7. What revenue mobilization strategies should be scaled up? Please provide 
justification. 
8. What were some barriers that you encountered? Staff turnover? Lack of key 
support? 
9. How did you overcome the barriers? 
10. What effect if any did you feel the revenue strategies had on the city? 
11. What recommendations for revenue mobilization can you give for cities with 
similar context in region/continent? 
12. Is there anything more that you would like to add? 
 
I will be analyzing the information that you and other interviewees provide for my 
thesis. On completion, I will be happy to send you a copy if you are interested. Thank 
you for your time. 
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APPENDIX FIVE 
JOHANNESBURG COUNCILLORS’ INTERVIEW SCHEDULE: 
 
My names are Angelita Kithatu-Kiwekete. I am a postgraduate (PhD) student at the Graduate 
School of Public and Development Management, Wits University. Presently, I am conducting 
a research on revenue mobilization of two African cities: Nairobi and Johannesburg.  
 
The interviews are scheduled for senior councillors and senior officials that helped shape the 
positive fiscus of the City of Johannesburg. The purpose is to solicit information to better 
understand the processes that went into shaping Nairobi’s turnaround. The information 
provided will be regarded as confidential.  
 
The interview will run for less than an hour and your consent will be established before the 
interview commences.  
 
The city of Johannesburg was plagued with financial woes until the recent local government 
transition processes.  
1. What brought on the fiscal crisis in Johannesburg?  
2. What political interventions to revenue mobilization were adopted by the council?  
3. What has worked well? Please elaborate.  
4. What revenue mobilization strategies were scaled up? Please provide justification  
5. Which should revenue mobilization strategies were discontinued? Why?  
6. What were some barriers that the council encountered?  
7. How did the council overcome the barriers?  
8. What effect, if any, did you feel the revenue strategies had on the city?  
9. What recommendations for revenue mobilization can you give for cities with similar 
context in region/ continent?  
10. Is there anything more that you would like to add?  
 
I will be analysing the information that you and other interviewees provide for my thesis. On 
completion, I will be happy to send you a copy if you are interested. Thank you for your time. 
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